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Abstract 
 
The last two decades since the early 1990s were characterised by important 
factors that influenced the banking institutions in the EU – introduction of the euro, 
globalisation, deregulation and technological advance. The speed and depth of these 
changes were unprecedented. For many European banks, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A‘s) became a universal response to these trends. Consequently, the number of 
operating banks has been continuously decreasing since the early 1990s due to 
integration processes. 
However, the influence of the above-mentioned factors was studied 
insufficiently in the existing literature, and the obtained results were mixed and 
inconclusive. The thesis attempts to add to the knowledge on M&A‘s and to 
determine the impact of external shocks in relation to the banking acquisitions in the 
European Union.  
The thesis re-evaluates and investigates the role of the introduction of the euro 
in the post-merger outcomes in the European banking sector. Following the 
methodology by Ekkayokkaya et al., (2009), the analysis is replicating the paper 
based on the sample of 1479 banking mergers in 1990-2004 and is further extending 
the research to the period of 1990-2015 to capture the abnormal returns for the banks 
involved into M&A processes and to establish the influence of the global financial 
crisis on the shareholders‘ wealth. As a useful improvement, the scope of the modern 
EU configuration was incorporated into second part of the analysis to reflect the 
economic, financial, social similarities between the EU states, as well as the 
integration efforts that were applied since the early 1990s. It was confirmed that the 
positive effect from the elimination of currency-related borders did not outweigh the 
negative effect of the intensified competition for the limited banking assets in the 
EU. Overall, introduction of the euro was one of the factors that played a negative 
role for the short-run outcomes of the merging institutions. Further, process of the 
short-run value creation in banking mergers among the European banks was studied 
for the period of 1990-2004 (replication of Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013) 
and then extended to 1990-2015 in attempt to capture the role of the global financial 
crisis. By utilising market-based approach (event study methodology), it was found 
that the global financial crisis was among the factors that caused a distinctive 
negative effect on the changes in the shareholders‘ wealth of both acquirers and 
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targets. On average, bidders experienced losses of -1.15% during the active phase of 
the crisis (2007-2009). Both focused and diversifying M&A‘s were value-destroying; 
however, the only type of targets, that was able to bring positive gains to the bidders, 
was investment companies. It was also found that market was able to react positively 
on the deals announced during the crisis, thus showing optimistic attitude to the 
efforts to diversify into the other industries. Overall, banks were unable to benefit 
from low asset prices due to their own poor financial performance and economic 
uncertainty. 
The second perspective analysed in the thesis was the attempt to utilise the 
combined approach by deploying market-based methodology (event study) and the 
methodology based on the accounting data, following Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou (2013). The objective was to replicate the above-mentioned study and 
determine the connection between short-run market reaction on the M&A‘s and the 
accounting variables presented by financial ratios. Further, the research was extended 
to cover modern EU-28 configuration and time period between 1990 and 2015. As a 
result, 197 bank-to-bank acquisitions were analysed using market return model and 
subsequently by applying OLS- and GARCH-based regression analysis. The findings 
indicate that mergers do not create value for the bidders‘ shareholders, whereas 
targets‘ shareholders benefit from +2.5% growth in their wealth. It was also found, 
that accounting data provides weak explanation of the abnormal returns around the 
deal announcement. Only bank size was considered to be negatively related to the 
cumulative abnormal returns, implying that integration costs are likely to be the key 
barrier towards the post-acquisition synergies. The findings also indicate the most 
value-generating mergers in the sample are deals between smaller banks with higher 
profitability and lower credit risks. 
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1. Introduction and research background 
The banking sector is a significant industry in the modern global financial 
network. It fulfils the functions of an important intermediary between economic 
agents and runs the underlying mechanisms that facilitate the economic growth. 
Furthermore, the banking sector is the channel that enables effective financial 
resources allocation among the respective companies and individuals.  
The last two decades were characterised by several important factors that 
influenced the banking institutions in the EU – introduction of the euro, 
globalisation, deregulation and technological advance. The speed and depth of these 
changes in the banking industry were unprecedented. The main components of the 
regulatory change in Europe have been the Second Banking Directive (1989) and the 
Capital Adequacy Directive (1993), both of which came into effect in 1993. These 
documents removed a number of geographical and product restrictions on banks, 
simultaneously aiming to move to the common regulatory standards. Rapid 
developments in technology have changed the way the banks deliver and structure 
their new products. Additionally, the potentials of the scale and scope economies 
established themselves as core objectives. Globalisation and the introduction of the 
euro have attempted to decrease the number of barriers between countries (Vander 
Vennet, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). 
For many European banks, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) became a 
universal strategic response to these trends. Consequently, the number of operating 
banks has been continuously decreasing since the early 1990s: from approximately 
11,100 in 1999 to 6,477 in 2015 (ECB Press Release, 2014). The key reasons for the 
banks to pursue into mergers were scale and scope economies, cost reduction and 
increased market power (Llewellyn, 1999). The importance of the consolidation 
processes for the European economic system is evident from the proportion of 
banking M&A‘s in the total number of mergers – almost 30% of the deals‘ quantity 
and 40% in deals‘ value between 1990 and 2008 (Pozzolo and Focarelli, 2007).  
Between 2002 and 2006 the European M&A activities peaked in both value 
and quantity, synchronically with the global sixth merger wave (Alexandridis, 2012).  
However, these rapid developments ended abruptly in mid-2007, when the global 
financial crisis broke out (Alexandridis, 2012; Beltratti and Paladino, 2013). It 
originated from the burst of the US residential real estate bubble and revealed serious 
weaknesses of the banking industry and the financial sector in general, causing 
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bankruptcies and collapses of several major financial institutions in the EU and the 
US, and provoking the strongest world economic crisis since the Great Depression.  
The global financial crisis has also brought a devastating effect and was an 
influential factor that had a strong influence on the European banking sector. Some 
of the banks turned to the M&A market as a possible solution in the conditions of 
intensifying competition and more strict capital requirements (mergers of BNP 
Paribas – Fortis, Credit Agricole – Societe Generale, Lloyds TSB – 
HBOS)(Weitbrecht, 2010; Ng et al., 2010). This situation of high uncertainty and 
depressed capital markets was distinctly different from the booming periods of fifth 
(1991-2000) and sixth (2002-2007) merger waves with easy access to liquidity and 
high leverage levels for financial institutions (Alexandridis, 2012).  
In the light of the preceding discussion, the lack of the new research on the 
M&A activities during and after the financial crisis is puzzling. The respective 
literature covering the theoretical and empirical aspects of M&A‘s (and banking 
M&A‘s in particular) has been very scarce since the end of the active phase of the 
global financial crisis (2009), mainly investigating particular narrow aspects of 
mergers, frequently covering only in the regional scope. The negative consequences 
of the crisis, however, did not dissuade banks from consolidation activities, although 
their number and scope have decreased significantly (Saqib et al., 2013). The 
European regulators responded to the post-crisis recession with the set of regulatory 
changes that were designed to eliminate the initial causes of the new crisis to emerge 
and to increase stability of the industry as a whole (CRD4 package – Capital 
Requirements Directive, 2013; MiFiD2 package - Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive, 2014; the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, 2014)(KPMG, 2014). 
The landscape, where the European banks are continuing their consolidation has 
obviously changed and continues to alter.  
In the context of the above-mentioned factors, the thesis aims to re-evaluate the 
performance outcomes of banking M&A‘s in the European Union for bidding and 
targets banks. The key structural changes that are considered as the most important 
impact factors are introduction of the euro (following Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009; 
Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013) and the global financial crisis (following 
Ng et al., 2010; Beltratti and Paladino, 2013; Saqib et al., 2013). Their impact in the 
economy-wide context was studied in the academic literature (Hodson and Quaglia, 
2009; Jackson, 2010; Weitbrecht, 2010). However, the phenomenon of M&A‘s 
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during the latest financial crisis, in particular, remains almost unexplored, especially 
considering the EU banking mergers in particular. 
Generalising, this thesis attempts to improve the understanding of the impact 
caused by external shocks, that have either regulatory (introduction of the common 
currency) or market-related nature (financial/liquidity crisis), on the European 
banking M&A‘s. The research is primarily motivated by the lack of sufficient 
empirical evidence to highlight the outcomes of the mergers in different time periods 
throughout the consolidation in the European financial sector. The objective is to re-
test the hypothesis of whether M&A‘s add to the value of participating banks. 
The thesis replicates the studies of Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) and 
Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) in order to re-evaluate the changes in the 
shareholders‘ wealth for the bidders and targets for the period of 1990-2004. Further, 
by expanding the sample and using the data from the banking acquisitions in the last 
two and a half decades (1990-2015) for the modern EU-28 configuration, the thesis 
also aims to add to the literature that attempts to establish the direct link between 
deal-related (domestic/cross-border, focused/diversified, cash/stock financing etc.) 
and bank-related parameters (origination from EU/non-EU states; size, profitability, 
exposure to credit risk and other accounting ratios) and the outcomes of the mergers 
(measured as abnormal returns around the announcement date). The estimation of 
short-term performance effects would also enable to establish the degree of the 
market reaction to the above-mentioned factors in different time periods (with 
respect to adoption of the euro and the financial crisis). For the above-mentioned 
objectives, the equity prices data (both for stocks and market indices as benchmarks) 
and accounting data for the merging banks are collected from Thomson SDC and 
Datastream. 
The thesis also sets an objective to extend the existing literature on the issues 
of M&A outcomes in the European Union in its modern configuration (e.g. 28 
members). Given the long-lasting consolidation and gradual transformation of the 
financial sector in Western and Central Europe (EU-15), it is crucial to incorporate 
the banking acquisitions in the countries that joined the EU since 2004. Furthermore, 
the period after the crisis lacks attention in the literature (2010-2015), thus 
motivating to establish, whether the market for the banking M&A‘s has recovered 
after the financial crisis (in terms of deal value and number of the deals).  
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This thesis is relevant for researchers in the fields of banking and M&A as 
different aspects of the post-acquisition wealth creation in the EU banking sector and 
internal/external determinants are addressed in the study. Practitioners are given the 
opportunity to identify the deal characteristics that lead to value maximisation by 
acquirers and targets.  
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an extensive overview 
of the existing literature, highlights the key theories of M&A‘s and relationships 
between them and describes the key determinants of acquisitions. Chapter 2 also 
reviews the empirical studies which estimate the outcomes of M&A, using both 
market-based and accounting data-based approaches. Further, Chapter 3 covers the 
key methodologies used to assess the effects of mergers and outlines their strengths, 
weaknesses and appropriateness for the research objectives. Chapter 4 replicates the 
paper by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), re-evaluating the influence of the introduction 
of the euro on the short-run post-merger abnormal returns. Chapter 4 also provides 
an extended assessment of the European banking M&A‘s for the period of 1990-
2015, capturing the role of the financial crisis for the outcome of the merging 
banking institutions. Chapter 5 replicates the study by Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou (2013), re-testing their initial hypotheses concerning the value creation 
for target banks and zero value changes for the banking bidders in 1990-2004 in the 
European Union. Furthermore, Chapter 5 extends the initial paper by covering all 
modern 28 members of the European Union for the period of 1990-2004 and 
applying both event study and accounting data approaches to establish the most 
important determinants of the post-merger value creation. Finally, Chapter 6 
provides the conclusion, limitations of the analysis and suggestions for future 
research.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, an extensive review of the academic literature on the M&A‘s is 
provided. The substantial number of papers concentrates on the motives and 
determinants of M&A‘s, which are extremely important to the understanding of 
mergers. Furthermore, it is also crucial to distinguish between the motives and 
determinants. M&A motives can be explained as a complex rationale that influences 
the decision of managers/shareholders to involve into M&A activities and to reach 
the strategic goals for the business as a whole (synergy gains, economies of 
scale/scope, geographic/industry diversification, etc.). On the other hand, merger 
determinants can be defined as a manifold of deal-specific, firm-specific, industry-
specific or country-specific factors that influence the outcome of the deal and can be 
estimated quantitatively, in contrast to the motives that can only be defined 
retrospectively and very rarely prior to the takeover announcement. The investigation 
of M&A determinants is an important part of the research studies focusing on the 
outcomes of mergers. The wide variety and scope of determinants allow the scholars 
to establish the role and effect of each factor for post-merger effects (Pasiouras et al., 
2005).  
The literature review chapter below first covers the motives of M&A‘s, then 
outlines the key determinants that influence the outcomes of the merger deals. 
Further, the review of the post-acquisition studies delineates the results of takeovers 
from two different perspectives: market-based and accounting-based. 
2.2. Motives for M&As  
Generally, three core groups of M&A motives were outlined in the literature 
and can be classified in the following way: synergy motives (aiming to reach synergy 
gains), agency motives (aiming to maximise the gains of managers at the expense of 
the shareholders) and hubris/behavioural motives (aiming to satisfy the psychological 
aspirations of managers‘ power or occurring due to valuation errors or hubris 
effects)(Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Zhang, 1998). 
The discussion below provides a clearer picture of the merger motives 
classification and interconnections between them for the reader and allows a better 
understanding of the possible benefits for the firms participating in the M&A‘s.  
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2.2.1. Synergy-related motives. 
The synergy is widely defined as the difference between the market value of 
the combined entity and the sum of market values of firms that are involved in the 
merger activities. In other words, the company that was established after the merger 
of two institutions is usually expected to have greater value than the sum of the initial 
values of participating companies. It can be described by the following formula 
(Pasiouras et al., 2005): 
 
            – (      )  – (   )       (1) 
where, 
     - synergy value 
    - combined post-merger value of the combined entity 
  - the value of the firm A (acquirer) 
   - the value of the firm B (target) 
P - premium paid for the target company 
E - expenses on the merger process 
Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) developed the hypothesis that the perception of 
future is crucial to assess the synergy gains of a particular takeover quantitatively. 
The researchers deployed games theory framework to simulate the effects of the 
M&A activities and managed to prove the theoretical existence of the equilibrium 
synergy level in the market under normal conditions. The key drawback of this paper 
can be its one-dimensionality, as authors did not consider the behaviour of any other 
type of market players that can be involved in the takeovers and assumed that 
positive future synergy is the only possible motive for the market players, which can 
be seen as disproven further below.  
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) have also found evidence in favour of their 
previous findings on the importance of synergy gains as an M&A motive.  
Three key motives of merger activities were studied and the number of M&A by 
each motive was assessed. Their initial hypothesis was that total post-acquisition 
gains are positive only if synergy is the initial motive. Further, Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) have calculated the respective cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) and subsequently estimated the aggregate values of the involved companies. 
It was found that synergy could be named as primary motive to merge, accounting 
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for almost 75% of the studied M&A‘s. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned paper 
failed to estimate the scenario when particular acquisitions can be motivated by the 
several factors simultaneously. Furthermore, the authors did not account for the 
gains‘ predictability and accuracy. For instance, consider the following case: the 
synergy-motivated merger fails to generate positive gains, but results in negative 
synergy instead; the authors‘ approach exclude this merger type from the category of 
synergistically motivated M&A‘s, which is obviously the model shortcoming and an 
example of ―survivor bias‖, when only positive synergy-motivated deals remain in 
the final analysis. This drawback is a source of the potential misclassification of the 
takeover motives and distorted conclusions. 
Later, Lawrence (2001) defined two sources of synergy effects in M&A‘s: 
operating economies and financial economies. Operating synergies are primarily 
drawn from combining resources of financial companies in a more productive way. 
Financial synergy can be achieved in the following manner. Firstly, it can form tax 
advantages due to opportunities to acquire debt financing for the company of a larger 
size. Secondly, some researchers claimed that merging banks can achieve lower costs 
of internal funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Palepu, 1986). Thirdly, the coinsurance 
effect can possibly arise – the scenario when corporate debt is spread across larger 
firm size leads to the lower likelihood of bankruptcy for combined entity comparing 
with two separate companies (Higgins and Schall, 1975; Kim and McConnell, 1977). 
Furthermore, some scholars view synergy effects more broadly and consider 
replacement of inefficient management as synergy effect as well. As Gammelgaard 
(1999) mentions in his classic synergy approach in support of the previous statement, 
the objective of the merger is to transfer higher managerial abilities and a higher 
level of knowledge. It is important to mention that relevant M&A literature often 
considers ―synergy gains‖ not only in its narrow sense (the increase in market value 
for the combined firm comparing tow the sum of values of two separate firms), but 
often understands ―synergy gains‖ as any business-related benefits (and not only 
financial benefits) for the combined firm comparing with the pre-merger state of two 
separate companies. 
These and further aspects of synergistic benefits associated with M&A‘s are 
reviewed below with particular attention to the banking industry which is a particular 
area of interest of the thesis: 
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a) Economies of scale 
This aspect of synergy gains assumes that possible positive effects can arise 
from producing lower average costs by distributing fixed costs in the production of 
larger output. This is typical for horizontal mergers among financial institutions. 
Particularly, Berger (1998) points out that mergers among small banks are widely 
characterised by scale economies effects: closing redundant branches, consolidating 
back offices and optimising payment systems. The researchers emphasise the fact 
that gaining improvements in efficiency through mergers is one of the key objectives 
for modern M&A processes in the banking sector (Humphrey and Vale, 2004). 
 
b) Economies of scope 
Implementation of the scope economies is widely considered as the second 
most widespread reason for M&A‘s in the banking sector (Amel et al., 2004). 
Researchers distinguish cost-based and revenue-based scope economies (ibid), which 
share the common mechanism: to offer wider services‘ range by exploiting existing 
facilities at current fixed costs (Wang, 2003). In the banking sector, in particular, 
revenue-based scope economies are related to the ability of banks to transform fixed 
inputs into a larger number of provided products and services (Pasiouras et al., 
2005). The classic example is the role of advanced research, which is frequently 
unaffordable for the small banks.  
 
c) Increased market power 
This motive is also well-highlighted in the early literature on the M&A‘s. 
Some authors mention, that particular types of acquisitions (especially horizontal) are 
widely influenced by the firms‘ intention to increase the market power (Stigler, 
1964). As noted by Blair and Harrison (1993), companies can raise prices without an 
appropriate level of competition and try to benefit from oligopolistic market 
structure. Thus, it can be considered that acquisitions allow shareholders‘ to receive 
wealth gains at the expense of customers (due to higher prices). On the other hand, 
Manne (1965), and later Vickers (2004) claimed that the government could play an 
important role in the M&A market (and banking M&A market in particular) by 
blocking some of the deals according to the anti-trust laws. Nevertheless, not all 
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countries can benefit from effective government competition control, thus motivating 
banks to engage into the takeovers that guarantee the growth of market power.  
Gaughan (1996) provides three sources of market power: product 
differentiation, barriers to entry and market share. As long as European national 
banking industries markets can be defined as national oligopolies, there is a high 
potential for the post-merger market gains among operating banks (Vander Vennet, 
1996). 
 
d) Risk diversification 
This source of synergy is mainly based on the assumption that the merger of 
two banking institutions can reduce aggregate institutional risk and decrease the 
failure probability. The two most widespread risk diversification types are 
geographic diversification, which enables firms to operate in more countries than in 
pre-merger period, and product diversification, which enables the company to 
provide a wider range of services (Goetz, 2012).  
Particularly in the case of the banking industry, geographic diversification is 
supposed to reduce the risk as returns on loans that were issued in different 
geographic locations might have low or zero correlation, whereas the product 
diversification might reduce risk because the correlation between various financial 
instruments have low or zero correlation as well (Froot and Stein, 1998; Pasiouras et 
al., 2005). The merger-related growth in size can potentially result in the ability to 
provide a wider range of services in a larger number of countries thereby reducing 
overall risk for the institution (Rose and Hudgins, 2013). However, other studies 
provide evidence to the opposite trend that describes a stake of mergers among 
European banks as ―subsidiarisation‖ (Lloyds TSB group split off into Lloyds and 
TSB; divestitures by Royal Bank of Scotland; selling off UK direct banking business 
by ING; sale of Greek subsidiary Emporiki Bank and securities department by Credit 
Agricole in 2012)(PwC Report, 2013). The conditions of economic uncertainty can 
motivate the banks to reduce risk by selling off peripheral activities and 
concentrating on core businesses (ibid). 
 
e) M&A’s as an alternative to bankruptcy 
Several researchers argue that mergers can also be motivated by the possible 
future bankruptcy among the target companies (Dewey, 1964; and Manne, 1965).  
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For instance, Dewey (1964) accentuates that applying for bankruptcy can be a costly 
alternative for some categories of the target firms (for their creditors, shareholders, 
employees, etc.) Further, the author points out that these companies are often 
uncompetitive and unable to survive on the market in the long-term perspective. 
Dewey (1964) suggests that M&A‘s can be a much more effective alternative to 
bankruptcy, minimising losses of the targets‘ shareholders.  
 
f) Replacement of Inefficient Management 
As a development of ideas expressed in Dewey (1964), Manne (1965) offers 
the ―inefficient management hypothesis‖, which asserts that M&A‘s create 
opportunities for the companies to compete for the limited market resources. The 
author also points out that often mergers occur in the situation when more efficient 
managers win the competition ―battle‖ over the limited resources and gain the right 
to control them at the expense of less effective managers. Developing his initial 
thoughts, Manne (1965) states that if some mergers take place to save failing firms, 
gaining control rights over the inefficient firms can be an even better option. In other 
words, these types of mergers prevent the inefficient firms from the situation when 
they were forced to apply for bankruptcy or find the acquirer under tight deadlines. 
In the empirical context, inefficient management hypothesis is tested under an 
assumption that corporate stock prices reflect the quality of the management (Manne, 
1965).  
Developing the ideas mentioned above, Boisi and Essig (1994) has outlined 
that mergers provide an important advantage for the involved firms – an appointment 
of the more efficient management results in higher efficiency in the future. This 
theoretical approach to the mergers is followed by Franks and Harris (1993), who 
assumed that only two groups of takeovers exist: ―allocational‖ and ―acquisitional‖. 
―Allocational‖ mergers provide the re-allocation of the resources in a more efficient 
configuration, whereas ―acquisitional‖ mergers occur between companies with no 
efficiency differences. Jensen (1988) has supported the ideas of Franks and Harris 
(1993) by claiming that M&A‘s are the universal mechanism to motivate managers 
to work more effectively and to increase their chances of survival in the company.  
Other authors indicate that target shareholders will be the agents that are 
interested the most in the profit maximisation, resulting in a search for a merger 
opportunity to sell their shares at a profitable price (Berger et al., 2000). A counter-
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argument is that some shareholders expecting better future performance (and 
therefore greater value for themselves), will seek to extract a high price from the 
bidder in order to compensate for the future gains they can potentially forego, 
making acquisition unattractive to the bidder (this problem was first characterised as 
special case of the ―free-rider problem‖ in paper by Grossman and Hart (1980), who 
applied the ―free-rider problem‖ concept to the field of M&A research).  
 
g) Growth opportunities and technology 
The scholars that studied the role of technology development as a motive for 
M&A‘s and a sub-type of synergy gains are normally relying on the Q-theory of 
investment (see Hayashi, 1982). Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that positive 
synergy gains emerge when the resources are transferred from firms with less 
advanced technologies to the companies with more advanced technologies. The basic 
underlying assumption of the model is a condition that the ―state of technology‖ 
includes all the production processes and methods. Relying on the ―state of 
technology‖ concept, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) suggest that a special cut-off 
level Q exists, that forces all the firms below that level to be either liquidated or 
taken over by firms above the Q level, who are the acquirers in the M&A market. As 
a result, high-Q firms gain a possibility to apply their superior technologies to the 
assets of low-Q firms, reaching the equilibrium. Simultaneously, the value for the 
shareholders is created. 
 
 
h) Tax advantages 
Copeland and Weston (1988) emphasise the importance of tax aspects in the 
corporate activities and M&A‘s. The synergy theory can be combined with the idea, 
that substantial positive synergy gains can be created by acquiring firm if a merger 
results in possible tax optimisation. The authors outline two key aspects of potential 
tax gains. Firstly, previously accumulated losses of the acquirer (i.e. the losses 
connected to the acquisition) can be used towards the reduction of future tax 
liabilities. Secondly, the post-merger increase in firm size allows the company to be 
placed into higher tax band with further wider possibilities to increase the value that 
would be written-off as depreciation (Copeland and Weston, 1988).  
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i) Financial aspects (debt capacity, co-insurance effect) 
Several researchers expressed an opinion that improvement of the financial 
position can be compelling merger motive per se. Developing the Q-theory outlined 
in the previous paragraphs, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Fluck and Lynch (1999) 
produced another interesting explanation on the M&A motives. Their theoretical 
models assume that the firms are able to transfer ―internal financing capabilities‖ 
(and not technology, in contrast to Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) of a more 
advantageous firm (i.e. ―financially unconstrained‖ company) to finance the 
expansion and strategic growth of a less advantageous firm (i.e. ―financially 
constrained‖ firm). The authors claim that their model describes the situation when 
particular firms fail to raise capital or possess insufficient resources/funds. M&A‘s 
are considered as a tool for such firms to find the merger partner with sufficient 
funds and internal capacities. Particularly, Myers and Majluf (1984) speculate that 
their model is applicable in terms of high uncertainty in the financial markets, as 
firms are facing higher costs of raising capital, thus becoming more motivated to be 
involved in alternative growth strategies (M&A activities). Recent literature has gone 
even further and considered the process of seeking unused debt capacity as an 
independent merger motive (van Binsbergen et al., 2010). Thus, relying on the 
above-mentioned theory, well-managed companies with low debt level and wide debt 
capacities are first candidates to be taken over under the conditions of high 
uncertainty or a situation when a large number of firms is cut off from the 
mechanisms of capital-raising (ibid). 
Second, Lewellen (1971) accentuates the ―increased debt capacity hypothesis‖ 
as an autonomous motive for acquisitions. This hypothesis concentrates mainly on 
„financial synergies‟ that occur in the case of conglomerate acquisitions (see also 
DePamphilis, 2003). Lewellen (1971) considers conglomerate mergers as a 
mechanism to create additional synergy and value due to the increase in debt 
capacities and the ―co-insurance effect‖. Further, the author hypothesises that a 
merger between two firms with imperfectly correlated or mismatched cash-flows 
reduce the volatility of the cash flows for the combined entity, which can be 
considered as positive, stabilising effect. In turn, less volatile cash flows motivate 
lenders to widen the lending possibilities, increasing the debt capacity of the 
borrower. As a result, Lewellen (1971) argues that the bankruptcy risks remain 
unchanged, while the objective of better opportunities of capital-raising is secured. In 
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other words, Lllewellen‘s theory (1971) considers conglomerate takeovers as the 
most effective method to gain access to the capital markets without increasing 
default risks.  
 
j) Information asymmetry and market misvaluation 
Another interesting stream of literature concentrates on the market 
misvaluations and information asymmetry as a powerful motive for the companies to 
involve into M&A activities.  In one of the first studies on this subject, Scherer 
(1988) tried to analyse the informational discrepancies between the stock market and 
target firms. The investigation was based on the assumption that stock prices follow 
―random walk‖ pattern. Consequently, the undervaluation of a particular company 
can occur only randomly and cannot be treated as a systemic feature. To the same 
extent, bidder companies can sometimes engage themselves in the M&A processes 
simply due to the random market shocks.  
Generally, the theories on informational discrepancies refer to the different 
perception of the target value by targets‘ and bidders‘ managers. Thus, this situation 
can be interpreted through game theory, as was shown in several papers, which tried 
to model takeovers from this perspective. For instance, Giammarino and Heinkel 
(1986) postulated that an acquisition can be considered as a type of game between an 
informed target (presented by shareholders with full knowledge on their firm value) 
and an uninformed bidder (presented by shareholders with limited knowledge on the 
value of the target). The tender offer or any other kind of takeover approach is 
simulated as a bidding game under conditions of rational expectations and 
asymmetric information. Normally, target shareholders are expected to accept the bid 
with the highest premium in the first rounds of the bidding game, as the premium is 
the only decisive criterion for the target managers to assess the received bid. 
However, the main drawback is that game theory framework uses too many initial 
assumptions to consider the findings realistic and to extrapolate the results to the 
real-world capital markets and corporate environment. Another concern is that 
authors did not consider the motives of the bidders and the targets separately while 
modelling their rational behaviour.  
The latest literature on market misvaluation is in line with the ideas expressed 
above (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanatham, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf, et al., 2005). As 
managers usually possess superior information on their own firms, irrational market 
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valuation leaves a potentially wide room for the M&A‘s. Similarly, when corporate 
managers consider that market overvalues the equity of the company, they are often 
forced to finance the subsequent acquisitions with the overvalued stock (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003, van Bekkum et al., 2011). Furthermore, Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanatham (2004) elaborated two core implications for the ―misevaluation 
framework‖. Firstly, acquisitions are expected to be a prevalent type of strategic 
growth during the periods of market misvaluation. Secondly, the stock is a preferred 
payment method in the misvaluation-driven M&A‘s (instead of cash that does not 
depend on the market estimations). 
However, only a few papers study anomalies of market timing with regard to 
the European Union (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Huang and Ritter, 2005).  
2.2.2. Agency theory 
Apart from a large group of synergy motives, the literature on the merger 
motives distinguishes second large block of knowledge that can be delineated as 
―agency theory motives‖ or ―agency-related motives‖. Agency motives as key non-
value-maximising motives were first studied by Manne (1965) and further developed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who formulated the classic agency theory, which 
describes the situations that emerge if management is insufficiently motivated in 
maximising company value. The ambiguity mainly arises when managers pursue 
their own objectives (an increase of bonuses, personal risk diversification, etc.). 
Particularly, the concept of ―empire-building‖ is capturing these personal objectives 
that influence the strategic decisions of managers in the context of M&A‘s. The 
prevalent assumption in the related literature is that managers are primarily interested 
in pursuing personal benefits even if the value of the firm would decrease as a result 
(see Becht et al., 2003; Tirole, 2005). In contrast to the literature covering synergy 
aspects of the M&A‘s, agency theory suggests that the key driver of acquisitions is 
the personal interest of the corporate managers. The goals of management can often 
diverge or even contradict their direct duties on increasing shareholders‘ wealth  (e.g. 
Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Masulis et al., 2007). 
The connection of agency theory to the field of M&A‘s theory was first 
described in detail by Pastena and Ruland (1986). The authors claimed that mergers 
are arranged and finalised by managers who aim to maximise their own benefits 
instead of their shareholders‘ wealth. In their theory, mergers can be considered as a 
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mechanism to satisfy the personal interests of managers who try to increase 
generated profits in the post-merger period. Additionally, the management also aims 
to increase the size of the company due to non-economic psychological factors (the 
above-mentioned ―empire-building‖ and pursuit of power).  
Developing the above-mentioned ideas, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) 
expressed an opinion that managers can engage into the M&A‘s to attract media 
attention. This idea is based on the presupposition that more intense media coverage 
can contribute towards further growth in value of the company and reputation of 
management.  
As was shown in the previous paragraphs, there is a strong probability that 
managers decide to undertake a direct way to increase the company size quickly, on 
the basis of their own motives and survival chances and not relying on the 
shareholders‘ interests. An alternative hypothesis states that managers are likely to 
undertake ―hit first‖ strategy in order to be involved as a bidder and to survive rather 
than to act as a target and to be fired (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Nevertheless, 
there is no uniform and harmonised approach in the literature considering the aspects 
of the managers‘ decision-making processes that are not related to the value 
maximisation.  
An interesting contribution to the agency theory that should be mentioned in 
the context of M&A‘s is the ―free cash-flow theory‖ developed by Jensen, (1986; 
1988), who claimed that the key reason behind the M&A activity is the presence of 
the agency costs associated with conflicts between managers and shareholders over 
the ―control over the free cash flow‖. Following Jensen (1986; 1988), the free cash 
flow is the cash flow in excess of the funds required to finance all projects available 
for the firm. Therefore, the free cash flow must be distributed to shareholders in 
order to maximise share value, serving as a control mechanism. As a support of this 
theory, Berger et al., (1999) report that one of the main reasons for the acceleration 
of consolidation in the financial services industry in the USA was the improvement 
in the financial situation of firms as a result of record-breaking profits in the mid-
1990s, low interest rates and high stock prices, which reduced financing constraints 
on M&A‘s, making excess cash flow available for managers. The main derivation of 
his theory can be expressed in the following way: companies with excess cash flow 
and limited investment opportunities are more likely to be involved in value-
destroying acquisitions (see also Stulz, 1990). Overall, it is possible to conclude on 
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the M&A‘s-related agency theory literature that managers are pursuing own interests 
while participating in the acquisitions, disregarding their duties to maximise the 
shareholders‘. Consequently, the theory holds the view that takeovers are much more 
likely to be value-destroying.  
2.2.3. Hubris theory 
The third major theory that covers motives of M&A activities is the ―hubris‖ 
theory. The hubris hypothesis was first elaborated by Roll (1986), who asserts that 
managers are involved into M&A‘s due to their overconfidence and over-optimistic 
estimation of the target firm assets, as well as the assessment of the post-merger 
positive synergies. Furthermore, such approach results in higher premiums. As Roll 
(1986) mentions, the key scenario when his theory is applicable is the situation, when 
the fundamental reasons in favour of the merger exist (based on the synergy gains or 
agency theory), but they are insufficient to initiate the takeover. This is the moment 
when hubris theory comes into play. The subjective estimation of the managers is the 
important trigger that starts the acquisition process, making misconceptions and 
irrationality of management the major driving forces. 
Roll (1986) provides further explanations that managers are more likely to pay 
higher premiums for the target stock in conditions of competition in the M&A 
market. In other words, it is possible to observe so-called ―winner‘s curse‖, when 
bidder pays a higher price for the targets company not only because of the acquirer‘s 
overconfidence, but in the result of ―bidding competition‖ with other potential 
buyers. Morck et al., (1990) also mention that the intense competition can be an 
independent reason for the M&A‘s. The genuine estimation errors can also be the 
source of overpaying for the particular target (DePamphilis, 2003).  
Overall, the cases of pure hubris-driven mergers are quite rare, but they result 
in zero gains at best, and often in value destruction for the bidders‘ shareholders. The 
targets‘ shareholders, however, increase their wealth, as it is transferred from 
acquirers through the mechanism of the stock premiums (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1993). 
Some studies highlight a special type of the hubris-related motivations that 
push the managers of bidder firms to acquire other companies. In particular, ―raider 
theory‖ concentrates on the mechanisms of mergers when acquirers have no strategic 
reasons to engage into M&A‘s. Generally, private equity funds are the key 
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representatives of the corporate world to illustrate the ―raider theories‖, when the 
targets‘ wealth is transferred to the acquirers after the purchase of the controlling 
stake (Vos and Kelleher, 2001). Frequently, private funds are seeking ineffective, 
inappropriately structured or distressed firms in any industry. Vos and Kelleher 
(2001) also admit that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are the most widespread merger 
method in these cases.  
2.2.4. The relationship between M&A theories. 
The major motives of M&A‘s are outlined above. However, it does not mean 
that they are completely unrelated to each other. Moreover, in many cases several 
motives might explain the M&A activity in the better way if analysed together. For 
instance, maximising shareholders‘ value can be attained in many ways: market 
power, increasing efficiency or through achieving synergy gains. In fact, market 
power can be considered as another form of increasing profit efficiency in the sense 
that the same quantity of input is generating a higher quantity of output. Hence, it 
becomes very difficult to distinguish between the true reasons behind the merger 
decision. Moreover, synergy gains can also result in the efficiency improvements. 
Scale efficiency and scope efficiency are the two sources for efficiency growth: 
when the combined entity cuts the costs by implementing scale economies or when 
they distribute total fixed costs on a wider range of products, then synergistic gains 
are realised and can be detected by the researcher. Therefore, it might be difficult to 
disentangle one motive from another when a takeover took place. On the other hand, 
when no net shareholders gain is realised, agency theory and hubris theory could be 
the possible explanations.  
Summarising, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) systematised different 
theories and motives of M&A‘s in three key groups and concluded that post-merger 
gains are positive for synergy motive, zero for hubris theory motive, and negative for 
agency theory motive. The authors have also suggested the following framework to 
define the dominating motive in any merger event. Synergy is the theory that 
explains the takeover decision when the relations between acquirer gains and target 
gains, and target gains and total gains are both positive. Further, when there is no 
relation between target and total gain, and when the relation between acquirer gain 
and target gain is negative, then hubris theory is the best explanation. Finally, agency 
theory is the best fitting explanation when the relation between target and total gains, 
22 
  
and the relation between acquirer and target gains are both negative (Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993). 
Importantly, very few papers concentrated on the banking M&A‘s. To the best 
of my knowledge, there is no such study similar to Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) 
that effectively and thoroughly summarises the motives typical for the mergers in the 
banking sector or establishes the similarity between them, as well as analyses the 
merger outcomes in conjunction with preceding motives.  
2.3. Determinants of banking M&A’s  
The reviewed literature in sections 2.1 and 2.2 concentrated on the key motives 
that are present in the pre-merger decision-making process of the companies 
involved in the M&A‘s. Another part of researchers focuses on the outcomes of the 
acquisitions, analysing the phenomenon of M&A ex-post and aiming to define the 
factors that influence the value creation (or destruction) and the factors that define 
the overall success (or failure) of the merger. As Sudarsanam (2003) points out, 
value growth is the fundamental objective of any acquisition. Consequently, the 
growth in shareholders‘ wealth is considered as the most important characteristic that 
can help to assess the outcome of the merger.  
The review of the studies in previous sections indicates that mergers can act as 
both value-generating and value-destructing mechanism of strategic growth. The 
factors that influence the future outcomes of the merger deal are widely known as 
―determinants‖ in the M&A literature (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
Researchers distinguish three groups of determinants of merger activities: ―firm-
specific‖, which comprise bidder- and target-specific characteristics; ―deal-specific‖, 
that consist of deal parameters that can exert positive or negative influence on the 
merger outcome; and ―macro-determinants‖, that consist of industry- and country-
specific factors that are exogenous in the strategic decision-making process in the 
field of M&A‘s. According to the objectives of our research, the analysis of the 
literature considering the M&A determinants is provided. Where possible, particular 
focus is put on the role of merger determinants for the deals in the banking sector.  
2.3.1. Firm-specific factors 
a) Operating performance of bidder and target. It is usually implied 
that the firms with worse operating performance are more likely to be acquired 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000). Furthermore, underperforming companies are more 
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attractive for the in-market competitors, as the latter possess the necessary 
knowledge to improve the performance of the target firm. Wheelock and Wilson 
(2004) have studied the dependence of operating performance and the probability to 
be involved in M&A as an acquirer. The authors investigated 890 US bank mergers 
in 1987-1999 and discovered that more efficient banks are more likely to become 
bidders and acquire less efficient institutions. On the other hand, Akhigbe et al. 
(2004) concentrated on the target side of the M&A‘s, examining the operating 
performance of the US banks in the context of the probability to be acquired. The 
authors have demonstrated that the probability of acquisition is higher for larger and 
less profitable banks. Further, Hannan and Pilloff (2006) confirmed that low 
profitability is a key factor that increases the chance of being taken over. Generally, 
in line with the ―competition theory‖ mentioned previously in section 2.2 by Manne 
(1965), it is completely correct to regard M&A‘s as a mechanism when unprofitable 
and poorly managed firms are eliminated by profitable and well-managed firms. 
A number of studies focused on the European market of banking M&A‘s. In 
line with the US studies, it was also found that banks with poor performance are 
more likely to become a takeover target. For instance, Beitel et al. (2004) and 
Pasiouras et al. (2007) have demonstrated in their papers that merger targets are 
normally less efficient (cost-efficient and profit-efficient) that bidders. Focarelli et al. 
(2002) studied the Italian financial sector and have shown that target banks have 
relatively poor credit management; on average, the takeover resulted in the 
improvement in asset structure and credit allocation.  
However, another stream of studies produces conflicting evidence. For 
instance, Koetter et al. (2007) studied the sub-category of distressed banks‘ mergers 
and found no connection between the financial performance and the probability to 
become takeover target (the authors implemented regulatory assessment ratings and 
the independent credit ratings to address the research problem). Contrary results can 
be found in Hosono et al. (2006), who investigated Japanese market and concluded 
that inefficient banks are more likely to be acquired, similarly to the results for the 
US banking sector.  
b) Capitalization. This merger determinant is based on the two groups of 
arguments. Firstly, the negative relationship can be presented by hypothesis, that less 
capitalised targets reflect low management abilities (Hernando et al., 2009). 
Secondly, low capitalization targets can be used to obtain higher post-merger 
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performance gains (ibid). In contrast, a positive relationship is presented by 
arguments that highly capitalised banks are less diversified and therefore will be 
targeted by less diversified acquirers. The most influential studies by Hannan and 
Pilloff (2006) and Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) have pointed out that banks 
with higher capitalization are less likely to be acquired. On the other hand, Akhigbe 
et al. (2004) have found evidence to the contrary. Interestingly, US banks were found 
to be better capitalised than their EU counterparts. Overall, the relationship between 
capitalisation and the potential to take part in the M&A processes is unclear in the 
existing literature. 
c) Prospects for future growth. The hypothesis of a direct relationship 
between growth rates and the acquisition likelihood is confirmed by studies of 
Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Cheng et al. (1989). However, in more recent 
studies Moore (1996) and Pasiouras et al. (2007) have shown that targets with lower 
growth rates are more likely to merge with acquirers. Pasiouras et al. (2007) have 
provided following explanation, which is competition-related: banks with lower 
growth rates face intensifying competition and prefer to maximise the shareholders‘ 
value by selling the bank to the buyer prior to the moment when efficiency problems 
would drive the stock price down.  
d) Size. Recent studies support the hypothesis that smaller banks are more 
likely to be acquired due to lower integration costs (Lanine and Vander Vennet, 
2007; Pasiouras et al., 2007). On the contrary, Hannan and Pilloff (2006) testify 
mixed evidence: in large sample investigation large banks are more likely to be 
acquired, whereas in case if the sample is narrowed to larger banks (excluding deals 
that are lower than $1 billion) it becomes more probable for the smaller banks to be 
acquired. 
e) Management incentives. The mechanism of this determinant is based 
on two hypotheses:  
1) the management is likely to oppose the merger if they do not have 
sufficient control on the board and are not exposed to potential gains similarly to 
shareholders; 
2) the management is likely to oppose the merger due to the high 
efficiency and incentives to maximise value. 
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The findings by Hadlock et al. (1999) accentuate that the firms with higher 
management ownership levels have a lower probability to become a takeover target 
(due to higher costs to overcome the management‘s reluctance to leave).  
f) Industry concentration. In theory, intense competition and thorough 
regulatory supervision should reduce the likelihood to merge. However, if the 
banking sector is considered, the existing literature, fails to find supportive evidence 
for the US banking sector (Hannan and Pilloff, 2006). Some studies suggest that the 
level of concentration in the European financial sector higher than in the US, 
resulting in higher potential exposure to actions by regulatory authorities (Lanine and 
Vander Vennet, 2007). On the contrary, Pasiouras et al. (2007) obtained significant 
and negative coefficient for the concentration ratio in their model that was deployed 
to study the impact of concentration on the M&A outcomes. Their results testify that 
higher market concentration leaves almost no options for the existing banks to 
expand further, reducing the probability to be acquired for each of them.   
g) Bidding experience. There are several views on previous bidding 
experience as a factor influencing M&A outcomes. These are the ―learning by doing‖ 
hypothesis, the monopolisation hypothesis, the indigestion hypothesis. As can be 
seen from the names of the hypotheses, these suggestions are connected and can be 
developed from the motives that motivate companies to be involved in M&A‘s.  
Following the ―learning by doing‖ hypothesis, the number and subsequent 
success of the performed mergers should have a positive effect on future deals. The 
fundamental idea behind this hypothesis is that an "acquisition learning curve" exists 
and that the "experienced acquirer" will be more successful (Collins et al., 2009). 
Consequently, the returns to acquisitions are predicted to rise over time. The 
supporters of the ―learning by doing‖ hypothesis argue that the type of acquisition is 
important and so there are several learning curves. There could be one for related 
acquisitions and another for unrelated, one for domestic and another for cross-border, 
one for public acquisitions and another for non-public acquisitions. As a result, the 
performance effect of any acquisition depends on how many of that type of 
acquisition has been carried out previously. 
Multiple acquisitions may also result in a sequential improvement in acquirer 
performance if they bestow upon acquirer companies a sequential increase in market 
power. For example, Kamien and Zang (1993) have shown that a sequence of 
domestic mergers will subsequently lead to the increase of monopolisation level in 
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the industry. However, the key shortcoming of this paper is following: it can be 
argued that with the present-day global enforcement of competition policy, this type 
of monopolisation is a rarely observed phenomenon. Other hypotheses postulate that 
serial acquisitions do not enhance the bidding firm's shareholder wealth.  
The indigestion hypothesis states that the acquirer is unlikely to integrate 
several targets successfully in short periods of time because of the set of operational, 
financial and structural difficulties. Consequently, there is a high probability that 
each subsequent acquisition would result in poorer performance than the previous 
one (Kengelbach et al., 2012). 
Empirically, plenty of studies highlighted the bidding experience as a 
determinant of the post-merger success, in short-term and long-term aspects. Some 
early studies, such as Schipper and Thompson (1983), investigated the post-merger 
returns for the frequent bidders and found positive abnormal returns of almost 13% 
around the announcement date. However, they found the weak stock reaction to 
subsequent merger announcements. They explained their findings by the fact that 
most of the benefits of a merger event are capitalised during the time around the 
announcement. 
At the same time, some early studies studied the performance of frequent 
bidders depending on order of the acquisition. For instance, Asquith et al., (1983) 
found that the majority of the acquirers in their sample performed multiple bids, 45% 
of them being involved in four or more subsequent bids during the sample period 
(1963 -1979). They investigated the abnormal returns for the 156 bidders that 
initiated mergers after eight years without a bid. They also found that bidder returns 
remained positive at roughly 2.5% through the fourth bid. Subsequently, Loderer and 
Martin (1990) studied the impact of takeovers on the short-term returns of 1,538 
acquirers of 5,172 targets from 1966 to 1984. They have discovered that the first 
mergers resulted in significantly larger effects on announcement date than 
subsequent acquisitions. They also demonstrated that first acquisitions tended to 
cause higher abnormal returns when they were standalone comparing to the ―serial 
bidding‖ cases. They explained the findings by suggesting that mergers are profitable 
in general, but the positive anticipations of the subsequent mergers are already 
included in the stock prices, thus resulting in the weaker market reaction in next 
takeover announcements, i.e. creating so-called ―experience estimation bias‖. 
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Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) have studied the announcement CARs for 449 
American mergers taking place in 1980-1992 and further compared the findings with 
the results for the time period of 1948-1979. They reported a significant negative 
relationship between merger experience and merger outcome. Hayward (2002) 
investigated 350 takeovers by 100 US companies between 1990 and 1995. Further, 
the author attempted to find a connection between the stock performance close to the 
event date and the performance of the previous M&A‘s performed by the same 
companies. It was revealed that the number of past mergers has a negative effect on 
the CARs around the announcement date. In a nutshell, the two above-mentioned 
authors simply argue over the interpretation of the obtained results: the key point is 
whether the companies learn from acquisitions and improve their results over time, 
or whether serial bidding has no impact on any of the firm characteristics except 
market power. 
The milestone research by Fuller et al. (2002) has investigated the short-term 
abnormal returns to 539 bidders that had fulfilled minimum five acquisitions over a 
three-year period in 1999-2000. They did not look at any takeover activity prior to 
this period and found that initial bids resulted in significant positive returns, while 
returns to the subsequent bids were insignificant and negative. The authors provided 
an explanation to their findings that acquirers were more efficient in the first 
acquisitions, and the negotiation process became less effective in the subsequent 
takeovers, thus creating lower synergy gains in the post-acquisition period. Another 
interesting result was the observation that abnormal returns are lower for shorter 
event windows around the announcement date. 
Several studies have covered the long-run aspect as well, as long-run 
perspective is present in the research of serial bidding over a particular period of 
time. For instance, Stegemoller (2001) studied the long-run performance of 542 US 
firms making five or more acquisitions from 1990 to 1999. The evidence shows that 
frequent acquirers outperformed comparable firms in both accounting and stock 
return measures. Stegemoller (2001) also presented results testifying that larger 
merger deals are more successful than smaller ones. Baker and Limmack (2001) 
found similar evidence for the UK.  
Furthermore, Rosen (2004) examined the short-term and long-term effects for 
the finalised acquisitions by a sample of companies over a period of three years. The 
author has revealed that the short-term abnormal returns were higher for the deals 
28 
  
that were initiated first in the row of takeovers. Rosen (2004) has also found the 
direct positive relationship between the announcement effect for the bidders and the 
previous merger performance at the announcement.  
In summary, better performance of the serial bidders exists. There are also 
findings that testify gradual decline in the announcement returns over time in the 
case of frequent bidding. Unfortunately, the market of the European M&A‘s has 
received almost no attention in the existing literature. The same lack of relevant 
papers can be attributed to the banking sector in particular. 
2.3.2. Deal-specific factors 
Scholars also investigated the M&A characteristics of the merger deals in an 
attempt to define whether merger outcomes are sensitive to the deal parameters. 
Generally, the most important are following: listing status, relative bidder size, 
method of payment, industrial relatedness.  
1) Listed status. Existing literature demonstrates different reaction of the 
market players to the takeover of private and public targets. Consequently, the 
scholars distinguish a plethora of reasons to anticipate these differences in the 
abnormal returns for acquirer companies involved in mergers with private and public 
targets. For instance, Draper and Paudyal (2006) noted several theories that can 
explain the discrepancies in reaction: managerial hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and 
the bargaining power hypothesis. 
According to the liquidity hypothesis, it is usually assumed that the market of 
private mergers is frequently illiquid. Whereas public takeovers occur in the 
environment of transparency and unhindered circulation of the information, the 
market for private M&A‘s is operating in the opposite conditions. In other words, the 
information on the privately held targets is quite scarce and difficult to be verified. 
This creates additional complications for the processes of asset estimation by public 
companies. The bidders can often benefit from market illiquidity and expect lower 
premiums in the process of merger negotiations, thus increasing their bargaining 
power and leading to underpayment. Finally, the abnormal returns should be higher 
because of the lower price paid and higher anticipated post-merger synergy gains 
(Fuller et al. 2002; Conn et al., 2005). Because of the above-mentioned arguments, 
private firms are less attractive for the external bidders, thus enabling acquirers to 
benefit from larger discounts and lower premiums. Most scholars reach a consensus 
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that private firms usually motivate bidders by reducing the requested price for their 
stock in order to uphold the status as an attractive investment opportunity, resulting 
in generally higher post-acquisition gains for the buyers (Antoniou et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, the managerial hypothesis asserts that two types of 
managers exist. The first type usually aims to maximise personal gains (sometimes 
even at the expense of the company) and to increase the size and the prestige of the 
firm. The second type includes managers who are not prone to agency problems and 
perform their primary duties thoroughly, increasing the shareholders‘ wealth. The 
attention of the first category is usually drawn by public firms, which provide a direct 
and simple way to increase company size and prestige. Simultaneously, this scenario 
involves higher premiums for the targets stock and subsequent lower abnormal 
returns and possible value destruction of the bidder. Alternatively, the takeover of the 
private targets is initially motivated by the future synergy gains and other merger-
related wealth-maximising benefits that are in line with the beliefs of type two 
managers. The latter are less likely to pay higher premiums because of the risk to 
destroy the shareholders‘ wealth in the moment of the bid announcement. An 
additional argument is that private firms are usually smaller and easier to integrate 
into the bidder structures with lower costs and efforts. Thus Draper and Paudyal 
(2006) anticipate more optimistic market perception of the merger deals that involve 
privately held companies in comparison to public ones.  
Finally, the bargaining power hypothesis asserts that private firms are not 
exposed to the agency problems due to their peculiar ownership structure involving 
only a small group of people or a family as both shareholders and managers. Thus, 
the absence of confrontation between shareholders and managers creates an 
opportunity for the private companies‘ owners to control the merger negotiation 
process more thoroughly and choose the better timing. These conditions increase the 
bargaining power of the targets‘ representatives and open a space for higher wealth 
gains for the targets, simultaneously decreasing prospective wealth gains for the 
bidders, comparing with the public takeovers. As can be seen from the previous 
discussion, the theoretical expectations of the private acquisitions are quite diverse. 
Thus, the scholars have studied the problem of acquiring private companies 
empirically. 
For instance, Fuller et al. (2002) have found that the gains for the bidders 
involved in private takeovers were significant and positive (around +2.08%) in the 5-
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days event windows around the announcement date. Further, Conn et al., (2005) has 
demonstrated higher abnormal returns for the bidders involved in domestic 
acquisitions of the private company comparing with public takeovers. The authors 
concluded that public deals destroy shareholders‘ wealth of the acquirers by almost -
0.99%, whereas the takeovers of the private targets generated significant gains of 
almost +1.05%. These findings were completely in line with other studies that 
concentrated on the UK and European market (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). 
More recently, Antoniou et al. (2007) investigated the wealth effects of the 
bidders‘ shareholders that were involved in private acquisitions in 1987-2004. The 
authors have found significant positive gains of almost +1.59% for the bidders 
acquiring private targets. These results are largely consistent with the findings by 
Ang and Kohers (2001) and Draper and Paudyal (2006) who have reported 
significant gains from buying private firms.  
2) The method of payment. Existing literature provides decisive arguments 
in favour of the theory that cash-financed mergers outperform stock-financed deals in 
the short term (Travlos, 1987; Draper and Paudyal, 1999; and Dong et al., 2006) and 
in the long term (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Linn and Switzer, 2001; Cosh and Guest, 
2001). Researchers consider the choice of the payment type as an important problem 
to investigate, as it is one of the key deal-related determinants that can influence the 
merger outcomes for both bidder and target. In general, the existing literature on the 
takeover payment types finds strong evidence in favour of larger value gains in cash-
financed deals in comparison to stock-financed mergers. Interestingly, higher wealth 
gains are generated for both acquirers and targets (Huang and Walking, 1987; 
Travlos, 1987; Franks and Harris, 1989; Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Sudarsanam and 
Mahate, 2003; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Dong et al., 2006; Tuch and 
O‘Sullivan, 2007). 
Myers and Majluf (1984) were first to suggest that payment method serves as a 
signalling mechanism to the market. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
the asymmetry in information available to the merger counterparts is almost always 
present in the case of M&A‘s. In other words, target managers possess the unique 
information on their company, while external investors rely on the public 
information only. Developing the ideas of Myers and Majluf (1984), Hansen (1987) 
offers the hypothesis that bidders engage into equity-financed merger deals if they 
lack information on the true target value or in private acquisitions. Furthermore, the 
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factor of taxes can also play a substantial role in the M&A processes: capital gains 
are taxed immediately, whereas it can be postponed in the stock payment scenario. 
Effectively, the acquirer can choose to deploy equity as a financing method if the 
option of postponing taxation liabilities is important to the shareholders of bidder or 
target. 
Travlos (1987) considered the abnormal returns to the acquirers and 
demonstrated significant and positive abnormal returns for the cash-financed deals, 
while bidders suffered wealth destruction if their takeovers were financed by stock. 
These results are in line with the findings by Martin (1996) who has presented 
evidence for a significant difference between mergers with cash as a key payment 
method in comparison to stock-financed acquisitions. As a result, the managers of 
the acquirers choose to implement cash as a payment type if they consider their 
company undervalued and believe in the further growth of stock prices. 
Alternatively, bidder‘s management prefers stock as a financing method if they 
consider their company overvalued and aim to utilise their advantage in the 
acquisition. Thus, the information on the payment with acquirer‘s equity can signal 
the market on the situation when the bidder is overpriced (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004). Following the similar logic, announcement of the cash deal financing signals 
to the market that investors can anticipate the growth in acquirer‘s value in the 
nearest future (in the post-takeover period) which will definitely lead to the gains in 
the shareholders‘ wealth (Tuch and O‘Sullivan, 2007). 
In line with the above-mentioned theoretical implications, the post-merger 
outcomes of cash- and stock-financed mergers are mixed. For instance, Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) investigated a sample of the European M&A deals and revealed 
that the bidders‘ shareholders enjoyed wealth gains of almost +1% in the equity-
financed acquisitions, while cash-financed takeovers resulted in only +0.4% value 
growth. These results allow concluding that the signalling hypothesis is not 
confirmed, as market ignored the payment type as information on possible acquirer 
overvaluation. In a similar manner, Andre et al. (2004) analysed Canadian M&A‘s 
and came to the conclusion that cash-financed deals are underperforming if 
compared to the merger with mixed payment type. The authors considered that the 
lack of information transparency and market inefficiencies could be the reason of the 
findings‘ contradictory nature.  Several other studies that concentrated on the 
difference between cash-financed and stock-financed merger in the long term have 
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shown better results for the cash payments (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Linn and 
Switzer, 2001; Cosh and Guest, 2001).  
3) The relative size of the bidder and target. A substantial number of 
studies have considered comparable characteristics of bidders and targets as an 
important factor that influences the post-merger outcomes apart from payment type 
and listed status (Tuch and O‘Sullivan, 2007). The authors hypothesise that bidding 
for larger targets can possibly result in better post-merger performance comparing to 
the takeovers of smaller targets. Large bidders can benefit from decreased 
competition and attempt to obtain gains from their advantageous status (Roll, 1986). 
Furthermore, the takeover of the larger target can result in an even more powerful 
economic impact on the post-merger performance of the combined firm, if market 
power, debt capacity and other factors can be taken into account in this context 
(Bruner, 2002). However, Moeller et al. (2004) express an opinion that integrating 
larger targets is exposed to higher risks and costs to harmonise two structures into the 
merged company, making the role of the relative size of bidder and target in the post-
merger value creation is unclear.  
In the empirical perspective, the majority of the studies concentrating on the 
effect of the relative size factor on the post-acquisition performance have found that 
bidders experience stronger positive impact from acquiring larger targets (is the 
market reaction to the merger announcement is assessed)(Asquith et al., 1983; Franks 
and Harris, 1989; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Tuch and O‘Sullivan, 2007). 
Generally, the existing studies show mixed results about the impact of M&A 
announcement on the returns to bidders with respect to the relative size of the 
involved companies. Some of the papers find significant and positive abnormal 
returns for acquirers (Fuller et al., 2002; Conn et al., 2005; Ben-Amar and Andre, 
2006), while others reveal zero or negative CARs (Sudarsanam et al., 1996; 
Sudarsanam, 2003; 2006). The papers that studied the European market have shown 
insignificant and close-to-zero abnormal returns (Campa and Hernando, 2004; 
Gregory and McCorriston, 2005). 
The discrepancies in the obtained results among the above-mentioned studies 
could be present due to the fact that scholars studied M&A‘s in the various industries 
over different periods of time; additionally, even different benchmark models were 
applied. One of the obvious shortcomings among several papers is that authors 
imposed additional constraints on their sample, limiting it to only large-scale 
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acquisitions (see Aw and Chatterjee, 2004; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004), which 
may probably lead to the findings that cannot be generalised across time and 
extrapolated to other industries. 
Furthermore, as is obvious from the literature, the majority of the existing 
studies were performed using merger deals that occurred in the 1980s and early 
1990s, such as Conn et al. (2005) who studied a sample of UK bidders in 1984-1998, 
Gregory and McCorriston (2005) who investigated a sample of merger deals in 1984-
1994 of UK bidders, and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) who investigated US 
merger market between 1985 and 1995. Thus, the findings of the above-mentioned 
studies are somehow obsolete and are necessary to be re-tested.  
4) Industry relatedness. The intuitive argument implies that synergetic 
gains and, hence, higher performance can be obtained in the case of takeovers within 
industries, as the integration costs are lower. Singh and Montgomery (1987) 
speculated that acquisitions between companies of the same industry provide 
powerful opportunities to actualize economies of scope and scale, whereas unrelated 
acquisitions are expected to result in administrative and financial synergies. Short-
term investigations are also in line with the argument above. Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) have found significant CARs of approximately +1.6% from focused and 
insignificant abnormal returns from diversifying mergers around the announcement 
date. Walker (2000) provided evidence supporting the initial hypothesis: industry-
related deals result in significant value growth.  
The long-run research appears to be conclusive as well. Gregory (1997) has 
shown significant losses for conglomerate deals (-11,33%) comparing for non-
conglomerate bids (-3,48%) in 24-months horizon. Maquieira et al. (1998) report 
+6.2% CARs for non-conglomerate mergers.  
5) Cross-border status. Current literature on M&A‘s clearly 
distinguishes cross-border M&A‘s from domestic mergers. As long as cross-border 
takeovers feature a set of specific characteristics, the scholars outline systematic 
differences regarding underlying motives and future outcomes of domestic and cross-
border M&A‘s (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Seth et al., 2000). It is also important 
to take into account that plenty of external factors play a decisive role in the post-
merger integration, among which are cultural, economic, regulatory and institutional 
characteristics (House et al., 2002; Shimizu et al., 2004). As Sudarsanam (1995) 
outlines, cross-border acquisitions should be even considered as a separate 
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phenomenon, and not only as an extended category of domestic M&A‘s, primarily 
due to the vast number of differences between countries and their economies. 
Consequently, all secondary aspects may have impact on the post-merger 
performance: cultural, legal characteristics, accounting rules should be thoroughly 
analysed in order to establish a true picture of the M&A activities (Sudarsanam, 
1995). Generalising, the same set of motives highlighted in section 2.2 (synergy, 
hubris and agency theories) is applicable to both cross-border and domestic M&A‘s.  
Empirically, the literature which investigates the cross-border M&A‘s 
explicitly is quite scarce. The explanation of this phenomenon can rely on the notion 
that international mergers massively emerged only during the penultimate, fifth 
merger wave (1992-2000). Nevertheless, several earlier papers effectively forecasted 
and compared the subsamples of domestic and international takeovers, assessing 
post-merger outcomes and premiums paid in the transactions (see Dewenter, 1995). 
The author has also shown that stock premiums are significantly higher in the cross-
border acquisitions (ibid). Several relatively early empirical studies examined 
cumulative abnormal returns generated around the announcement of the cross-border 
acquisitions. The majority of scholars focused on the short-run analysis. The findings 
presented in Doukas and Travlos (1988), Morck and Yeung (1991), Markides and 
Ittner (1994) and Cakici et al. (1996) provide a view that cross-border mergers result 
in higher gains for the counterparts than domestic deals. Further, Doukas (1995) 
concentrated on the sample of 463 cross-border deals in 1975-1989 with bidder 
registered in the US. He has reported that on average shareholders‘ wealth increased 
by significant +0.4%. 
Eun et al. (1996) attempted to test the synergy hypothesis by studying a sample 
of cross-border acquisitions that involve US targets between 1979 and 1990. The 
reported results demonstrate that international M&A‘s generate larger wealth gains 
for the acquirers‘ shareholders than domestic deals. In particular, the findings show 
that abnormal returns for the non-US acquirers substantially vary among the 
countries where bidders are headquartered: while gains for the bidders from Canada 
are positive, but close to zero and insignificant, Japanese bidding firms have 
demonstrated major positive and significant CARs around the announcement date. 
Eun et al. (1996) explain these differences as a reflection of cultural and legal 
differences. On the other hand, shareholders of the UK acquirers suffered losses. One 
of the shortcomings of the paper is that researchers did not attempt to quantify and 
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study the cultural differences as factors that influence changes in the companies‘ 
value. Instead, the authors concluded that the interpretation of the findings is highly 
dependable on the sample selection criteria and the deployed methodology (the 
length of the selected event windows in particular). 
On the other hand, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) have shown insignificant 
negative CARs of almost -3.7% for the US bidders involved into cross-border deals. 
It would be fair to mention that a vast majority of the early papers studied only the 
US and the UK M&A markets, as international M&A‘s were an endemic 
phenomenon to the Anglo-Saxon financial world and only in the past two decades 
became a widely used type of strategic growth mechanism. 
Kleinert and Klodt (2002) suggested that cross-border deals do not result in 
higher wealth gains for the acquirers‘ shareholders, primarily because of the higher 
risks of growth over the international barriers. Firm- and deal-specific factors define 
the success or failure of M&A deals almost entirely (Kleinert and Klodt, 2002). 
Generalising, the researchers distinguish four core factors that can explain the 
possible reasons why shareholders can generate higher gains after engaging in the 
cross-border M&A‘s: access to the foreign markets, international risk diversification, 
exchange rates effects and managerial issues (Danbolt, 2004).  
Later in 2000s several papers attempted to perform a direct test of whether 
domestic or cross-border M&A‘s are better for the shareholders of both involved 
companies. In particular, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) investigated the market 
of the US domestic and cross-border acquisitions that occurred in 1985-1995. The 
authors implemented the event study approach with market-adjusted estimation of 
the abnormal returns. The focused attention on the shortest possible event window of 
(-1;+1) around the announcement date. The results have shown insignificant CARs 
of approximately +0.3% for the cross-border subsample, while domestic deals 
resulted in significant value growth of almost +1.12%. It is worth mentioning, the 
authors also testified negative correlation between the abnormal returns of acquirers 
and the degree of restriction in the target‘s economy, and concluding that countries 
with less complex regulation are producing larger wealth gains for the outside 
acquirers. A similar approach was taken by Conn et al. (2005), who studied the 
takeover announcement effects for the UK firms between 1984 and 1998. The 
scholars considered the broad variety of the deals, with subsequent sub-division into 
smaller samples of public, private, domestic and cross-border deals and further 
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detailed analysis. Again, the event window of (-1;+1) around the announcement was 
deployed to estimate the market reaction on acquisitions. The findings have shown 
significant and positive CARs for domestic mergers (+0.68%) and significant 
positive CARs for the cross-border deals (+0.33%). Although the difference was not 
significant, the authors did not take steps to provide further insights on the 
domestic/cross-border mergers outcomes issue.  
Interestingly, the interest of researchers towards the European M&A‘s was 
quite weak, resulting in the scarce number of studies reflecting the low quantity and 
volume of the M&A‘s (Lowinski et al., 2004).  
Further, the scholars began to focus attention on the mergers in the particular 
industries, narrowing their interest. The banking sector was definitely no exception. 
Naturally, the financial sector began to grow exponentially in the early 1990s, 
motivated by the European liberalisation, thus encouraging researchers to study the 
effect of mergers on the financial institutions. A large number of countries in the EU 
allowed more flexibility to study cross-border takeovers. Initial literature undertook 
the efficiency approach but failed to find any improvements in costs‘ optimisation 
for the banks involved into cross-border M&A‘s (Berger et al., 2001; Vander Vennet, 
2002). However, Vander Vennet (2002) has found some weak signs of profit 
efficiency improvements for cross-border deals comparing to domestic acquisitions. 
However, further studies obtained mixed results.  Beitel et al. (2004), for 
instance, have demonstrated that domestic mergers perform better than cross-border 
acquisitions, while Lepetit et al. (2004) and Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) have 
produced reverse results. Also, Buch et al. (2005) attempted to compare actual and 
optimal cross-border portfolios for banking sectors in the US, the UK, France and 
Germany in 1995-1999. The authors came to the conclusion that banks are 
underinvesting internationally, as cross-border growth might result in both short-run 
(growth of the shareholders‘ wealth) and long-run (cost and profit efficiencies) 
advantages, as well as risk diversification. 
 
2.3.3. Macro-determinants 
After describing the deal-specific and firm-specific parameters that influence 
mergers, it is necessary to outline the factors that influence the merger process 
exogenously (e.g. the factors that cannot be changed or adjusted in the decision-
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making process and should be taken as given). A brief discussion on the most 
important macro-factors that define the mutual dependence between mergers and the 
economy is presented below.  
In particular, researchers were studying different aspects of the relationship 
between macro-factors and merger outcomes. The discussion on these factors is 
provided below. 
 
1. Stock market 
One of the first breakthrough studies on the connection between M&A‘s and 
the stock market was performed by Weston (1953) and further developed by Nelson 
(1959), who both asserted that the stock price causes significant influence on the 
total number and volume of the M&A activities. Particularly, Nelson (1959) 
investigated the mergers occurred in the period between 1895 and 1920 for the US 
market. The author found a significant and direct relationship between fluctuations in 
aggregate merger levels and stock prices.    
Later studies took a more sophisticated approach. For instance, Melicher et al. 
(1983) implemented regression analysis of the time series data, covering the 
aggregate M&A activities in the US market. The researchers aimed to find out the 
influence of the core factors that define the economic conditions (level of the 
industrial activity, bankruptcy rates) and the capital markets conditions (bond yields, 
interest rates, stock prices). The sample included all the merger deals in 1947-1977. 
The authors demonstrated the weak and insignificant relationship between business 
conditions and takeover activities. However, capital markets seem to play an 
important role in defining the level of total mergers in the US market. Specifically, 
Melicher at al. (1983) pointed out that the changes in the merger activity are directly 
correlated with current and prior stock prices, and bond yields.  
Other studies obtained mixed results. Geroski (1984) used Granger causality 
tests to investigate the relationship between stock market prices and mergers. He uses 
four different samples: monthly and quarterly for the US and the UK which differ in 
length and time period covered. However, the key shortcoming of this study is 
following: results from all four samples show that such relationships are spurious. 
Developing ideas of Geroski (1984), Guerard (1989) examined the relationship 
between US mergers, stock prices and industrial production for the period 1895-
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1979. His results also suggested that stock prices or levels of the industrial 
production do not help in explaining mergers.  
Clarke and loannidis (1996) investigated the relationship between stock market 
prices and mergers, using a Granger causality approach and UK merger data during 
the period 1971-1993. In contrast to previous studies, the level of M&A activity was 
measured by the number of deals and by the real value. Their findings testify that 
stock prices ―Granger‖-cause mergers.  
Several relatively new theoretical approaches have been elaborated to describe 
the link between the merger activities and stock prices. These models are based on a 
concept dating back to Hickman (1953), who argued that in booming markets, 
investors might behave over-optimistically. These types of models are also known as 
―behavioural approach models‖. As long as managers make efforts to manage the 
timing of their strategic decisions, they benefit from the positive attitude of the 
markets. A growing stream of papers studying the role of timing in the M&A‘s has 
emerged, exploiting the neoclassical paradigm.  
For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) offered a theory that postulated the 
irrationality of the stock market and orientation on quick benefits by target 
management. The authors suggested that capital markets are irrational, implying that 
stocks are constantly overvalued in the short term. However, Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) admit that the overvaluation degree largely varies across different industries 
and national economies. Consequently, if the acquirer‘s shares are overvalued, 
bidder‘s management is forced to use their stock as payment for the target. If the 
second assumption is recalled (targets‘ managers aim to maximise their own short-
run benefits), the elaborated model can explain why target managers tend to accept 
even pure stock-financed tender offers. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) emphasise, that 
the short-term investors‘ perceptions can self-consistently result in the increase in the 
merger activity. However, the gains for shareholders are persistent only in the short 
run, as long-run stock prices converge to their efficient, zero-return level.  
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) applied the same logic to the problem 
and proposed another model which rests upon the rationality of M&A‘s. Their major 
development was to introduce an assumption, that bidder management possesses 
private information on their companies and on the future combined entity. 
Furthermore, target managers also have undisclosed private information on their 
firm. It is also important to keep in mind that market valuation might not reflect the 
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true value of both companies. Thus, the arising misvaluations can be divided into two 
components: firm-specific and market-specific. The authors point out, that market‘s 
expectations on the future post-acquisition synergies are correct in the equilibrium 
point. However, the limited information comes into play and distorts the valuation 
process, resulting in misvaluations. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also 
conclude that it is extremely difficult for the target firms to distinguish between 
market overvaluation in general and overvaluation of their own stock, in particular. 
Thus management of acquired company tends to overestimate the possible future 
synergies. As a result, the decision is biased towards acceptance of the bid; 
consequently, a number of the mergers in the market is growing. Authors also 
emphasise that the motivation to involve into M&A‘s can be caused by positive and 
negative industry shocks, technology shifts, deregulation campaigns or changes in 
the corporate governance.  It would be fair to conclude that valuation aspects are 
extremely important factors that define the rise of merger waves, but should be 
considered in conjunction with other economic issues. 
Developing the ideas of structural market misvaluations, Morellec and 
Zhdanov (2005) elaborated the theoretical model of M&A, which rest upon stock 
market valuations of the involved firms. Their framework captures imperfect 
information and competition, and attempts to predict exact terms of merger 
negotiations and timing of acquisitions by solving solutions for games with imperfect 
information between targets and acquirers. Their model predicts that the probability 
of wealth destruction for the bidders increases along with the variance in beliefs 
considering the future post-takeover synergies. Additionally, Morellec and Zhdanov 
(2005) have established that abnormal returns (as key criteria to measure merger 
outcome) tend to increase synchronously with the volatility of stock returns, and 
decrease in line with opposite movement of the counterpart‘s stock return. 
The above-mentioned theoretical concepts demanded the empirical testing, and 
it was produced by several papers, who attempted to find practical evidence 
considering the impact of market misvaluations on the aggregate levels of M&A‘s. 
For instance, Vasconcellos and Kish (1996) studied the US stock market under 
conditions of depression in the 1970s and had found that economic decline in the US 
can motivate non-US companies to buy US targets. It is crucial to mention several 
empirical studies by Vasconcellos and Kish (1998), McCann (2001) and Kish and 
Vasconcellos (1993) which supported the hypothesis of a positive relationship 
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between stock prices level and merger activities. They have found that share prices 
influence M&A‘s intensity, but the evidence on the direction of the movement 
remains inconclusive. 
Further, Ang and Cheng (2003) tested several hypotheses based on the theory 
of stock market driven acquisitions. The authors collected the sample of 
approximately 3000 mergers in 1981-2001, and their results suggest that the 
probability to become an acquirer is in direct relationship with the degree of 
overvaluation. Their findings also provided evidence in support of the statement that 
completed mergers were associated with higher overvaluation than unsuccessful 
acquisitions. Assuming that any mismatch in asset prices should be corrected in the 
long run, Ang and Cheng (2003) compared long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) for the successful bidders with the control sample of firms that were not 
involved in the M&A activities but still overvalued. It was found that the benefits of 
shareholders in equity-financed takeovers are much higher for the bidders that took 
part in the merger processes. The findings of Ang and Cheng (2003) testify that 
overvaluation might be an autonomous driving force for the stock-financed 
acquisitions. 
Further, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) performed a direct test of model 
predictions by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) in their paper. The degree of overvaluation was considered to be a factor that 
defines the level of aggregate merger activity and the payment type. The key idea of 
the empirical study was to decompose market-to-book value into two parts: value-to-
book and market-to-value. The authors produced evidence supporting the initial 
hypothesis of valuation-driven merger activity. Furthermore, the results have shown 
that bidders tend to commit more valuation-related errors that targets.  
Developing the existing findings, Baker et al. (2009) broadened the scope of 
the research by studying international perspective of M&A‘s. The authors argued 
that cross-border acquisitions can be driven by the same stock overvaluation, and 
sometimes the effect can be even stronger. For instance, a bidder from the country 
with ―overheated‖ stock market would experience these effects if the decision to buy 
a target company from a country with the undeveloped stock market is made. Baker 
et al. (2009) termed their concept ―cheap financial capital hypothesis‖ and explained 
the aggregate level of takeovers in the same manner as Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
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Summarizing, most academic studies have indicated that stock prices level is 
directly related to the aggregate merger activity. In contrast, there is no agreement 
considering the effects of the macroeconomic factors on takeovers. Unfortunately, 
the market for the EU mergers has received almost no consideration in these studies. 
 
2. Macroeconomic aggregates 
Macroeconomic aggregates are also considered as important factors that 
influence the market M&A‘s outcomes. The research evidence indicates that external 
drivers play an important role in the merger-related decision-making process by 
providing the context when a company decides to acquire another firm.  
The scholars distinguish several factors that received attention in the academic 
literature. 
 
a) Money supply 
Widely recognised neoclassical theories point out the prominent role of 
external shocks (regulatory, technological, economic, etc.) which determine the 
outcomes of mergers (Gort, 1969). However, more recent researchers emphasise that 
these shocks are insufficient to be the unique and complete explanation for merger 
activities. Thus several researchers regard money supply as one of the key reflections 
of macroeconomic conditions (so-called ―monetarist approach‖). 
As Fishman (1989) pointed out, growing money supply increases the number 
of buyers by reducing borrowing costs and expanding disposable income. The study 
of Mueller (1989) has clearly shown conjunction of mergers with upturn cycle in the 
real economy and capital markets. During upturn cycle phase companies possess 
large amounts of cash and are more likely to spend in the M&A market (ibid). Such 
scholars as Clarke and Ioannidis (1994) and Resende (2008) stressed the importance 
of the excess liquidity which determines the total number of acquisitions in a 
particular period of time. These findings are consistent with findings obtained by the 
researchers who were studying an aggregate number of mergers (Harford, 2005; 
Gartner and Halbheer, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the role of liquidity and money supply in defining quantity and 
configuration of the merger deals is studied insufficiently. The influence of the recent 
financial crisis and the possible implications for the new merger wave were not 
analysed in the literature yet.  
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b) Exchange rate  
Exchange rates are one of the key factors that are important in the process of 
negotiating cross-border acquisitions, as different currencies contribute to the 
additional risk of the changes in corporate value after the merger. For instance, 
bidders from a particular country gain a potential advantage if the currency of this 
country rises in value: acquirers have to pay a lower price for foreign companies, 
thus motivating bidders‘ managers to involve into M&A‘s. This idea is totally in line 
with the opinion expressed in Vasconcellos and Kish (1996), who proposed a 
hypothesis that relative exchange rate between national currencies of target and 
bidder is an important factor in connection to merger outcomes. Weston and Jawien 
(1999) followed this framework when they showed the mechanism of exchange rate 
influence on the transaction costs, payment method and the post-acquisition 
integration costs.  
The empirical aspect of cross-border M&A‘s was addressed in the study by 
Froot and Stein (1991), who considered the scenario of the depreciating US dollar. 
The authors provided evidence that foreign companies are in advantageous condition 
comparing to the domestic US firms. Evidently, the scenario of the appreciating 
dollar has demonstrated inverse results. Further studies by Harris and Ravenscraft 
(1991), Kang (1993), Dewenter (1995) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) focused 
on the empirical testing of initial theoretical hypothesis and supported the theory of 
exchange rates. The authors pointed out that other things equal, countries with 
appreciating currencies might be involved in M&A more intensely, acquiring targets 
from the countries with a depreciating currency. Nisbet et al. (2003) tested this 
assumption and produced consistent results for the comparison of the UK and the US 
markets: the appreciation of the British pound resulted in a larger number of the 
mergers between UK acquirers and US targets. However, earlier studies by Stevens 
(1992); Healy and Palepu (1993) have found little support to the significant effect of 
exchange rates on the number of M&A‘s. 
 
c) Interest rates  
Existing literature on economics and investments regards base interest rate as a 
powerful instrument to stimulate international investments. Moeller and 
Shlingemann (2005) admit that transaction costs and costs of merger financing affect 
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the total acquisitions expenses. Consequently, the interest rate can be considered as a 
dominant factor that can encourage or suppress total takeover activities. These 
notions are supported by Tolentino (2010) who hypothesised that low interest rates 
serve as a powerful stimulus to encourage cross-border capital inflow and therefore 
increase the number of cash-financed cross-border deals, as foreign companies utilise 
the possibility to diversify their assets and benefit from favourable investment 
conditions.  
Theoretical studies were accompanied by papers that tackled the problem 
empirically. The majority of them concentrated on the connection between FDI 
inflows and interest rate as a key regulating instrument, considering M&A‘s as a 
special case of FDI. For instance, Aliber (1970) has found out that lower financing 
costs in the US market due to a period of low base interest rate in the 1960s had a 
positive impact on the number of the M&A deals. Barrel and Pain (1996) considered 
the capital costs in a broader manner and testified positive correlation between 
transaction costs and outward investments (which consisted vastly from cross-border 
mergers). More recent papers confirmed the validity of above-mentioned results. 
Forssback and Oxelheim (2008) and Pablo (2009) admitted in their studies that the 
cost of capital could independently explain the strategic decision to engage in 
takeover activities. Uddin and Boateng (2011) developed these ideas and showed that 
financial synergies are much easier to be materialised under a scenario of lower costs 
of capital borrowing.  
 
d) Inflation 
Another important macroeconomic indicator that should be considered in the 
context of its impact on the M&A market is inflation. In theory, inflation influences 
both the cost of capital and the profitability of the firm, thereby playing an important 
role in the decision-making process prior to the tender offer. For instance, McKinnon 
(1973) argued that higher inflation rates motivate firms to increase their expenses as 
it becomes less efficient for the rational management to hold cash on accounts. On 
the other hand, Fisher‘s equation, that describes the link between nominal interest 
rates and inflation rates, proves that nominal interest rates are always higher than real 
interest rates (Phillips, 2005). Under the scenario of high inflation rates, the 
international investment is discouraged, reducing a number of the potential 
acquisitions, as long as high inflation creates conditions of reduced profitability and 
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high borrowing costs. Further, Gugler et al. (2012) argued that firms are motivated to 
buy more assets in the form of M&A‘s or capital investments if company return on 
its capital exceeds the cost of capital. 
 
e) GDP 
The influence of GDP on a number of M&A‘s and post-merger performance 
was researched as well. For instance, it is anticipated that the larger GDP growth rate 
influences post-acquisition performance positively (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; 
Levine, 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine and Zervos, 1998).  
One of the few papers that study the European market and tries to find out the 
effect of macroeconomic indicators on the takeover activities is the study by Ali-
Yrkko (2002). The author considers the sample of Finnish acquisitions and compares 
it with another sample of mergers in other European countries. It was found out that 
GDP, market capitalisation and capacity of the stock market can explain the great 
part of the cross-sectional and time-related variance in post-acquisition abnormal 
returns. The results of Ali-Yrkko (2002) lead to the conclusion that the GDP growth 
rate can be a powerful driver of the cross-border takeovers.  
Another paper that studies the European M&A market and focuses on the 
financial sector is Aminian et al., (2005), who analysed the macroeconomic 
aggregates for the sample of EU mergers in the banking industry between 1999 and 
2004. They find GDP growth rate and exchange rate to be the main drivers of M&A. 
Several other influential studies (e.g. Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Staikouras and 
Wood, 2003; Abreu and Mendes, 2001; Pasiouras et al., 2005) have tested the impact 
of macroeconomic variables (GDP, interest rate, unemployment rate) on the post-
acquisition profitability of the EU banks. ROI and ROA were selected to be a proxy 
of corporate financial performance, as post-merger positive or negative effects would 
be reflected in the accounting data. However, no significant relationship was found. 
Finally, Neto et al., (2010) considered M&A‘s as a specific case of FDI‘s have found 
that nominal GDP and GDP growth rate was insignificant. However, it was revealed 
that several other variables are significant and positively correlated with larger 
volumes of the foreign direct investments, including M&A‘s: openness of the 
economy, size of the economy, level of corporate governance, human development 
index. 
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3. Introduction of the euro 
The adoption of the common currency in the European Union can be regarded 
as an event that had a strong structural impact on the economic environment where 
European companies operate. It was one of the landmarks of the consolidation and 
harmonisation processes that started in the early 1990s. The report by Group of Ten 
(2001) provides an overview of the mechanisms that can connect adoption of the 
euro and the market of M&A‘s. Briefly, regulators distinguish following factors: 
impact of the common currency on the treasury activities in the corporate sector, 
integration of the money and capital markets, unification of the market of 
government bonds and facilitation of borrowing capital. Consequently, these changes 
open the wide potential for the firms to reach costs optimisation, more transparent 
asset valuation and easier subsequent materialisation of synergy gains.  
The aspect of the uniform European currency was investigated only in several 
studies. For instance, Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) have examined the European 
banking M&A‘s between 1990 and 2004 and reported that returns to acquirers in 
banking M&A‘s have decreased in the post-euro period, relatively to the pre-euro 
period. The introduction of the joint currency has increased the competition between 
financial institutions, resulting in significant losses for the bidders in the ―post-euro‖ 
period.  
As distinct from Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), Ilkovitz et al. (2007) and 
Coeurdacier et al. (2009) contend that as the euro has eliminated country-specific 
regulatory and financial market barriers, the abnormal returns to bidders should 
increase in the post-Euro era relative to the pre-Euro era. This is so because the 
introduction of the euro would have caused Eurozone firms to access wider growth 
opportunities. The most recent study by Perera et al. (2013) has found that the short-
run post-merger abnormal returns to the European acquirers were greater in the post-
euro era than in the pre-euro era. In other words, the gains associated with the more 
integrated Europe after the adoption of the euro (due to the expanded set of 
opportunities) seem to have outweighed the negative pressures created by heightened 
competition.  
 
 
 
4. Legal environment 
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Another issue that is tightly linked to the previous factor of deregulation is the 
general legal environment of the countries that are involved in the M&A activities. 
Several researchers distinguish legal environment as separate macro-determinant that 
play an important role in the M&A‘s (especially for cross-border takeovers). 
Primarily, it is crucial to emphasise that the impact of legal environments on the 
acquisitions is studied quite scarcely. The majority of the studies investigate the US 
market, and only a few of the papers concentrate on the financial sector (in the US). 
The key findings are presented below. 
The theoretical background is following. Since the investigation by La Porta et 
al. (1998), plenty of papers studied the link between legal environment and its impact 
on the firm value around mergers. As is widely considered in theory, ―strong‖ and 
inflexible institutional system is frequently connected to high investor protection, 
which in turn increases the costs of acquiring stock by the minority shareholders (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Starks and Wei, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Conn et al., 
2005). On the other hand, flexible and market-oriented regulatory environment 
encourages economic freedom and business activities, which in turn boosts inflowing 
investments and capital markets (simultaneously reducing borrowing costs)(Rossi 
and Volpin, 2004; Hagendorff et al., 2007). Effective corporate governance systems 
are possible only in countries with developed capital and stock markets and advanced 
institutional network of regulators.  
The results of empirical studies are somehow mixed. Whereas some 
researchers demonstrate positive market reaction to the mergers in flexible regulation 
systems (Moeller et al., 2004; Hagendorff et al., 2007; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; 
Kuipers et al., 2009), others produce contrary findings (Francis et al., 2008).  
In one of the cornerstone papers of 2000s, Rossi and Volpin (2004) studied the 
impact of shareholders‘ protection on the post-merger changes in the shareholders‘ 
wealth for both bidders and targets. The authors have shown that national economies 
with more developed shareholders‘ protection experience higher levels of takeover 
activities. Furthermore, it was revealed that the common practice is following: 
bidders from countries with more effective investor protection acquire targets from 
less effective and weaker regulatory systems. Rossi and Volpin (2004) explained 
their findings that the bidders are able to improve the asset efficiency of targets only 
by transferring them to more effective regulatory environment. However, the 
aggregate for the acquirers is not clear from the study, as they experience higher 
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transaction costs and a potential threat of deal blocking by authorities. This 
shortcoming was not addressed by authors. Thus, further attempts to address the 
problem of legal and regulatory environment in the cross-border M&A‘s were 
undertaken.  
Moeller et al. (2005) investigated the wealth effects of the mergers of the 
American firms that occurred in 1985-1995. The authors hypothesized, that weaker 
and less effective regulatory systems imply existence of stronger information 
asymmetries and more powerful agency problems, which in turn would result in 
higher premiums, but did not find significant results. The authors also admitted that 
firms in less harmonised legal environment tend to have more concentrated 
ownership structures. In further studies, Francis et al. (2008) were more successful. 
The authors have demonstrated that the US bidders received significant gains from 
acquisitions of targets from less effective regulatory environments. The reason is that 
acquirers are able to provide target firms with access to cheaper financial funds. The 
average cost of capital in the US is directly related to the post-merger wealth gains. 
Francis et al. (2008) conclude that cross-border acquisitions can be regarded as an 
alternative mechanism to avoid market inefficiencies. The authors point out that the 
differences with findings by Moeller et al. (2005) can be attributed to the lower 
transaction costs during the fifth merger waves in late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Hagendorff et al. (2007) developed ideas of the above-mentioned researchers 
and studied the abnormal return of the financial companies that were involved in 
mergers between 1996 and 2004 in the US and the EU. The scholars considered 
subsamples of cross-border and domestic M&A‘s. The results testify that weaker and 
less effective regulatory and legal environment in the target country has positive 
impact on the acquirers‘ CARs, as bidders gain access to the undervalued assets that 
can be utilised more effectively in the future, generating higher synergy gains. 
Normally, lower premiums are compensation for the information asymmetries and 
agency problems that were confirmed to be the most important factors in the 
analysis.  
In another paper, Bris and Cabolis (2008) studied financial mergers that took 
place between 1989 and 2002 globally and produced contrary results. It was found 
that bidding companies pay higher price for the targets‘ stock, if the deal involves 
less effective regulatory system than in case of the domestic takeovers. The 
researchers explained higher premiums by the presence of more concentrated 
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ownership structures, forcing targets‘ managers to demand higher price in case of 
incoming tender offer.  
Further, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) did not manage to clarify the 
analysed issue. The authors focused on the European market of the financial M&A‘s 
during fifth merger wave (1992-2001). It was found that acquirers experience larger 
abnormal returns around the announcement date if a target originates from a country 
with weaker or stronger legal systems compared to the bidders‘ system. Martynova 
and Renneboog (2008) admitted that these findings can confirm the presence of the 
―spill-over effect‖, that extends the positive effects of stronger law to the target 
firms. On the other hand, the reverse scenario (when targets originate from countries 
with more effective regulatory environment) was termed ―bootstrapping effect‖, as 
acquirers can improve their governance system voluntarily and on a unilateral basis. 
Interestingly, authors reject ―law spill-over effect‖ for the second case, making 
impossible for the above-mentioned effects to be active simultaneously. 
Summarising, it is possible that more effective regulatory system in the target‘s 
country of origin might reduce the wealth gains for the bidder companies. This is 
valid only in situations when acquirers are obliged to pay a higher price because of 
targets‘ high concentration and transaction costs (Starks and Wei, 2004). The 
acquirers, however, may obtain substantial gains from mergers with opaquely 
structured firms, which would attempt to attract potential buyers by lower premiums 
(Kuipers et al., 2009). On the other hand, it is also possible that acquiring firms can 
benefit from mergers with targets that are operating in the more developed legal 
system, primarily by adopting higher governance standards (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). The aggregate result for bidder companies is still unclear. In one 
of the early attempts to generalise the post-merger outcomes, Levine (1997) 
indicated that the adaptability of the financial system is directly linked to the 
flexibility of the legal environment. Thus Levine (1997) brought the discussion to the 
higher abstraction level, assuming that separate analysis of the regulatory system is 
not consistent. He also pointed out that more broad category of ―legal regimes‖ can 
define the behaviour of companies and institutions in the market more effectively. 
Eun and Resnick (2012) developed those ideas in their study and introduced the 
following classification: common law system (UK, Ireland, Cyprus) and civil law 
system (other EU members), with latter further subdivided into Napoleonic (French, 
Spanish), German, Scandinavian (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark) and mixed 
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traditions systems. The impact of the above-mentioned legal system on the post-
merger performance in the financial sector has not yet been sufficiently investigated 
in the academic literature. 
 
5. Global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis can be undoubtedly considered as an independent 
factor that played an important role in the M&A‘s. Although the phenomenon of the 
financial crises is widely viewed as specific reflection parameter of economic cycles 
(Harford, 2005), the recent credit crunch was an important phenomenon to be 
analysed stand-alone in the light of influence on the M&A‘s outcomes. Mergers 
during the financial crises can possibly have positive effects on the bidders‘ CARs, 
as acquirer companies would be involved into geographic diversification (Hughes et 
al. 1999), portfolio diversification (Emmons et al., 2004), activity diversification 
(Van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009; Hankir et al., 2011) when the prices for the 
competitors assets are low. The dramatic fall in the number of the potential buyers 
and rapid growth of companies that can be potentially considered as future targets 
might cause more accurate reflection of the true value in the stock prices and reduce 
the issues of the asymmetric information (James and Wier, 1987). It is also important 
to admit that some banking M&A‘s can occur due to the direct instructions issued by 
the regulators, who aim to prevent the long-term of the existence of the 
undercapitalized banks or to bail-out distressed institutions (Koetter et al., 2007). 
Obviously, the cumulative abnormal returns are usually negative in such ―forced‖ 
mergers. The report of the Group of Thirty also emphasises that some proportion of 
the acquisitions can be inspired by the targets‘ management who are seeking for the 
takeover in order to avoid bankruptcy and the merger is regarded as more efficient 
scenario (Group of Thirty, 2009).  
It can also be hypothesised that the importance of the due diligence procedures 
increases during the crisis, as more efforts have to be applied to overcome the 
negative effects of the information asymmetries and to establish the true value of the 
assets. Kwan et al. (2010) confirm the problem of assets‘ opacity during the financial 
crisis. Beltratti and Paladino (2013) express the same opinion, acknowledging the 
dramatic rise in opacity among assets at the beginning of the financial crisis. The 
mechanism of the crisis expansion is also important in this context. It is widely 
agreed that the crisis was initially proliferating because of large volumes of toxic 
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mortgage-backed securities on balance sheets. The increasing uncertainty 
considering the liquidity of such financial instruments caused information asymmetry 
to grow exponentially and to distort valuation even further (Beltratti and Paladino, 
2013).  
Normally, the process of takeovers involves due diligence procedures that 
establish the true value of the target‘s assets. The importance of these controlling 
mechanisms is increasing during the periods of general uncertainty expressed by 
investors in the market. The objective of the bidders is to establish the stake of low-
quality assets in the target‘s ownership structure to minimise the uncertainty. Jones et 
al. (2011) confirm the crucial nature of due diligence procedures, testifying that 
revaluations and other positive information were present in the analysed sample of 
the US-based banking mergers between 2000 and 2006. Another interesting remark 
is made by Beltratti and Paladino (2013), who point out that average time periods 
before the deal is completed are generally larger during the financial crisis. This 
scenario is obviously driving abnormal returns down, as stronger information 
asymmetries and a higher probability of sudden adverse changes could motivate 
counterparts to terminate the negotiations prematurely. 
Saqib et al. (2013) took a different approach. The authors implemented 
Merton‘s distance-to-default (DD) methodology and have found no viable 
relationship between the intensity of the takeover activity in the European banking 
industry and risks of banks during the financial crisis  (particularly, solvency and 
bankruptcy risks). Overall, the researchers concluded that M&A activity during the 
financial crisis was risk-neutral for the involved financial institutions, except for sub-
sector of investment banking.   
An important paper by Beltratti and Paladino (2013) took another approach and 
investigated the difference between outcomes of the European banking M&A‘s 
during the financial crisis and before it. The scholars implemented classic event 
study methodology and were the first to measure abnormal market reaction on 
mergers not only on the announcement date, but also on the date of the official deal 
completion. Their findings reveal that investors considered the completion of the 
deals significant, and the finalised mergers were rewarded with positive CARs. The 
difference in abnormal returns was explained by Beltratti and Paladino (2013) as a 
trade-off between higher volatility and realisation of the deal during the crisis. 
Additionally, one of the possible improvements can be extending the sample length 
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in order to include several upward and downward phases of economic activity; 
theoretically, it would help researchers to compare the outcomes of the European 
banking M&A‘s before and during the crisis more precisely.  
However, Ng et al. (2010), who utilised the same approach in their 
investigation of the US and EU banking mergers between 2004 and 2010 have found 
no difference between pre-crisis and crisis merger outcomes from M&A‘s. 
Interestingly, it was established (and these remarks are in line with authors‘ thoughts 
on further research), that several improvements can be performed in order to improve 
the validity of the results. Firstly, considering the highly volatile markets and 
unstable investors‘ attitude towards M&A‘s, it could be useful to implement larger 
event windows in order to establish whether positive or negative market reactions 
persist for longer periods of time. Secondly, as long as the existing literature on the 
EU banking mergers is quite inconclusive and covers EU-15 at best, it would be 
interesting to examine a wider range of the European countries, especially in the light 
of past EU expansion waves. These ideas are incorporated into the analysis in the 
thesis. 
 
6. Financial deregulation 
As the banking sector is a key focus of the thesis, it is also important to outline 
the factor specific to the banks. The financial sector generally and the banking sector, 
in particular, were historically under scrupulous attention by regulators, primarily 
because of the importance of the field for the economy and immense volume of 
funds the financial institutions are operating. The M&A processes were no exception. 
The regulators usually distinguish five key mechanisms that governments implement 
to influence the processes of M&A‘s (Group of Ten, 2001): 
1) through market competition and entry barriers; 
2) through approval decisions for merger transactions;  
3) through limits on the range of permitted activities; 
4) through public ownership of companies; 
5) through minimisation the social costs of bankruptcies. 
Nellis et al., (2000) testify, that only establishment of European Single Market 
enabled banks to offer cross-border services on the united market basis (so-called 
―Single Banking License‖ initiative, adopted in 1992) and therefore universal 
banking model was created, bringing first success to deregulation procedures. 
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European Commission has also implemented Financial Services Action Plan in 1999 
in order to tackle differences in the accounting rules and prudential practices that 
were another barrier on the way to financial integration and the creation of a single 
regulatory framework in banking (Hamoir et al., 2002).  
There have been several attempts to investigate the impact of regulatory 
environment on the shareholders‘ value of merging companies. For instance, Brady 
and Feinberg (2000) studied 20 acquisitions in 1991-1995, that were subject to the 
investigations of the European competition authorities, which were performed 
according to the EU merger regulations since 1990. The authors emphasise that their 
sample included the first merger deals that were examined by the EU formal powers. 
Brady and Feinberg (2000) attempted to find any evidence in support of the 
legislation regime effects and individual effects on the shareholders‘ value of both 
acquirers and targets. It was revealed that all possible impact was insignificant and 
weak. As was initially assumed by theory, if the merger deal was temporarily 
suspended because of ―competition infringements‖, the stock prices plummeted 
almost immediately, resulting in wealth losses. The authors also admitted that 
investors were unable to predict the decision of the EU authorities, which can be 
explained by the novelty of the anti-trust regulations.  
Another influential paper by Aktas et al. (2007) attempted to test whether EU 
merger investigations were unfair and biased against cross-border deals involving 
non-EU bidders. Their findings were contrary to the results of Brady and Feinberg 
(2000). It was established that market investors were able to anticipate deal 
suspension and the stock prices moved down before the official announcement by 
authorities. Further, Duso et al. (2007) found out similar effects in their analysis of 
the competitors‘ share prices in case of the merger announcements. The authors were 
following the methodology offered by Eckbo (1983) and developed by Stillman 
(1983). Duso et al. (2007) argued that admittedly announced competition-infringing 
merger cause positive effect on the competitors‘ stock prices, mainly because 
competitive forces would be reduced, pushing profit margins and abnormal returns 
upwards. Consequently, authors draw a surprising conclusion that positive movement 
of the competitors‘ stocks can be regarded as a reflection of the anti-competitive 
nature of a particular takeover.  
Some researchers admit that despite all legislative and political efforts, 
European financial sector is still not integrated (Carletti and Vives, 2008). The 
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authors also point out to the exact examples where interaction between European 
Commission as supervision authority and national banks as competition regulator is 
hindered (for instance, banking mergers of BNL – BBVA and BA – ABN-AMRO in 
2005), which are illustrative examples of substantial barriers on the way to market 
consolidation.  
Furthermore, Koehler (2010) points out that the lack of regulatory transparency 
in the European Union is a substantial barrier on the way to the consolidation of the 
financial sector. Karolyi and Taboada (2014) provide evidence that target abnormal 
returns are in direct dependence with the quality of the national banking supervision 
system. 
Some analytic reports outline high uncertainty level concerning new regulatory 
and legislative issues that have been anticipated by the key market players (KPMG, 
2014). The prohibition of proprietary trading and structural separation between credit 
institutions and trading activities that occurred after the financial crisis in 2009, can 
probably be core factor that will define European merger activities in the financial 
sector in the nearest future (PwC Report, 2013).  
As the financial crisis exposed the extreme level of risk in the banks, the 
authorities reversed the deregulation trend, intensified the supervision efforts over 
the financial sector and have identified the method to regulate the soundness of 
banking institutions – via capital requirements. 
 
7. Capital requirements 
Capital requirements are considered as a specific factor of influence for the 
mergers among banks. These regulatory norms can be theoretically interpreted as a 
reflection of the regulatory environment in the banking sector. Remarkably, the 
legislation that regulates the financial industry experienced important changes during 
recent twenty years. Regulatory factor as a parameter influencing M&A outcomes 
can also be considered pan-European, which fits the area of interest of the thesis. 
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision first introduced minimum 
capital requirements for banks (Basel I) and the financial institutions adopted these 
changes in G-10 countries in 1992. Crucially, Basel Accord attempted to decrease 
the risk of the global financial sector and reduce competitive inequality originating 
from discrepancies in the regulatory regimes in different countries. This Agreement 
elaborated common definition of bank capital and introduced its division into two 
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tiers: Tier I (core capital) and Tier II (supplementary capital). Briefly, financial 
institutions were obliged to hold 8% of the total capital (4% in Tier 1 and 4% in Tier 
2) measured depending on the riskiness of the underlying assets. The methodology to 
estimate maximum level of risk in the banks‘ assets was implemented in the 
Solvency Ratio Directive (1989) and the Capital Adequacy Directive (1993). 
According to the new Basel III Agreement, banking institutions have to hold 6% of 
core capital, while the total capital ratio remains frozen at the level of 8%.  
Table 1 summarises the proposed Basel III regulation. 
Table 1. Basel III regulations for banks 
 
RWA – risk-weighted assets 
Source: Lambertini and Uysal (2014), p.7 
 
Nearly all papers that tried to assess the role of capital for banking institutions 
investigated the US market. The researchers adhered to two approaches in their 
investigations in the banking takeovers. The first stream of literature utilises market 
data in an attempt to estimate the reaction of the stock market on the M&A 
announcements.  These studies usually test the hypothesis of whether sufficient 
capital requirements increase the shareholders‘ wealth of both bidders and targets. 
The second stream of research focuses on the question of whether capital 
requirements motivate banks to merge. Subsequently, the changes in cost/profit 
efficiency are assessed in the post-merger period. 
On the one hand, the studies by Hannan and Rhoades (1987), O‘Keefe (1996), 
Moore (1997), Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Akhigbe et al., (2004) testify that 
undercapitalised banks are more attractive as targets for the acquisitions. In 
particular, Hannan and Rhoades (1987) argue that banks with sufficient Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 ratios require additional premium for their soundness, which discourages 
potential buyers. In the same manner, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) point out, that 
Bank Capital Regulation 
Components Minimum Requirement  
Core capital (Tier 1) 
of which common equity Tier 1 
Total capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) 
U.S.: Leverage ratio 
≥ 6% of RWA 
≥ 4.5% of RWA 
≥ 8% of RWA 
≥ 3% (6%) 
Capital Conservation Buffer 
Common equity Tier 1 additional 2.5% of RWA 
Counter-cyclical Buffer 
Common equity Tier 1 additional 2.5% of RWA 
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banks with lower regulatory capital are closer to the bankruptcy and thus will be 
motivated to seek for potential acquirer. On the other hand, O‘Keefe (1996) and 
Akhigbe et al. (2004) demonstrate that capitalization rates are usually higher by 
targets, comparing to the subsample of the bidders, but lower if compared with 
companies that were not involved in M&A‘s. This finding allows concluding that 
undercapitalised bidders are motivated to engage in takeover activities in order to 
improve their financial soundness. Additionally, Akhigbe et al. (2004) confirm that 
lower capitalisation of the bank increases its probability of being taken over. The 
authors argue that overcapitalized targets allow bidder to have their losses (current or 
potential) absorbed and avoid additional capital injections.  
Another interesting paper that examines the role of capital requirements in the 
M&A‘s is a study by Hannan and Pilloff (2004). The researchers concentrated on the 
bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US from 1993 to 2002 to determine whether 
adoption of the Basel Accord would increase merger activity in the US banking 
industry. The key hypothesis states that overcapitalized banks have higher 
probability to be involved in M&A‘s as both bidders and targets than banks with 
average or low capital requirements. The authors provide at least two possible 
explanations. Firstly, undercapitalised banks wishing to be involved in merger 
negotiations can be deterred by regulatory authorities, primarily because the level of 
risk-weighted assets of the combined entity would be too low. Thus, potential 
bidders are motivated to choose overcapitalized targets in order to reach 
―compensation effect‖. Note that institutions with excess or average levels of 
obligatory capital would not experience these problems. Secondly, banks with higher 
soundness are able to free out a fraction of their capital and boost the shareholders‘ 
wealth. These actions can potentially increase the value of the bank, which might 
make merger negotiations easier. Their findings indicate a small positive relationship 
between excess capital and merger activity that is statistically significant when M&A 
activity is measured by the number of completed mergers but statistically 
insignificant when it is measured by the relative size of the acquisition. It is possible 
to conclude that the ―excess capital hypothesis‖ is partially supported. Despite the 
statistical significance, the lack of economic significance of the results lead the 
authors to conclude that there is no convincing evidence that adoption of the Basel 
Accord will have any effects on merger activity in the US banking industry.  
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However, the study has two main limitations that prevent it from being 
generalizable and requires improvement that would be carried out in this thesis. 
Firstly, the study considers only BHCs with assets exceeding $15 billion. BHCs have 
an advantage over traditional banks in that it is easier for them to raise capital and 
make acquisitions, therefore focusing on BHCs could seriously bias the conclusions. 
Secondly, authors focus only on the US market, while the EU market is currently 
understudied and can potentially provide other findings on the role of the regulatory 
capital.  
Another influential study by Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) has investigated 
the role of bank regulatory capital in the M&A‘s for the combined sample of US and 
EU financial companies. Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) build their examination on 
Hannan and Pilloff‘s (2004) study and address its weaknesses by focusing on banks, 
including both the US and the European banking sectors, and exploring whether 
target banks have higher volumes of obligatory capital than bidders and non-merging 
peers. They examine 105 pairs of acquirer-target banks for differences in pre-merger 
Tier 1 ratio and find that target banks usually are better capitalised than their bidders. 
Their interpretation is that it is the high capital of these banks that makes them 
attractive targets for takeover because acquirers can make use of the excess capital, 
for instance by freeing it up to increase their own ROE as suggested by Hannan and 
Pilloff (2004). Another finding is that US banks tend to be better capitalised than 
European banks. Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) testify that merger pairs that had 
greater relative capitalisation had higher CAARs following a merger announcement. 
Although results are only partially significant at the 10% level, the findings provide 
some evidence that capital markets reward acquirers for bidding for targets that have 
a high potential to have their excess capital reduced. The authors argue that this is an 
indication that the market considers banks with high capital ratios, i.e. those holding 
a relatively large buffer, as inefficient users of capital. Given that banks tend to target 
underperforming banks and that a bank can increase its ROE by cutting any surplus 
capital as stated by Hannan and Pilloff (2004), Valkanov and Kleimeier‘s (2007) 
findings suggest that the reason for this acquisition premium is the anticipation of the 
financial market. Investors expect that acquirers would ―trim‖ their underperforming 
targets‘ capital and rewards them in advance for any associated improvement in 
performance. If this is indeed what occurs, two predictions can be drawn from this 
study: first, the capital adequacy ratio decreases after merger, reflecting the process 
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of freeing up excess capital by the acquirer. Second, this capital ―freeing up‖ results 
in the improvements of the post-merger performance.  
Other explanation was produced by Hernando et al. (2009): if an excess level 
of capitalization implies bank‘s ineffectiveness in the diversification of assets, these 
banks would be more desirable targets for their competitors who can find better ways 
to allocate given assets of a target bank.  Nevertheless, Hernando et al. (2009) did not 
find significant evidence in support of their initial hypothesis. The authors were also 
unable to reveal neither positive nor negative link between minimum capital 
requirements and changes in the shareholders‘ wealth (in both subsamples of the 
domestic and cross-border M&A‘s).  
Although a vast body of literature has investigated gains from mergers and 
acquisition, few studies have considered a direct link between post-merger 
performance improvements and the regulatory capital from the accounting data 
perspective. Altunbas and Ibañez (2004) investigate whether M&A‘s between banks 
with similar attributes, including capital ratios, improves the operating performance 
of the acquirer after the takeover. The authors argue that capital may be used to give 
signals to the markets about the bank‘s expectations regarding its future 
performance. In a situation where greater equity capital is considered to be a signal 
of quality, an acquirer may target a bank with a large capital reserve to create a 
favourable signal to the market. This rationale is contrary to the more widely 
accepted view that good quality banks signal their quality by taking on more debt in 
an effort to distinguish from poorly performing banks. 
To sum up, a review of the relevant literature indicates that regulatory capital 
has an inconclusive role in the outcomes of bank mergers. Most of the studies focus 
on the pre-merger situation and find that banks holding a high level of capital have a 
greater tendency to become targets of acquisitions. Capital markets reward acquirers 
of those highly capitalised targets, where the potential to reduce the excess capital 
holding is greater. To date, however, there has been little discussion as to whether 
acquirers act on these signals from the financial market. In particular, two questions 
have not been addressed: are acquirers observed to reduce the capital ratio of their 
targets, and if so, what effect does this have on their post-merger performance?  
 
Summarising, the macro-factors are important parameters, that define the 
M&A activity from both neoclassical and behavioural approaches. While some of the 
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factors have received substantial attention in the existing literature (stock market, 
regulatory aspects), these parameters are necessary to be re-evaluated in the light of 
the latest financial crisis.  
2.4. Post-merger performance studies  
The existing literature also provides an array of extensive research on the post-
merger performance. The empirical studies that investigate banking mergers and 
acquisitions can be classified in the following way, according to the methodology 
that has been deployed:  
- market-based studies, reflecting external (market) reactions on the 
takeover;  
- studies based on the accounting data, investigating the change of firm-
specific accounting ratios (cost/profit efficiency, capital adequacy, 
loans/deposits quality, etc.); 
2.4.1. Market performance studies  
Market-based studies rely on the stock prices as a measure of market reaction 
to the merger events. Scholars distinguish two separate groups: short-term horizon, 
which covers the periods up to 60 days prior and after the merger event (Brown and 
Warner, 1985) and defines how fast information is captured by changes in stock 
prices, and long-term effects horizon, which covers the periods from 6 months up to 
5 years prior and after the merger event (Kothari and Warner, 1997; Barber and 
Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999). Traditionally, scholars use wide range of event 
windows: the shortest cover (-1;+1) and (-2;+2) days around the merger 
announcement (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Andrade et 
al., 2001), while the longest event periods classified as short-term studies deploy      
(-60;+60) days around the trigger event (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006). The long-
term studies, initially introduced by Barber and Lyon (1997), usually use event 
windows varying from (0;+1) or (0;+2) years (Gregory, 1997) to extreme cases of     
(-5;+5) years around the announcement date (Baker and Limmack, 2001). The 
subsequent discussion outlines the key results and determines the most important 
contributions to our understanding of banking merger mechanisms. 
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2.4.1.1.  Short-term performance studies 
In general, the studies that investigated short-term effects of M&A‘s cover 
developed markets and produced extensive, but mixed results. Initially, the majority 
of the studies focused on the US market, beginning from the cornerstone paper by 
Fama (1969) up to the early 1990s. The scholars concentrated on the market-based 
approach, studying the abnormal returns for bidders and targets. 
One stream of literature considered the post-merger effects (Mandelker, 1974; 
Firth, 1980; Asquith and Kim, 1982; Asquith, 1983 and Siems, 1996). Their findings 
were supporting the initial hypothesis that M&A create significant wealth for the 
target firms.  
 For instance, Mandelker (1974) performed one of the first consistent studies 
on takeovers in the American market, but did not manage to find changes in the 
bidders‘ value around the announcement. Further, Dodd and Ruback (1977) came to 
a different conclusion: the authors have found significant positive CARs of almost 
+2.83% for their sample of acquirers and +20.58% for the targets. Both results were 
statistically significant. Following their techniques, Jensen and Ruback (1983) and 
Conn (1985) found supportive evidence that bidders are likely to obtain gains from 
the merger announcement. On the other hand, Roll (1986) did not confirm their 
result, concluding that bidders‘ CARs were insignificant and close to zero. 
Several further studies continued to study US mergers, focusing on the event 
study methodology. For instance, papers by Bradley (1980), Bradley et al. (1982), 
Jarrell et al. (1988) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) investigated tender offers in the 
US market. Remarkably, all studies except Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) concluded that 
bidders normally experience significant positive CARs between 2% and 4% in the 
short-run horizon, while targets manage to bring their shareholders around 20-30% 
of additionally generated wealth. Only Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) testified 
insignificant returns close to zero for the bidders.  
Asquith (1979) developed the methodology initially introduced by Dodd and 
Ruback (1977) and applied two-factor market model as a return benchmark in the 
study of the US mergers. The authors revealed statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns in (0;+30) event window. Further, authors developed their ideas in 
subsequent papers (Asquith and Kim, 1982; Asquith, 1983). The scholars analysed 
the classic hypothesis of whether bidders experience value gains in the short-term 
period after the takeover announcement. The sample of public NYSE-listed 
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companies was analysed, provided that these firms were involved in M&A activities 
between 1962 and 1976. It was also important to study only companies with full 
stock price data. Thus the periods of 480 days before and 240 days after the 
announcement were selected. Asquith (1983) and Asquith and Kim (1982) estimated 
daily stock returns with the help of simple market model and compared them with 
the market index returns. It was finally concluded that announcement date resulted in 
almost zero reaction; the 2 days horizon allowed to testify insignificant +0.2% for the 
acquirers. Interestingly, authors also found that nearly all bidders suffered value 
losses in the longer post-merger periods (up to one month). 
On the other hand, James and Wier (1987) demonstrated value gains for the 
bidders, when authors analysed mergers in the 1970s in the US. These positive 
findings for the acquirers were confirmed by Dubofsky and Fraser (1989). Further 
scholars also reported positive CARs for bidders: for instance Seidel (1995) studied 
sample of government-assisted mergers in 1989-1991. The findings for the targets 
are more clear, yet quite dispersed: from +1.18% in results by Frames and Lastrapes 
(1998) to nearly +33.6% in findings by Neely (1987). 
More recent papers by Andrade et al. (2001) and Tuch and O‗Sullivan (2007) 
were less optimistic and provided more unambiguous results: short-run value effects 
are on average negative for the bidder firms in the US. Bruner (2002) performed an 
extensive work by reviewing other studies that investigated short-term reactions to 
corporate events and concluded that nearly half of them (20 papers) testified wealth 
destruction for the bidders (13 of them - significant). On the other hands, 17 studies 
showed significant gains for the acquirers. These findings made the final conclusions 
considering the performance of bidders more complicated and confusing. 
Quite a powerful stream of literature covers the short-term post-merger 
performance in the banking sector, which corresponds with the focus of this thesis. 
Most studies cover the United States and emphasise that mergers are on average 
wealth-destructing (Hannan and Wolken, 1989; Baradwaj et al., 1990; Cornett and 
Tehranian, 1992; Kane, 2000; Cornett et al., 2003; Gupta and Misra, 2007). Since 
2000, several studies obtained findings that mergers that took place in the 1990s 
resulted in better stock performance for the bidders, than a decade earlier (Becher, 
2000; Houston et al., 2001; Al-Sharkas and Hassan, 2010). The scholars explained 
their results with better access to the information, weaker information asymmetries 
and more precise market estimation of companies‘ value (Houston et al., 2001).  
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Thus the researchers continued to be sceptical in the 2000s considering the 
ability of the bidders to generate significant gains for their shareholders during 
M&A‘s. A plethora of studies obtained zero CARs for their samples of acquirers 
(DeLong, 2001; Cornett et al., 2003; Anderson et al. 2004; DeLong and DeYoung, 
2007).  
On the other hand, scholars were unanimous that target shareholders are able to 
increase their wealth in the short run after the takeover announcement, usually in the 
range between +10% and +15%. The only study by Toyne and Tripp (1998) testified 
significant losses for the targets. Other papers have also demonstrated positive CARs 
for the combined entities as well (Zhang, 1995; Becher, 2000; DeLong, 2001; 
Anderson et al., 2004; Becher and Campbell, 2005; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007; 
Al-Sharkas and Hassan, 2010) or no changes (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Pilloff, 
1996). 
The findings for the European banking sector, however, showed a different 
picture if compared to the US. While the target banks generated significant and 
positive CARs, bidders and combined entities suffered significant losses in the short 
run. One of the pioneers to study the European banking takeovers were Tourani-Rad 
and van Beek (1999), who demonstrated significant value gains for the European 
targets.  
It would be crucial to analyse the cornerstone paper by Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000), who pioneered in the realm of the M&A-related studies on the 
European banking industry. Their sample included 72 mergers in 1988-1997. The 
estimation of abnormal returns has shown significant gains for both bidders (+4.5%) 
and targets (+16.6%). Furthermore, Resti and Siciliano (2001) studied one of the 
most intense national markets of banking takeovers in Europe – Italy. The authors 
have also obtained similar results that have shown significant positive value creation 
for both bidders and targets.  
However, further findings were contradicting to the results obtained by Cybo-
Ottone and Murgia (2000). Especially, the direct comparison of the US and the EU 
banking acquisitions exhibited the situation when European banks were 
outperforming their American competitors. In particular, DeLong (2003) 
demonstrated that although CARs are frequently not significant for the EU acquirers, 
the latter still perform better that the US financial counterparts. Scholtens and de Wit 
(2004) undertook a direct approach and performed a direct comparison between the 
62 
  
post-merger gains of the US and the EU banks. The results, however, contradicted 
previous studies, as authors failed to find significant gains for bidders from both 
markets. Furthermore, the American targets outperformed their European 
competitors significantly.  
However, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) have found significant positive 
returns for the bidders (almost +4%) for their sample comprising EU banking 
mergers between 1988 and 1999. Furthermore, in other classic paper, Campa and 
Hernando (2006) studied 244 European bank takeovers in 1998-2002 and provided 
evidence to conclude that M&A banking mergers were value-increasing for the 
targets in the EU. Schmautzer (2006) has also shown that the wealth growth to for 
targets‘ shareholders outweighs the losses by acquirers bidders in the EU cross-
border mergers. 
Considering bidder banks separately, the findings show mixed results (similar 
to the US studies). Beitel et al. (2004) studied the sample that was constructed of the 
98 European high-scale bank takeovers in 1985-2000 to determine the most 
important drivers of the value growth. On average, the results show that both bidder 
and targets manage to obtain positive and significant CARs around the 
announcement date. The authors also indicate that more than a half of the total deals 
in the sample were wealth-increasing. Interestingly, higher abnormal returns were 
detected in focused mergers, deals with less experienced acquirer and transactions 
with a target that demonstrated persistent poor stock performance. On the other hand, 
Fritsch et al. (2007) investigated financial mergers that occurred in 1990-2004. The 
authors testify insignificant and zero-approaching CARs for the bidders in the short-
run period after the announcement date.  
Several papers focused on the particular external factors that influence merger 
outcomes for the banks. In particular, Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) attempted to study 
the impact of the introduction of the common currency (euro) on the post-merger 
performance. As was initially expected, the authors have shown significant and 
positive abnormal returns for the European bidders before the adoption of the euro in 
1999. The transactions after 1999, however, failed to generate wealth for the bidders‘ 
shareholders. Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) have also analysed the subsamples of 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone acquisitions. Surprisingly, it was found that the 
takeovers that involve Eurozone bidder, and non-Eurozone target demonstrate the 
higher value creation potential. The authors suggested that high abnormal returns can 
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be attributable to the geographical diversification which is obviously pursued by the 
banking institutions. Furthermore, scholars added, that the financial market became 
more competitive after the introduction of the euro.  
Further studies did not bring clarity into the researched problem. For example, 
Lensink and Maslennikova (2008) have found significant CARs for both bidders and 
targets, analysing the sample of financial M&A‘s during the period of the most 
intensive merger activities between 1996 and 2004. Reported CARs were significant 
and varied from 0.2% to 0.4% in (-5;+5), (-10;+10) and (-20;+20) event windows 
respectively. On the other hand, Beltratti and Paladino (2013) became the first 
researchers who distinguished between announcement and completion dates in their 
investigation, reporting zero CARs on the announcement and significant positive 
returns on completion dates. Additionally, prior empirical studies did not use a large 
sample of bank mergers to measure shareholder wealth of combined firms. Other 
crisis-related papers by Asimakopoulos and Atanasoglou (2013) and Tsangarakis et 
al. (2013) also support the findings in the previous literature, documenting no wealth 
gains for the bidders‘ shareholders and positive and significant gains for the target 
shareholders.  
In general, European target banks are almost always value-generating for their 
shareholders. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Beitel et al. (2004) and Campa and 
Hernando (2004) confirm the presence of significant and positive abnormal returns in 
the short-term horizon. Furthermore, the calculated results for the mergers that 
occurred in the 2000s imply the increase of the targets‘ shareholders wealth by 
almost 10% on average. Similarly, almost all studies are unanimous that the CARs 
for the combined entities are significant and positive, meaning that bidders‘ losses 
are offset by the targets‘ gains. These findings were demonstrated in papers by 
Lepetit et al. (2004), Ismail and Davidson (2005), Lorenz et al. (2006) and Lensink 
and Maslennikova (2008). On the other hand, the results for the acquirers are 
pessimistic. Recent studies report either zero returns (Lepetit et al., 2004; Karceski et 
al., 2005; Asimakopoulos and Atanasoglou, 2013) or document significant value 
decrease as a result of M&A‘s (Campa and Hernando, 2004). The studies discussed 
above also failed to reach a consensus with the investigations of the US market, 
which usually testify significant losses of approximately -2% for the acquirer banks 
(Cornett et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007). One of 
the core limitations that can be encountered in these papers is the exclusion of the 
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new EU members (countries that joined EU after 2004) from the analysis, as very 
few studies cover the period after 2004 – the largest expansion wave of the European 
Union. 
The aspect of the banking M&A‘s in the emerging markets is highlighted in the 
literature quite scarcely. In particular, Soussa and Wheeler (2006) included the 
mergers between bidders from the developed countries and targets from the emerging 
markets into their analysis. Their findings point out that this type of takeover usually 
results in value destruction for the bidder. Authors have considered different 
subsamples in the various time periods. Interestingly, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 
did not result in negative CARs for the involved companies, whereas the post-crisis 
period brought significant wealth decrease for the bidders‘ shareholders. Evidently, 
market investors did not anticipate the materialisation of the synergy gains in terms 
of the post-crisis uncertainty. In another study, Crouzille et al. (2008) came to the 
identical conclusion for the combined entities. More recent investigations report 
significant positive abnormal returns for the targets (Goddard et al., 2012), but fail to 
bring the clarity into the issue of the bidders‘ gains. Authors admit that obtained 
CARs are close to zero (Ma et al., 2011). Further, Kolaric and Schiereck (2013) 
examined the returns of bank mergers and acquisitions in Latin America and found 
that these takeovers were successful for both involved counterparts on the 
announcement date and first several days after it (CARs are positive and significant). 
2.4.1.2.  Long-term market performance studies 
The second part of the post-merger performance studies is concentrating on the 
long-run M&A effect detection, considering the reaction of the market investors to 
the takeover announcement or the dynamics of the accounting data ratios. 
Remarkably, the quantity of papers that investigate the long-term outcomes from 
mergers is much lower than short-term studies. The lack of information, the 
complexity of the analysis and a necessity to incorporate a plethora of external 
factors into the model make the research efforts difficult to implement (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997). Especially, the majority of difficulties emerge when the researcher 
needs to distinguish immediate impacts of mergers and other external 
(macroeconomic shocks, volatility) or internal factors (strategic, financial changes in 
the bank itself). Some authors argue that BHAR (buy-and-hold) methodology is 
more appropriate to reflect the experience of the investor in the long run, than 
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implementing CARs (cumulative abnormal returns. Smit (2005) has provided 
evidence that the results of the long-run post-merger analysis are subject to a high 
range of variation in the obtained abnormal returns. Earlier, Andrade e. al. (2001) 
admitted that CARs and BHARs in the three-year horizon are very difficult to be 
decomposed into the initial effect of the merger itself and the effect of another firm- 
or industry-related factors. The authors have also indicated that new information 
(corporate events as annual reports, restructurings, other corporate events) and 
cyclical merger nature (serial bidding) are often influencing the stock prices 
behaviour, making it almost impossible to separate the effect of a particular 
announcement. Furthermore, Smit (2005) has also mentioned, that the scenario when 
the majority of the firms in the industry are involved in M&A activities makes the 
results of the event study analysis less valuable. Nevertheless, Smit and Ward (2007) 
emphasise in their further study, that although long-run investigations are subject to 
some methodological and practical difficulties, it is still important to determine the 
persistent outcomes of the acquisitions, as the majority of synergy gains are 
materialised in the longer periods of time. 
The first attempts to determine long-term effects from mergers were 
undertaken in the 1970s. One of the pioneers, Mandelker (1974) has investigated the 
long-term abnormal returns for the firms involved in M&A‘s. He employed the two-
factor risk-adjusted market model. The findings were consistent with the market 
efficiency hypothesis, showing that information on the anticipated merger was 
captured by the investors prior to the announcement. Remarkably, the abnormal 
returns for the bidders were similar to the abnormal returns from any other 
investment-related activity and were insignificant and close to zero. On the other 
hand, Mandelker (1974) has found that targets increase their value by almost +14% 
on average in the horizon of seven months after the announcement date. 
Further, Langetieg (1978) attempted to implement the classic three-factor 
model, first mentioned in Fama (1969). The author aimed to test whether merging 
firms are able to increase their value in the long run. Thus Langetieg (1978) collected 
the US takeovers that were finalised in 1929-1969 and testified that abnormal returns 
for the bidders were insignificant indistinguishable from zero. 
Similarly, the paper by Jensen and Ruback (1983) has demonstrated nearly 
identical findings. The authors came to the conclusion that targets manage to obtain 
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gains of almost +4.0%, whereas bidders‘ CARs are close to zero and insignificant 
(for the sample of successful and finalised mergers).  
Malatesta (1983) has also attempted to estimate the long-run results for the 
bidders and targets (in both aspects of accounting data and the shareholders‘ wealth). 
The author analysed the sample of 256 merger deals that occurred during the period 
between 1969 and 1974 in the US. Identically to the previous studies, cumulative 
abnormal returns were estimated according to the market-based approach. It was 
revealed that acquirers‘ shareholders suffered significant, but small wealth 
destruction (around -2%). Furthermore, target firms did not show any positive value 
changes as well, in contrast to the past evidence. The authors explained that their 
results could be explained by the inclusion of the small firms into the sample and 
variations in the selected stock price benchmark specification.  
Singh and Montgomery (1987) have been first who addressed the issues of 
merger relatedness in the long-run perspective. They tested the hypothesis that 
focused acquisitions result in higher gains for the bidders than unrelated deals. 
Finally, it was confirmed, indicating that mergers between companies in the same 
industry create more powerful synergy effects in the future, and the latter are 
anticipated by the market investors.  
Another cornerstone study by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) tested the 
identical hypothesis with a much larger sample of 1273 US-based takeovers that took 
place between 1970 and 1987. The researchers revealed three key findings. Firstly, it 
was found that cross-border deals are more numerous than domestic mergers; what is 
more interesting, almost 75% of the cross-border mergers are among firms in the 
same industry.  Secondly, foreign targets manage to obtain higher abnormal returns 
than the US acquired firms. Thirdly, the observation that cross-border mergers 
outperform domestic transaction was attributed to the weak US dollar, 
simultaneously admitting an important role of currency exchange risk in the long-
term post-merger outcomes. Franks et al. (1991) followed the same framework of the 
market reaction assessment. The authors have analysed 399 American acquisitions 
between 1975 and 1984 and contradicted to the previous findings. Franks et al. 
(1991) emphasised that the results of the poor performance of the acquirers was 
likely to be discovered due to the methodology inconsistencies and benchmark 
errors.  
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Further studies attempted to bring clarity to the issue of merger-related value 
creation in the long run. In particular, Agrawal et al. (1992) expanded the sample to 
the period of 1955-1987 and estimated the long-term market performance of the 
involved companies, adjusting for the size and risk. The scholars confirmed that 
acquirers suffer significant value losses of almost 10% during the nearest 5 years 
after the deal completion. The authors also confirmed the presence of the efficient-
market anomaly which was first found by Jensen and Ruback (1983).   
Andrade et al. (2001) and Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) continued to study the 
set of various deal-related aspects of the acquisitions (payment type, industry 
relatedness, listed status, etc.), estimating the average abnormal return (AAR) in the 
long run. Although the methodologies in these two papers slightly differed, the 
results in both papers have shown that the average outcomes for the bidders‘ 
shareholders are zero changes in their wealth. Several shorter event windows (1-2 
months after the announcement) resulted in insignificant value losses (-3.8%), but 
returns converged to the zero value in longer event windows (up to 12 months). 
Finally, it would be fair to conclude that bidders do not experience significant 
wealth gains in the long-run if the market-oriented approach is implemented (Bruner, 
2002). Frequently the wealth decrease is detected. Abnormal returns usually vary 
from -4% in the results of Rau and Vermaelen, (1998), who analysed 3968 takeovers 
in 1980-1991 and considered the periods not more than 3 years after the 
announcement, to -14.3% in Loughran and Vijh (1997), who investigated post-
merger effects for 434 acquisitions in 1970-1989 with a maximum 4-year event 
window period.  
Remarkably, more recent studies were unanimous concerning the negative 
long-run performance of acquirers and the combined entities. Particularly, 
Alexandridis et al. (2006) utilised the classic model by Fama and French (1993). The 
results showed significant negative CARs of approximately -1%. Recent papers by 
Kyei (2008) and Laabs and Schiereck (2010) limited themselves to only 14 and 164 
mergers in the samples respectively. Both papers utilised standard 3-year event 
window and applied both BHAR (buy-and-hold returns) and CAR (cumulative 
abnormal returns) approaches. The authors reported average CARs of +1.4% and 
BHAR of -16.6% on the 378
th
 day after the announcement. Kyei (2008) expressed an 
opinion that ―...short-term measurements of abnormal performance do not capture the 
full effects of the market reaction to an event‖ and that ―...market participants 
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systematically tend to react sluggishly to corporate financial and strategic decisions‖. 
These findings are very important in the context of M&A research, as they reject the 
efficient markets hypothesis which is the cornerstone of the event studies (Kyei, 
2008). 
Considering the studies that concentrate on the particular industry (banking 
sector, specifically), the papers investigating long-run BHARs for the European 
banking sector are very few, opening prospects for further research. In one of the 
first papers on the long-term post-merger outcomes in the European banking sector, 
Agrawal et al. (1992) points out, that the bidders experience a decrease in value of 
almost 10% during 3 and 5 years after the announcement, which is comparable to the 
results of scholars researching US merger environment. The other papers by 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) authors confirm the 
above-mentioned results. It is crucial to outline, that in contrast to short-term event 
studies, long-run effects for merging firms in the European market are coherent with 
results describing US market.  
Specifically, one of the milestone studies investigating long-run returns for the 
European banking mergers is Conn et al. (2001), who considered the sample of the 
UK-based M&A‘s. The authors attempted to focus on the 36-month event window 
and to test the results using standard t-statistics and produced evidence on significant 
negative gains for the bidder shareholders. Gregory and McCorriston (2005) have 
reported results consistent with finding, that mergers decrease bidder‘s value in the 
long-run: acquirers suffer losses of -9.36% and -27% returns averagely in 3-year and 
5-year periods respectively. The findings provided by Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2003; 2006) are consistent with the above-mentioned studies, confirming the fact 
that mergers ruin shareholders‘ value of the acquirers in the long run. The main 
limitation of the aforementioned studies is the absence of variables that reflect the 
effect of macroeconomic environment and corporate governance. The majority of 
studies also limit samples with large deals, which makes impossible to analyse 
mergers among small banks (less than USD 100 million). The most recent study by 
Kyriazopoulos and Drymbetas (2014) investigates the long-term post-merger effects 
for the European banking mergers in the 2-year horizon. The authors found out the 
existence of negative long-term returns, totally in line with the existing literature. 
Surprisingly, the long-term stock price behaviour of cross-border M&A‘s is 
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distinctively different: the returns are significantly positive for bidder banks and, on 
average, are almost 8% in the 2-year post-merger time horizon.  
2.4.2. Operating performance and efficiency studies 
The majority of existing research on post-merger performance is focused on 
using market data on stock prices as an external reflection of the merger success or 
failure. However, first attempts to exceed the boundaries of market-based studies 
faced several difficulties. First, accounting information that could be used as a proxy 
for assessment might be subject to managerial manipulations and various accounting 
policies (different international standards were enhancing the effect)(Stanton, 1987). 
An additional difficulty arises when researchers are trying to detect impacts for the 
target companies, as they cease to exist or become a subsidiary of the bidder (Powell 
and Stark, 2005). Nevertheless, a massive number of studies were produced in order 
to measure outcomes of the merger for the involved companies, arguing that any 
benefits or losses emerging after the takeover will be reflected in the accounting data 
of the acquirer, provided that the asset transfer occurs at the completion date.  
Two key techniques are widely used in the literature on the M&A 
consolidation in the banking industry. The first approach focuses on the pure changes 
of the accounting ratios (studying operating performance), while the second approach 
studies changes in the cost/profit efficiencies. Normally, the researchers only apply 
one of the two frameworks, and only a handful of papers aim to undertake complex 
attitude and to incorporate both of them to establish a full picture of post-merger 
changes.  
2.4.2.1.  Accounting data studies. 
The approach used to evaluate the effect of the merger on firm performance 
has been the examination of the operating performance change due to the merger. A 
number of studies examined performance improvements due to M&A activities and 
used various accounting ratios to analyse profitability and cost ratio changes. It is 
worth outlining, the majority of the studies utilised the two popular ratios: return on 
equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). The early evidence from studies that 
considered accounting ratios had reached a consensus that merger did not improve 
operating performance.  
Several papers as Singh (1971), Utton (1974), Meeks (1977) and Kumar (1984) 
provided evidence for UK mergers that the majority of the takeovers experienced a 
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decline in profitability after the merger. An exception was Cosh et al. (1980) who 
found a weak increase in profitability. Other studies that reported a decrease in 
profitability included Peer (1980) for mergers in Netherlands, Ryden and Edberg 
(1980) for takeovers in Sweden. Other studies reported no statistically significant 
change in profitability for mergers in Germany (Cable et al., 1980), France (Jenny 
and Weber, 1980) and Belgium (Kumps and Wtterwulghe, 1980). Several later 
studies were in line with previous findings; in particular, Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) 
testify a significant decrease in ROE in the period after the merger completion. 
The substantial array of literature is dedicated to the post-merger effects for the 
operating performance of the banking institutions. The findings of the studies 
covering US banking M&A‘s were in line with the studies of non-banking mergers. 
The majority of the papers reached a conclusion of no improvement in profitability 
for various samples, time periods, and geographic locations (Rhoades, 1986; Linder 
and Crane, 1992; Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Pilloff, 1996; Akhavein et al., 1997; 
Chamberlain, 1998). 
On the other hand, the evidence of profitability improvement was found by 
several studies in the USA (Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; Spindt and Tarhan, 1992) 
and in the EU (Vander Vennet 1996; 1999). Spindt and Tarhan (1992) reported 
improvement in ROE but not in ROA.  
The contrasting findings of these studies could be explained by various sample 
size, location and time period or even by methodological shortcomings. On the other 
hand, the studies that utilise accounting data are frequently suffering from the weak 
ability to capture the profitability of the analysed firms (Fisher and McGowan, 
1983). Furthermore, some substantial distortions connected with the treatment of the 
merger completion and announcement can also play their role in the non-robustness 
of the final results (Chatterjee and Meeks, 1996). Logically, other researchers aimed 
to take other approaches in their studies (e.g. cash flow measures).  
Some further papers tried to utilise ratios other than classic ROA and ROE to 
study the changes in the operating performance. For instance, Healy et al. (1992) 
used the adjusted operating cash flow return on the firms‘ market value for 50 US 
mergers in 1979-1984. The authors have shown that merging companies improve 
their cash flow significantly in the 5-year horizon after the takeover.  
Other studies concentrated on changes in the bank expenses and implemented 
non-interest expenses as a benchmark to test performance: The general conclusion 
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for USA bank mergers is that cost ratios do not show any improvements after merger 
(e. g. Rhoades, 1986; Rhoades, 1990; Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Spindt and 
Tarhan, 1992; Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; Peristiani, 1993) or demonstrate slight 
improvements (Boyd and Graham, 1998)). Meanwhile, some other studies 
documented a decrease in some or one of the ratios they analysed e. g. Linder and 
Crane (1992) and Crane and Linder (1993) using non-interest expenses to assets, and 
Pilloff (1996) for the expenses-to-assets ratio. However, Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) 
found that the above-mentioned ratio was the only one that improved after the 
acquisition.  
Later studies express the same degree of scepticism concerning operating 
performance gains after the takeover. There is no evidence of improvement in the 
performance in the studies focusing on measuring ROA (Houston et al., 2001; 
DeLong, 2003; Zollo and Singh, 2004) or ROE (Akhavein et al., 1997). On the other 
hand, performance gains are reported only by a handful of papers (Cornett et al., 
2006; Knapp et al., 2006). More recent studies present a more optimistic picture of 
the post-acquisitions effects for the banks involved into M&As. Illustratively, 
Cornett et al. (2006) and Knapp et al. (2006) examined banking M&A‘s in the US 
and reported a significant increase in efficiency for the large-scale and domestic 
deals. These findings are in line with Berger et al., (2001) who admitted that the 
profit efficiency is directly linked to the geographic expansion. However, the study 
by DeLong and DeYoung (2007) conclude that banking mergers are performance-
neutral in the accounting data framework. 
Remarkably, the findings for the European banking mergers provide a different 
picture if compared with the US market. Generally, researchers demonstrate 
improvement in the personnel expenses to assets ratio (Vander Vennet, 1996) and in 
the cost-to-income ratio (Vander Vennet, 1999) for the mergers of comparable-sized 
banks. Besides that, Vander Vennet (1996) admits that European M&A‘s between 
similar-sized banks on average result in substantial positive changes in performance. 
Interestingly, the majority of other studies focusing on Europe concentrate on 
Germany. In the historical perspective, no performance changes were detected in the 
1970s and earlier (Gold, 1997). Haun (1996) reported a slight decrease in the post-
merger performance in the 1980s, whereas Baxmann (1995) documented mixed and 
inconclusive findings for the early 1990s. Later studies did not manage to clarify the 
controversy: Kondova et al., (2007) also obtained mixed findings. The authors 
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testified that takeovers in 1993-1998 were unproductive, while deals that occurred in 
1999-2004 brought improvements to the operating performance ratios. Auerbach 
(2009) implemented the same approach in his grand-scale study of the German 
market. The scholar considered 1682 bank mergers and revealed that the peak values 
of ROA and ROE are reached during the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 years after the merger 
completion. Only several papers covered the efficiency of the banking mergers in 
individual countries other than Germany. For instance, Spanish market of banking 
M&A‘s was studied by Carbo Valverde et al. (2003), who found that deregulation 
was a positive factor, but the most powerful benefit-bringing factor was improved 
economic conditions. Humphrey and Vale (2004) reported a 2% growth in 
profitability for the Norwegian M&A‘s. Pannetta et al. (2005) identified operational 
improvements among Italian banks after the takeovers (screening and compliance). 
They have also testified that the risk management system has also undergone positive 
alterations. 
Following the research line of Vander Vennet (1996; 1999) studies 
investigating the operating performance in the European financial sector in 1997-
2002 (see, for instance, Altunbas and Ibanez, 2004; Pasiouras et al., 2007) analysed 
the role of the pre-merger factors in the post-merger outcomes and corporate 
performance and came to the conclusion that European banking mergers slightly 
improve the key profitability ratios. Altunbas and Ibanez (2004) reported significant 
improvement in ROE for cross-border and domestic takeovers of +2.44% and 
+1.22% respectively. Interestingly, the authors argued that differences in credit risk, 
growth strategies and loans structure resulted in negative effects on post-acquisition 
profits. On the other hand, the analysis of the cross-border deals showed opposite 
tendency: larger differences resulted in higher gains. Pasiouras et al. (2007) applied 
the similar approach and tried to determine the reasons for the performance changes 
in the future for merging banks. The researchers concluded that targets were less 
profitable and bidders showed higher growth perspectives and higher profitability. 
Both targets and acquirers shared the characteristics of large size, low-cost efficiency 
and undercapitalised conditions. 
These findings are in line with further studies by Figueira and Nellis (2009) 
and Beccalli and Frantz (2009) who documented positive changes in cost- and profit-
related ratios of the banking institutions in the post-takeover period.  
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Concluding, it can be hypothesised, that the discrepancies between the findings 
for the market of the US and the EU can be explained by the higher potential to 
achieve scale economies for larger banks in Europe. This factor, in turn, can be 
caused by less tight competition.  Moreover, lower number of the restrictions in the 
1990s might have been a powerful driver for the M&A activities and further 
optimisation. 
Following the critique of the accounting ratios by some scholars, who consider 
them unable to capture the changes in the operating performance adequately, it 
would be logical to outline the studies which undertook different path in determining 
post-merger performance gains (or losses). Their key argument is based on the 
assumption, that the accounting-based studies do not distinguish between market 
power and internal efficiency changes (Berger et al., 1999). Below the brief overview 
of the cost and profit efficiency studies (X-efficiency approach) is provided.  
2.4.2.2.  Efficiency studies. 
Measurement of the cost/profit efficiency effects of M&A‘s has been another 
important issue in the literature on M&A‘s. The initial data for the banking 
institutions imply that cost efficiency improvement can be primarily reached by the 
reduction of competition. DeYoung (1993) concluded that average inefficiencies 
(mainly X-inefficiencies and managerial inefficiency) reached 20%. Thus, the goal 
of the is to establish how close each analysed firm is to the ―ideal‖, ―fully efficient‖ 
benchmark, or to the best firm in the collected dataset. It is also assumed that the 
input prices, scale effects and other external factors are kept constant. Interestingly, 
DeYoung (1993) mentions that efficiency growth is more probable in the cases 
where both bidder and target were relatively inefficient prior to the acquisition.  
 The efficient frontier methodology is widely utilised in these papers. Similar 
to the studies on the changes in accounting ratios, the researchers provide evidence 
that rejects any substantial positive improvements after the mergers in the US 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1993; DeYoung, 1997; Peristiani, 1997). 
Recalling the hubris theory of Roll (1986), it would be fair to conclude that future 
synergies are often exaggerated by managers. Additionally, agency theory is also 
applicable: the pursuit of personal benefits and reputation gains drives ineffective 
M&A‘ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Morck et al., 1990).  
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On the other hand, the studies covering the period of 1990s show mixed 
results. For instance, Rhoades (1998) argued that small but significant positive 
changes are present (approximately +2.5%). Similarly, Berger (1998) demonstrated 
improvements in the X-efficiency for both subsamples of large, medium-sized and 
small banking acquisitions. Surprisingly, some other papers found large 
improvement opportunities in aspects of costs and profits (Berger and Mester 1997; 
Berger et al., 2001). In particular, Berger and Mester (1997) testified that the best 
banks in their sample managed to achieve almost 55% of the benchmark profit 
efficiency. Shaffer (1993) pursued the same goal to measure potential changes in 
efficiency. The author constructed the sample of 20000 hypothetical acquisitions and 
concluded that smaller banks have the larger potential to optimise costs. Further, 
DeYoung (1997) emphasised that government-initiated takeovers of banks (or, 
alternatively called ―bailouts‖) can result in large efficiency gains. In line with the 
above-mentioned studies, Peristiani (1997) and Fried et al., (1999) argued that 
positive changes in efficiency can be reached only if the bidder is more efficient than 
the target prior to the transaction. Akhavein et al. (1997) asserted that the 
improvements in cost/profit efficiencies can be mainly explained by the ability to 
increase the returns of loans at the expense of the investment instruments.  
Unlike to the previous findings on the operating performance studies, European 
banking sector demonstrated similar, if not identical, results. It is important to 
mention that the studies on the post-merger efficiency changes are often covering 
national markets of a particular country, rather than working within the scope of EU 
as a whole.  
Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) and Altunbas et al. (2001) have found that 
scope and scale economies are proven phenomena for the European banking sector, 
thus motivating banks to engage into M&A‘s. Similarly to the conclusions by Shaffer 
(1993) for the US market, Altunbas et al. (2001) argue that potential improvements 
are larger for the smaller banks. However, empirical findings by Focarelli et al. 
(2001a) and Casu and Girardone (2002) have found cost and profit efficiency 
decrease for combined entities in Italy, while Rime and Stiroh (2003) present similar 
findings for Switzerland. Further, Focarelli et al. (2002) revisited the issue of the 
Italian banking mergers to examine bank mergers and acquisitions in 1984-1996. 
Remarkably, this study uniquely considers mergers and acquisitions as separate 
corporate events and demonstrates different motives, at least in the Italian market. 
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The mergers are usually driven by the potential growth of customer base and increase 
in the market power, whereas acquisitions are performed in order to increase the 
value of the combined entity and benefit from positive financial consequences (larger 
volume of possible debt, easier access to the capital markets, etc.)(Focarelli et al., 
2002). 
The studies analysing banking mergers in Germany provide various results that 
largely depend on the investigated subsamples. For instance, Lang and Welzel (1996; 
1998) documented significant cost efficiency gains among small universal banking 
institutions, but were unable to confirm their finding in the case of cooperative banks 
(Lang and Welzel, 1999). Nevertheless, several years later Wutz (2002) managed to 
confirm the initial findings: gains were small but yet significant. The picture is 
similarly mixed for the sample of savings banks, as was demonstrated by Bresler 
(2007) and Radomski (2008), who did not succeed in their attempts to find evidence 
in favour of profit and cost improvements. However, different results were presented 
by Koetter (2008) who studied 1500 banking M&A deals in 1993-2005 and 
concluded that more than a half of all German mergers managed to improve costs or 
profit efficiencies. Overall, the discussed findings testify that European banks are 
successful in optimising costs and profits only in case of cross-border and 
diversifying acquisitions, which differs to the US banking M&A‘s, which result in 
zero effects at best. 
Similarly, investigations of the other European national markets provide mixed 
findings. Bernad et al., (2010) showed that the aggregate post-merger cost-related 
effect of Spanish banks is unclear. The Greek banking mergers demonstrate negative 
changes after the takeover (Rezitis, 2008). Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) also 
focused on Greece and did not find evidence supporting the profit-improving nature 
of banking mergers. 
Some of the studies provide more optimistic findings. For instance, Al-Sharkas 
et al. (2008) argue that the US banks are more likely to obtain both profit- and cost-
efficiencies after the acquisition. The studies on the mergers in the European banking 
sector have proven empirically, that banking mergers are able to optimise costs and 
profits of the involved banking institutions (Diaz et al., 2004; Altunbas and Ibanez, 
2008; Beccalli and Frantz, 2009). Further, Chronopoulos et al. (2011; 2013) 
conducted tests examining changes in profit efficiencies for the European merging 
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banks and concluded that they are in a direct relationship with the deal value and size 
of the involved institutions.  
Another small but distinctive stream of literature, primarily presented by Dong 
et al. (2006), Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and Ang and Cheng (2006) propagates the 
point of view, that normally the deterioration of the long-term post-merger 
performance is mainly explained by the market correction, instead of widely used 
hypothesis of internal reasons. This assumption allows concluding that all studies 
that examine the economic outcomes of the M&A‘s are biased, as they are implicitly 
based on the presupposition that stock prices always reflect the fundamental value of 
the firm. In particular, Ma et al. (2011) challenged the widespread event study 
approach and emphasised the fact, that market investors are prone to pre-merger 
overvaluation and post-merger undervaluation. These behaviour patterns, in turn, 
distort the true, or ―intrinsic‖ firm value.  
Thus the above-mentioned researchers proposed an alternative methodology to 
assess the economic impact of the M&A‘s – residual income model, which is based 
on the estimation of the cost of equity (Ma et al., 2011). This model was first 
introduced by Ohlson (1995) and largely extended by Lee et al. (1999). Using this 
toolset, Ma et al. (2009) examined 1077 takeovers in 1978-2002 and attempted to 
assess raw and industry-adjusted intrinsic value of the acquirers. The estimation 
period began from the point of ―+2 months‖ after the merger announcement, in order 
to capture the deal completion delays. The authors revealed insignificant 
discrepancies with the classic event study approach. 
In of the other papers, Guest et al. (2010) studied 303 bidder companies that 
were involved in M&A activities in 1985-1996. The authors applied the residual 
income model and compared obtained results with the estimations from conventional 
event study method (both short- and long-run horizons). It was revealed that the 
increase of the intrinsic company value was positive but insignificant, measured 3 
years after the deal completion. This result is in contrast with the market-based 
studies, which usually document negative effect for the acquirers, and with 
accounting-based studies, which usually report significant and positive effects (Guest 
et al., 2010). The authors concluded that the findings on the aggregate post-merger 
effects are still mixed and inconclusive, as changing the focus of company value 
analysis to equity through residual income model does not introduce substantial 
improvements.  
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Finalising, it is important to mention that current literature on the efficiency 
effects banking M&A‘s is far from being sufficient. The above-mentioned papers 
suffer from a set of substantial shortcomings that undermine the obtained collective 
evidence. Firstly, the majority of the studies concentrated on the specific national 
markets (Carbo Valverde et al., 2003; Humphrey & Vale, 2004; Pannetta et al., 2005; 
Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2006; Pasiouras & Zopounidis, 2008) and did not perform 
the analysis of the EU mergers in aggregate. Secondly, the few of them that used the 
sample covering the whole European Union did not examine the ex-post operating 
performance of the banks. Thirdly, the studies lack the adjustment for industry 
performance (Altunbas and Ibanez, 2004). Finally, there are very few studies that 
combine efficiency approach with operating performance measurements.  
Overall, several other indications should be made as final remarks on the 
relevant M&A literature. Firstly, the theoretical research on motives and reasons of 
mergers has almost stalled since late 1980s and early 1990s. As long as the markets 
of the EU and the US are well-studied, the researchers lacked the variety of new 
ideas, having reached relative consent on the key motives and outcomes for the 
performed acquisitions under conditions of limited methodology. Secondly, both 
stock-market-based and efficiency-related streams of studies were only temporarily 
reactivated directly after the financial crisis, covering its immediate consequences for 
the banking M&A (Weitbrecht, 2010; Ng et al., 2010; Saqib et al., 2013; 
Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013; Beltratti and Paladino, 2013). Furthermore, 
the focus of the studies moved to narrow regional and industry-wide aspects of 
mergers predominantly in the developing countries with understudied processes of 
mergers and acquisitions.  
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3. Methodologies 
This section presents research methodologies that are implemented in the 
existing literature covering the M&A‘s in the banking sector. The utilised 
methodologies are divided into several broad areas that cover market-based approach 
(short-run and long-run event studies), accounting data approach (direct comparison 
of the accounting ratios, efficiency frontier analysis (DEA, SFA), residual income 
valuation). Additionally, several studies also investigate the probabilities of the 
particular bank to be involved in merger (as target or bidder). 
3.1. Assessing post-merger market-based performance  
3.1.1. Short-term event study  
The methodological cornerstone of the market-based assessment of M&A‘s is 
the event study approach. It is generally applied to calculate abnormal returns around 
a particular date (announcement date or effective date/completion date), cumulate 
these returns for event windows to obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and 
measure the market reaction to this particular event. In other words, the primary aim 
of the event study methodology is to estimate the extent to which stock prices 
behaviour around the announcement date deviate from expectations (market-related 
benchmark) (Sudarsanam, 2003). This deviation is usually referred to as ―abnormal 
return‖. The procedure of abnormal returns calculation is based on the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970)
1
. 
The semi-strong form of EMH postulates that all publicly available information 
is fully reflected in the prices. Thus, if the market as a whole is rational and efficient, 
the changes in stock prices will reflect the changes in the company value, allowing 
the researcher to estimate the impact of the merger event (Solibakke, 2002). 
However, stock prices often do not adjust immediately, requiring the researcher to 
study different time horizons (time windows). Additionally, Sudarsanam (2003) 
expresses an opinion that stock prices are able to capture all available and relevant 
information about the company, making unnecessary to study accounting data in 
order to reveal post-merger effects. 
                                                     
1
 An efficient market is defined as a market where all available information is fully reflected in the stock prices. The efficiency in this context is 
informational efficiency. Fama (1970) distinguishes three forms of informational efficiency: (1) weak form, where prices fully reflect information 
concerning the past behaviour of prices; (2) semi-strong-form, where prices reflect only information that is public, such as announcement of 
financial statements data, and (3) strong form efficiency, where prices reflect all existing information, including insider information. 
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The history of the event study methodology dates back to the early 1930s. The 
pioneer of the event study research was Dolley (1933) who attempted to perform a 
research of the stock splits, which can be considered as first paper using event study 
methodology (MacKinlay, 1997). The sophistication level in the studies grew 
gradually increased up to the late 1960s, when two extremely important studies by 
Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) were published and defined the 
generally agreed methodology to investigate the market response to the particular 
event. Among other influential papers were studies by Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985), who proposed to gather data sample on the daily and monthly basis. 
The method to calculate the expected return for particular companies is argued 
in the existing literature. A widely accepted framework that allows detecting 
abnormal returns is based on the CAPM, the model that assesses expected returns are 
relying on the risk premiums and the market portfolio (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). 
However, more advanced techniques (Brown and Warner, 1980; Dodd and Warner, 
1983) that are robust against autocorrelation and variance changes in daily data are 
used more frequently (Brown and Warner, 1985).  
Since the study by Brown and Warner (1985) was published, it is a widespread 
practice to assess cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the short-run M&A-related 
event studies. The formula for CARs relies on the link between the stock prices of a 
particular firm and the stock market index.  
 
                                   (2) 
 
where     and     - returns in period t of stock i and of the market m, 
respectively,     - zero-mean disturbance term, which is usually referred to as the 
abnormal return. Further, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is applied to 
estimate the intercept    and slope    for each stock i for the corresponding 
estimation period. They are referred to as  ̂  and  ̂ .  
Expected returns are calculated as follows: 
 
 ( ̂  )   ̂   ̂                             (3) 
It is important to mention the assumptions that should be held for the OLS 
regression model: 
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- the residuals are normally distributed with a mean of 0; 
- the residuals are not correlated with the explanatory variable (market return); 
- the variance of the residuals is constant (no heteroscedasticity); 
- serial covariance of the residuals across time is 0 (no autocorrelation). 
Several comments to the above-mentioned characteristics of residuals should 
be provided. Firstly, the residuals are distributed more closely to the normal 
distribution than daily returns (Brown and Warner, 1985). The remaining residuals‘ 
non-normality can be ignored in event studies (Henderson, 1990). 
Secondly, a problem can emerge when residuals are correlated with the market 
index returns. It can occur during upward phases of the economic cycles (at ―bull 
markets‖)(Pojezny, 2006). In general, the researcher can obtain biased and 
inconsistent results if the estimation of expected returns is performed using a 
structurally and fundamentally different period (Henderson, 1990).  
Thirdly, standard Goldfeld-Quandt test is applied to test the obtained returns 
for the heteroskedasticity (von Auer, 2003). Generally, heteroskedastic estimators are 
inefficient, but yet consistent. An agreed method to tackle heteroskedasticity is to 
implement Generalised Least Squares (GLS) technique instead of OLS (von Auer, 
2003).  
Fourthly, a standard Durbin-Watson Test is applied to test for autocorrelation. 
Again, autocorrelation implies inefficient, but yet consistent estimators. Usually, 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) method by Cochrane-Orcutt is implemented. 
However, as several researchers point out, implementing autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity adjustments do not bring important improvements to the obtained 
abnormal returns and significance levels, and the adjustments can be neglected 
(Pojezny, 2006).   
Another suggested adjustment that was previously addressed in the existing 
literature is an adjustment for the non-synchronous trading (or a usage of the 
intertemporal arbitrage). However, the problem emerges when transactions are not 
occurring at the same time, but can arise at time intervals of irregular length. As a 
result, the presence of synchronous trading can possibly cause the model beta to be 
biased downwards. However, several influential studies (Brown & Warner, 1985; 
Jain, 1986) argue that the subsequent beta correction does not have a significant 
impact on the initial results. MacKinlay (1997) suggests ignoring the problem of 
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non-synchronous trading, as the difference between the distributions (OLS betas and 
corrected betas) is negligible. 
It is a widely agreed practice to utilise the market indexes that are the most 
closely related to the analysed stock prices (Coutts et al., 1994). The most advanced 
approach assumes that researchers should capture the regional differences and 
account for country-specific risk profiles. Most frequently, share prices are compared 
with the market index: it could be key stock exchange composite index of the 
country where acquirer is based or Datastream General Market index (or Datastream 
Bank Sector index as an alternative).  
Finally, abnormal returns for the stock i are normally expressed as difference 
between the expected stock return and the observed stock return: 
 
      ̂   ( ̂   ̂    )       (   )                             (4) 
 
Further, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) can be calculated in the following 
manner: 
 
     ∑     
   
     ∑    
   
      ̂   ̂                           (5) 
 
Where     - simple return of a firm,  (   ) - expected return for a firm, and 
     =      (   ) - abnormal return for a time period t. Cumulating across T 
periods yields a CAR (Brown and Warner, 1985). Finally, CARs are aggregated over 
the sample firms and divided by their number n to obtain the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) of the group: 
 
      
 
 
∑     
   
                                                                 (6) 
 
The implementation of the event study framework in practice includes several 
important aspects that should be described in more details. The first phase of 
performing an event study is to determine the event clearly, which can be either 
takeover announcement or takeover completion. According to the classic 
methodological framework, the key event date is considered to be the date of the 
public acquisition announcement. However, other researchers can extend their 
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interest to the completion date as an event of interest (effective date)(Beltratti and 
Paladino, 2013).   
Figure 1 illustrates a summary overview of the standard event study when 
studying effects on the companies involved in M&A activities. 
 
Figure 1. Estimation Period and Event Window 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another important issue is the selection of an estimation period to define the 
―normal stock behaviour‖. It is usually selected for a period of 50 and 240 days 
before beginning of the event period and should not comprise any other events that 
can distort the initial stock price behaviour (Campbell et al., 1997). The estimation 
period can vary from 120 days to 210 days, which is adopted in plenty of studies 
(Temming, 2014; Pundert, 2013; and Simões et al., 2010). Several researchers 
suggest using larger estimation windows, but the results are not significantly better 
(MacKinlay, 1997). However, there is no clear rule or justification regarding the 
issue of how long should be the estimation period to be included in the analysis; the 
interval should be wide enough to capture the link between the particular stock and 
the market.  
Then, event windows are selected, covering the examined period around the 
selected event date. Thus, short-term effects of the event of interest are captured and 
examined. The focal point of the event period is usually the announcement date, 
which usually plays the role of the ―zero day‖ of the event time. However, some 
researchers implement asymmetric event windows to track information expansion 
over the market in different phases of the merger event (Campa and Hernando, 
2006).  Frequently, the scholars utilise the event windows that are wider than the 
analysed date (event date). It gives an opportunity for more precise examination of 
surrounding time periods, allowing market imperfections to decrease their influence 
on the obtained results (MacKinlay, 1997). The only issue that can cause 
discrepancies among scholars and puzzles the researchers is the choice of appropriate 
length of the event window. For instance, Beverley (2008) argues that choice of 
Estimation Period Event Period 
Announcement Event 
𝑇 𝑛 𝑥 𝑇 𝑛 𝑇𝑛 
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event window length is arbitrary and that no valid and widely-recognized theoretical 
justification exists. Tuch and Sullivan (2007) claim, that shorter event windows are 
preferable, providing less noise in the data. However, some researchers point out, 
that the length of the event window can be interpreted as a measure of the speed, 
with the help of which market is incorporating new information about the merger 
events (Krivin et al., 2003). Furthermore, Mitchell & Netter (1989) argue that the 
implementation of only short event windows is justified if and only if the assumption 
of the efficient markets is held. However, the latest research concludes that only 
financial markets in Germany, the UK, Sweden and Ireland comply with a weak 
form of efficiency (Worthington and Higgs, 2004). The financial markets of the other 
EU members (since 2004) cannot be considered efficient even in its weak form 
(ibid). The comparability factor is also important among scholars, ensuring that 
results from identical event windows can be matched with each other.    
Secondly, researchers agree that determining merger date can be convincing in 
theory, but the process of news dissemination across the market can be less obvious 
in practice. The date of actual merger date can be different from one reported and 
even not discrete in time. Modern financial mergers are highly complicated 
phenomena comprising phases of legislative consultations, due diligence and other 
corporate procedures taking months to be finalised. Although the whole process is 
kept undisclosed, there is a substantial probability that some information will 
infiltrate the market in the form of rumours and influence the market reaction to the 
merger. Following Jayaraman et al. (2001), who investigated the level of trading 
activity for companies that were rumoured to be involved in M&A processes, there is 
strong evidence that significant increase in trading activity is observable in periods 
preceding merger announcement dates. The authors also admit that trading volumes 
and abnormal returns of selected companies are correlated with the illegal insider 
activities. Furthermore, Jayaraman et al. (2001) indicate, that their investigation on 
the reasons for pre-merger upward trend for the target company stock has provided 
clear evidence, that above-mentioned stock ―run-ups‖ cannot be fully explained by 
only publicly available information, as they were occurring even before the first 
public disclosure.  
Importantly, several technical problems, that can be encountered while 
implementing event study methodology, should be discussed. Primarily, it is 
important to account for ―confounding events‖ when estimating abnormal returns. 
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These events include restructurings, dividend payments (Morck and Yeung, 1992), 
earnings announcements (Brown and Warner, 1985), stock splits, legal claims, 
executive changes (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993), joint venture announcements 
(McConnell and Nantell, 1985). In other words, it is quite complicated to isolate the 
particular merger announcement from other events that can influence the changes in 
the stock prices. Therefore, longer event windows are more exposed to distortions in 
the abnormal returns derived from the share prices.  
The typical method to tackle the above-mentioned difficulties is as follows. 
The scholars usually have to isolate the event of interest by excluding those 
companies that are affected by confounding events. This solution is better than 
construct auxiliary assumptions concerning the effect and power of the signals to the 
market. This is quite problematic if sample consists of large firms that are likely to 
be involved in several corporate events during the period of analysis (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). Another possible technique can be found in DeFond et al. (2010), 
who proposed two-step approach to isolate the effect of the distorting events. Firstly, 
the information on all events is collected using reliable databases, like Bloomberg, 
Financial Times or Thomson Reuters (including all annual and quarterly reports, 
earnings/losses announcements, restructurings announcements, etc.) Secondly, public 
data sources are analysed in order to extend the sample of corporate events and 
ensure correct causality and robustness. 
However, other scholars indicate that compiling the fullest possible sample of 
the corporate actions might be insufficient to include all possible confounding events 
and it is almost impossible to control for all such factors. Nevertheless, Brown and 
Warner (1985) show that the problem of the confounding events can be omitted and 
ignored if and only if they are purely random, which usually happens in large 
samples. Furthermore, Ecker et al. (2006) assert that the widely used assumption of 
events‘ randomness is valid. In other words, the incoming news is either (or both) 
rare and randomly distributed across event and non-event days, and two events 
cancel each other
2
.  
Finally, one of the most important problems that researchers consider in the 
context of the event study methodology is the phenomenon of time-varying variance. 
                                                     
2 The cancelling argument can be explained through the process of abnormal returns estimation. In particular, average abnormal returns, 
calculated for the so called ―clean‖, non-event period, are widely used as a benchmark for the event studies. If other information or news are 
equally likely to take place on event days and on non-event days, then both estimated and control abnormal returns would contain the component 
of additional incoming information. When these two returns are compared, the effect of confounding events is eliminated.  Importantly, for this 
argument to be valid, the frequency and magnitude of the confounding events should not depend on the merger events. 
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Normally, the standard event study framework is improved by using Generalised 
AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. Although one of 
the basic assumptions of the classic event study technique is an equal variance for all 
investigated sub-periods, some influential papers admitted that this ideal scenario is 
not the case in the majority of samples (Brown and Warner, 1985). Brockett et al., 
(1994) emphasise that if the variance is assessed incorrectly (most frequently 
underestimated), the null hypothesis would be over-rejected in the subsequent 
analysis. Other papers aimed to explain and describe the importance of the time-
varying variance effect in the event studies (Weston et al., 1999; Leggio and Lien, 
2000; Xu et al., 2003; Murthy and Rao, 2009). The researchers were unanimous that 
it should be addressed in the merger studies scrupulously, as the majority of the 
financial series are prone to time-varying variance. This argument is extremely 
important for the studies that examine the periods of structurally different stock price 
behaviour or the periods of economic or financial crises.  
Engle (1982) developed a new model that was designed to tackle the problems 
caused by the time-varying variance. The author presented the new class of 
stochastic processes – ARCH (AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity). The 
initial specification was later generalised to become GARCH model (Bollerslev, 
1986; Baillie and Bollerslev, 1990). The key motivation was to link current 
conditional variance to its past values (Wang et al., 2002). The standard GARCH 
model includes two equations in one system: the mean equation and the conditional 
variance equation. The core advantage of the GARCH specification is that this model 
controls for the time-varying variance (which can be crucial in the analysis of the 
financial crises or other periods of high volatility) and estimates the expected returns 
in a similarly simple way as the OLS model. 
Similarly to the method used to calculate normal and abnormal returns 
previously, adjusted GARCH (1;1) model is widely implemented to obtain ―normal‖ 
returns in the following specification: 
 
                 
           ;     (   )                                                                               (7) 
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where     – normal return;     – market return,     – coefficient,     – 
residuals of mean equation,       – coefficients in variance equation,      – 
conditional variance. 
The first equation denotes mean equation, and the second one is variance 
equation. A plethora of papers demonstrated that the volatility is persistent in the 
financial markets and that a GARCH (1;1) model performs well in these conditions 
(Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1993). Furthermore, Wang et al., (2002), Batchelor and 
Orakcioglu (2003), McKenzie et al. (2004) decided to use GARCH (1;1) model in 
their investigations.  
Further, after obtaining the abnormal returns estimated with help of GARCH 
techniques, it is necessary to perform analysis using characteristics of merger deals 
and other bank-specific factors. The latter can provide further insight on the impact 
of M&A processes on the shareholders‘ wealth of bidders and targets and to establish 
what deal characteristics can be considered the most important for the acquisition to 
succeed. Generally, dummy variables are applied in order to explain the influence of 
the above-mentioned factors.  
Usually, the following equation is estimated: 
 
jjj ZCAR                      (8) 
 
where iCAR  is cumulated abnormal return for the bank j , jZ  is the vector of 
bank- and deal-specific variables,   is the vector of the estimated parameters and j  
is an error term.  
Assessing event study methodology in general, researchers point out some 
substantial drawbacks of the event study methodology, which arise during 
measurement of the short-term post-merger performance: 
1) event study methodology relies on the availability of the stock prices data. 
Therefore, only mergers among publicly-listed companies can be studied. Thus, 
Rhoades (1998) concludes that results obtained from event studies are at least not 
representative for the whole financial industry and significantly differ for the 
subsample of the private companies. 
2) it is important to emphasise that event study methodology relies on assets 
prices to establish post-merger benefits for the involved companies. However, 
87 
  
inferences on the merger results on the basis of stock prices fluctuation and changes 
in shareholders‘ returns are at least unobvious in the short run. In many cases, it takes 
several years for the post-acquisition benefits to materialise. Thus, it can be more 
appropriate to treat results obtained by event studies as evidence for a short-term 
change of shareholders‘ wealth rather than benefits for the bidder or target in 
aggregate. Furthermore, these problems deepen if the information asymmetries are 
present between acquirers and market investors. Consequently, it might be highly 
dubious to think that market-oriented approach provides a full, unbiased and accurate 
picture of the value-creating potential (Healy et al., 1997). 
3) Lyon et al. (1999) demonstrated that misspecification is a quite frequent 
shortcoming in the narrow, single-industry samples. Further, differences in 
sensitivity to news for different country stock indices create space for the ambiguity 
of the obtained results (Park, 2004).  
4) Finally, the selection of the appropriate event window is arbitrary, and there 
are almost no convincing theoretical justifications behind it. The length of 
examination period around the merger date of a merger is highly variable across 
different studies; additionally, reported results of event studies are time-sensitive, 
depending on the market activity, irrespectively to merger processes. 
Taking these drawbacks of the short-term event-study methodology into 
consideration, several researchers offered solutions and implemented long-term 
event-study methodology that is free of the short-term event study drawbacks and 
can serve as an alternative framework to assess post-acquisition value effects for the 
involved banks.  
3.1.2. Long-term event study  
The key objective of the long-term studies on mergers is to investigate the 
connection between market reaction and post-merger performance in the long-run. 
Thus, scholars advocate for the usage of buy-and-hold returns (BHARs). The market-
based research of long-term returns as the proxy to measure the outcomes of the 
takeovers is based on the same preconditions and methodology as short-term studies. 
The main modification implemented in this type of research are BHARs, which were 
first introduced in the new line of studies published by Ritter (1991) and Ikenberry et 
al. (1995).  
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Typically, BHARs are defined as margin between the actual return for the 
particular stock and the expected buy-and-hold return (Lyon et al., 1999): 
 
      ∏ (     )   (∏ (     ))
 
   
 
                           (9) 
 
where   - the number of months after the event;      return of ﬁrm   in month 
  and  (∏ (     ))
 
     is the expected return. The expected return is usually 
measured using the market index as a benchmark.  
 
As in the case of short-term event study, it is also important to establish to 
which extent different external factors influence the outcome of the mergers. 
Regression analysis is usually deployed including the set of deal-related and 
company-related variables. The control variables are frequently introduced to 
establish what characteristics are important for the merger outcomes. Multivariate 
regression models of the abnormal returns to acquirers and targets are estimated (see 
Equations 9 and 10). Further, another powerful solution is to include the set of 
accounting data variables and to test whether operating performance is influencing 
abnormal returns. In particular, the following equations are estimated: 
 
        ∑   
 
                  (10) 
 
               ∑   
 
           (11) 
 
where   and     are the intercepts of the model,   and     are the coefficients, 
and    and    represent the vectors of bank-specific, deal-specific and country-
specific explanatory variables for short run and long run models, respectively. 
Several scholars admit that BHAR methodology is optimally applied to the 
problems of the long-run performance estimation (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Lyon 
et al., 1999; Loughran and Ritter, 2000). However, other researchers prefer to utilise 
the portfolio approach (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The main point of the argument 
between different scholars is centred around the trade-offs between Type I and Type 
II errors. Generally, it is considered that the implementation of the buy-and-hold 
approach tends to over-reject null hypothesis, yet being powerful enough. In contrast, 
portfolio approach accumulates individual events in the calendar-time portfolios, 
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excluding important information about the investors‘ experience. As a result, Type II 
errors are frequent.  
Barber and Lyon (1997) compared CARs and BHARs for the identical sample 
of merger events and concluded that long-run CARs are biased estimators. 
Furthermore, buy-and-hold abnormal returns have a crucial quality, as they 
incorporate the investor experience, as BHAR returns are compounded (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997). The authors add that buy-and-hold approach is much more suitable for 
the long-term analysis (Pecherot-Petitt, 2000). 
However, Barber and Lyon (1997) indicate several biases that are linked with 
buy-and-hold methodology: 
1) new listing bias, which usually emerges in the long-run studies. This effect 
occurs because new companies are constantly added to the market index, that is used 
as a proxy to determine expected returns, whereas sampled firms have constant 
history of stock prices prior and after the acquisition event; 
2) rebalancing bias, which manifests itself in the possible difference between 
market index returns (usually rebalanced at regular intervals) and portfolio returns 
(which are normally compounded without rebalancing); 
3) skewness bias, which is often observable for long-run BHARs. 
Summarising, long-term event study methodology is not immune to the 
drawbacks. Primarily, researchers indicate that the most serious shortcoming of the 
BHAR-based framework is a large number of confounding events that occur during 
the analysed period. However, the ability to incorporate investors‘ experience in the 
long-term investigation makes long-run event study methodology applicable in 
examining M&A‘s outcomes. 
3.2. Assessing post-merger operating performance 
3.2.1. Accounting performance studies 
Apart from the market-based approach, another part of researchers considers 
internal corporate information more valuable to assess post-merger outcomes. Thus 
the accounting data is used to determine gains or losses for companies involved in 
the takeover process. Regarding the process of accounting data assessment, some 
scholars deploy pure accounting-based approach to track the changes in the post-
merger performance by direct comparison of accounting ratios before and after the 
merger. The researchers also consider the possibility that operating performance 
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might be externally influenced by industry-specific factors and other non-forecasted 
shocks. These concerns largely explain the industry adjustment, which can often be 
encountered in the studies. Similarly to the event studies, the focal point of 
accounting studies is also to estimate the industry-adjusted abnormal performance, 
which is basically presented as a difference between the bank-specific variable and 
the mean value of the control sample. The latter can be constructed from the banks 
that have never been involved in takeover activities, possibly size- and country-
matched as well.    
 The most widespread method to estimate the variables that influence post-
merger performance is a regression analysis. The most appropriate banks-specific 
ratios (solvency, liquidity, profitability, efficiency, etc.) are included in the model 
(see Hagendorff et al., 2012 for an illustrative specification): 
 
                                (12) 
 
Vector    represents aggregate changes in variable i for the bank j in particular 
years prior and after the year when the acquisition was finalised.     –vector of bank-
specific variables;     – vector of deal-specific variables;     – vector of country-
specific variables.   ,   ,    – vectors of coefficients,      – heteroskedasticity-robust 
error term; j - company type dummy (target or acquirer). Importantly, the researchers 
can also use separate sample of acquirers and targets to distinguish between 
companies involved into M&A‘s. For the bidder sample, the post-acquisition of the 
combined entity is compared with the pre-deal values.  
Some scholars also admit the presence of the specific behaviour patterns that 
can be observed for the operating performance variables. If the industry is affected 
by some random external shock, there would be an adjustment towards the mean 
value during the period of the analysis (normally 3 to 5 years). Thus it can be 
concluded that the dependent variable would be reversely linked to the first year 
values. These important comments were first expressed by Knapp et al. (2006) and 
are derived from the study by Fama and French (2000). The authors found out this 
interesting effect when they analysed profitability changes (measuring ROA and 
ROE) in the banking industry and continuously reported significant negative 
coefficient for the respective coefficients. 
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The set of variables used in the relevant literature is usually similar to the 
variables used in the event study methodology and can be divided into several 
categories: 
1) liquidity and stability ratios: capital adequacy, Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 
capital; 
2) profitability ratios: ROE, ROA, net income and EBITDA; 
3) financial ratios: total assets turnover, debt-to-assets, debt-to-equity, 
equity-to-deposits, loans-to-capital and cash-flow-to-revenue; 
4) valuation ratios: Tobin‘s Q, book value per share, total assets and total 
deposits; 
5) macroeconomic variables: GDP growth rate, Country Risk Index 
(calculated by UNCTAD), US dollar exchange rate to any other relevant currency, 
inflation rate and Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
Additionally, all the appropriate deal-specific dummy variables are 
incorporated, similar to the short-term event-study (cross-border status, payment 
type, Eurozone membership, diversification status, etc.) 
However, some researchers consider the direct comparison of ratios improper 
due to several reasons: the probability that accounting data can be manipulated by 
management, differences in accounting standards among countries, etc. Thus these 
scholars undertake other approaches. They solve the problem of more complicated 
cost and profit efficiency analysis by implementing DEA (data envelopment 
analysis) and SFA (stochastic frontier analysis). 
3.2.1.1. DEA (Data envelopment analysis) 
The objective of DEA is to assess the technical efficiency of banks or other 
firms involved in M&A‘s. The methodology was first proposed by Charnes et al. 
(1978), who elaborated a linear programming method to assess the maximum 
potential outputs at given inputs. This approach provides an accurate analysis of 
efficiency, provided that technology remains unchanged. The researchers construct 
the output frontier relying on the input data for each bank in the sample (Coelli et al., 
1998). The relative cost efficiency measure     is obtained as a ratio of the estimated 
minimum cost bank   could potentially achieve to its realised cost, where       
  and equals unity when the bank is deemed cost efficient. However, costs are not 
the only parameter that is important for the banks, as profit maximisation is a basic 
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objective for managers and their shareholders as final beneficiaries. Some scholars 
argue that cost-effective financial institutions can be not so efficient considering the 
aspect of profits. The same procedure can be repeated for the relative profit 
efficiencies (       ). 
Banks‘ cost and profit efficiencies are measured relative to a common frontier 
by pooling the data across countries estimated separately for each year. This 
approach allows for estimating efficiency differentials not only between 
conglomerates and specialised banks within a country but across countries as well 
using the same benchmark technology.  
In more technical terms, the calculation process is following. Assume that there 
is data on K inputs and M outputs for each of N banks. For i bank inputs and outputs 
are represented by the vectors    and    respectively. K x N input matrix – X and the 
M x N output matrix – Y represent the data for all N banks. The input-oriented 
efficiency score for each bank is calculated in towing way (under constant return to 
scale): 
 
    , 
                                                                                             (13) 
          
     
 
where   is a scalar representing the efficiency score for each bank in the 
sample (from 0 to 1); λ is a vector of N x 1 constants. Here, linear programming 
problem has to be solved N times, once for each bank in the sample. 
The second phase of the investigation is usually aimed to determine the 
relationship between the obtained efficiency levels and the set of deal-, bank- and 
country-specific factors. The regression analysis is a widely agreed method. 
Normally, the following regression specification is estimated: 
 
jjj ZEff                        (14) 
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where iEff  is cost/profit efficiency, jZ  is the vector of the bank-, deal- and 
country-specific variables of the bank j ,  is the vector of estimated parameters and 
j is an error term (Simar and Wilson, 2007).  
3.2.1.2. SFA (Stochastic frontier analysis) 
In contrast to the above-mentioned non-parametric DEA methodology, 
scholars widely implement the parametric methodology of SFA (stochastic frontier 
analysis). Its key advantages over DEA are following. First, SFA model includes the 
error term, representing random factors as external shocks, statistical noise, that 
cannot be controlled and anticipated by the banks. It is important to incorporate 
exogenous impact, as otherwise it would be determined as inefficiency in the model.  
Second, enables the researcher to perform statistical tests after the estimation. 
SFA methodology was first proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and 
van den Broeck (1977). Battase and Coelli (1995) developed the initial model and 
elaborated the framework that describes technical inefficiency of analysed banks. 
Thus, the determinants of inefficiencies became possible to assess using one-step 
approach. 
The researchers continued to improve the specifications of the initial SFA 
models and made them applicable to the analysis of the M&A‘s in the banking 
sector. Although the differences between various model versions are few, the most 
widespread formulation is a translog variation. The profit frontier model is usually 
presented in the following way: 
 
      ∑         ∑         
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∑ ∑                ∑ ∑                                                (15) 
 
where: j - outputs; k - inputs;   - profit (total revenue minus total cost);    - 
output j;    = input price k; and         .    is total residual, which can be 
decomposed into   , (profit inefficiency) and    (random noise effect)(Jondrow et 
al., 1982). Afterwards, the ML (maximum likelihood) estimation is fulfilled to obtain 
translog profit frontier. Importantly, the error terms,    and   , have to meet 
following condition: 
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Unfortunately, there is no current consensus among scholars considering the 
set of variables that are important to simulate an optimal input or output frontier for 
the banks. Nevertheless, it is widely agreed, that two basic approaches are utilised: 
intermediation approach and production approach, which differ mainly in their 
interpretation of the key functions of the banking sector. The first approach considers 
banking institutions as intermediaries in the capital markets, facilitating the exchange 
between borrowers and lenders. Outputs should include loans and deposits, and costs 
of funds should be considered as inputs. Meanwhile, the second approach regards 
banks as production units which utilise tangible assets as inputs to produce 
operations with funds as outputs. The number of transactions is the key output 
variable, while capital and labour are core input variables. 
As Berger and Humphrey (1997) emphasise, both approaches have their 
shortcomings. As authors argue, the production-based interpretation is optimal for 
estimating micro-efficiency (at branch level), whereas intermediation interpretation 
performs a better for efficiency assessment of the consolidated structures. It is also a 
frequent practice to ignore the non-core activities of the banks, as it can extremely 
difficult to trace their input/output structure otherwise.  
Considering the set of utilised variables, the output generally consists of loans, 
deposits and non-interest income (to partially reflect the above-mentioned non-core 
activities). The input component includes physical capital, staff and management 
expenses, interest payments on deposits (Berger et al., 1987; Berger & Humphrey, 
1991; Rogers, 1998). After the construction of the frontier, the efficiency scores are 
estimated according to the following formula:  
 
       
 ̂ 
 
 ̂ 
                                                                   (17) 
 
where: i = 1, ..., N are banks in the analysed sample,  ̂ 
    = the maximum 
value of  ̂ 
  i across the sample for a particular year, and  ̂ 
  = the expected profit of i 
bank at a given output for a particular year. Based on the last equation, each raw 
inefficiency score,  ̂ 
 , is divided by the highest inefficiency score,  ̂ 
    to obtain 
the final efficiency score of each bank.  
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As in the previous methodologies, the final stage requires regression analysis to 
be performed in order to determine the correlation and its power between 
inefficiencies and the set of deal-, bank- or country-related factors. The regression 
specification is identical to the one mentioned in the section on DEA.  
3.3. Prediction of M&A likelihood  
Further, some researchers aim to investigate the likelihood of a particular bank 
to become the target of the acquirer in the M&A processes. Thus, logistic (logit) 
regression is implemented to assess the probability for a particular bank to acquire 
another firm or to be acquired and to determine the functional relationship between 
the bank characteristics and the merger probability. As Palepu (1986) emphasises, 
this model allows the scholar to assess logit probability function of the measured 
attributes of the firm. Other scholars also support the logit regression as the optimal 
choice to model takeover probabilities (Pasiouras et al., 2007).  
The most widespread logit model is similar to the approach taken by Brar et al. 
(2009), Ramanathan (2002), Alcalde and Espitia (2003). Equation (18) is presenting 
a general form of the logistic regression model. The model can then be presented as 
follows: 
 
  (   )   
 
      (   )
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where:  
 
 (   )                                      (19) 
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     (    )                                                        (21)     
and p(i,t) - the probability of takeover occurrence in year t, x(i,t) - the vector of 
bank-, market- and country-specific variables in year t, β - a vector of unknown 
parameters. The dependent categorical variable p can vary between 0 and 1. Note 
that equations (20) and (21) show the existence of a linear relationship between the 
log-odds ratio    and the explanatory variables. However, the relationship between 
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the probability of the event and acquisition likelihood is non-linear and has a major 
advantage that is demonstrated below. Non-linear relationship measures the change 
in the probability of the event as a result of a small increment in the explanatory 
variables   .When the probability of the merger is high or low, the incremental 
impact of a change in an explanatory variable on the likelihood of the event will be 
compressed, requiring a large change in the explanatory variables to change the 
classification of the observation (Peat and Stevenson, 2008). If a bank is clearly 
classified as a target or bidder, a large change in the explanatory variables is required 
to change its classification. 
Afterwards, the estimated coefficients are compared with the reference group: 
for instance, direct (reverse) correlation can be asserted if a positive (negative) 
change in the merger likelihood was observed along with an increase in the 
explanatory variable. Several researchers argue that matched approach for 
constructing the control group should be implemented (Powell, 2001; Brar et al., 
2009).  
After the most common methodologies used in the existing literature are 
described, it is important to retest the initial research hypotheses by replicating 
several studies that investigate the post-merger outcomes and attempt to determine 
the most important factors for the maximum wealth gains for the shareholders of 
target and bidder banks in the European Union. The papers by Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009) and Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) were selected.   
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4. The impact of the external shocks on the shareholders’ wealth of the 
European bidder banks (following Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009) 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the replication and further extension of the paper 
by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), which investigates the announcement period changes 
to the shareholder wealth of banks involved in M&A‘s in the European Union. The 
focus of the initial research and its replication in chapter 4.1 in concentrated on the 
impact of the introduction of the euro on the banks‘ shareholders‘ wealth. In the 
context presented by researchers, the introduction of the euro as a common currency 
for the European Union members can be considered as a powerful external factor that 
influences the outcomes of banking M&A‘s. Further, the chapter 4.2 extends the 
initial research, considering banking mergers in 1990-2015 in broader, modern 
configuration of the European Union – EU-28. The extended period gives an 
opportunity to analyse the impact of the global financial crisis on the M&A outcomes 
in the same manner, as Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) analyse the impact of the powerful 
external factor – the introduction of the euro. 
The authors attempted to test following hypotheses: 
1) abnormal returns are higher in the period before the introduction of the euro 
comparing to the period after the introduction of the euro; 
2) diversified mergers are more profitable than focused mergers in the period 
after the introduction of the euro and equal in the pre-euro period; 
3) abnormal returns for bidders involved in domestic and cross-border 
mergers are unequal before the introduction of the euro (for focused 
mergers), but become homogenised afterwards; abnormal returns for 
bidders involved into diversified mergers are equal in any studied period 
4) abnormal returns to the acquirers of Eurozone targets in the pre-euro period 
are greater than abnormal returns to the acquirers of non-Eurozone targets, 
and vice versa in the post-euro period. 
The data is collected from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database and 
include stock prices of all banks that are involved into M&A‘s between 1990 and 
2015, as well as stock market indices. The key selected methodology was event study 
(market return model), assessing the abnormal returns of bidders and targets around 
the merger announcement date with market return model, used previously by Fuller 
et al. (2002) and Faccio et al. (2006). Obtained CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) 
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were included into regression analysis framework revealing the changes in the 
shareholders‘ wealth and the factors of M&A‘s success or failure.  
 
Importantly, to make the sections below more clear and understandable for the 
reader in the context of replication and extension of the paper by Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009), it is necessary to outline several specific terms that would be used quite 
frequently further.  
Firstly, ―cross-border M&A‘s‖ are M&A‘s which involve bidder and target 
originating from different countries. Alternatively, ―domestic M&A‘s‖ involve 
bidder and target with the identical country of origin. 
Secondly, ―focused M&A‘s‖ are mergers that involve banks from the same 
industry (banking sector in the case of this thesis). As long as the broader aspect of 
the EU financial sector is considered in Ekkayokkaya et al., (2009), ―focused‖ 
M&A‘s are mergers between banks, while ―diversified‖ M&A‘s are mergers between 
banks and other financial companies (asset management funds, insurance companies, 
etc.) The concept of focused/diversified mergers is also referred to as ―relatedness of 
business‖ and covers the same issue in the context of M&A‘s. 
Thirdly, the ―Eurozone‖ includes the group of countries that use the euro as 
their official currency. ―Non-Eurozone countries‖ include EU members with other 
currencies (e.g. the UK, Sweden, Denmark, etc.). Finally, ―non-EU countries‖ are 
countries that were not members of the EU. As the extension section is presented 
further, it becomes very important to clarify the dynamic aspect as well: the countries 
are not assigned a particular status for the whole examination period used in the 
second part of Chapter 4 (1990-2015), as particular countries entered the Eurozone 
(Slovenia switched to the euro as its official currency in 2007, Cyprus in 2008, 
Slovakia in 2009 and Estonia in 2011). For the countries that joined the EU and the 
Eurozone during the period of analysis (1990-2015), the status of the deal is 
considered according to the EU and Eurozone membership status in the year when 
the deal occurred. For instance, if a French bank bought a Slovenian bank in 2003, it 
would be classified as a deal between EU bidder and non-EU target. On the other 
hand, if the same deal occurred in 2010, it would be an EU-EU merger, as both 
countries were members of the EU. Similar classification can be performed in the 
context of the Eurozone membership: the first case in the example above can be 
classified as a merger between Eurozone bidder and non-EU target, while the second 
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case can be classified as a merger between both Eurozone-belonging bidder and 
target (as between 2003 and 2010 Slovakia joined the EU in 2004 and the Eurozone 
in 2009).  
Fourthly, it is crucial to mention that this thesis extends the replication 
procedure by analysing the period of 1990-2015, widening the time frame of analysis 
in order to capture the changes in the European banking M&A since the beginning of 
the 1990s, when first EU commission was issued and started the processes of 
financial consolidation, up to the most recent period with fully available data. 
Furthermore, the current members of EU-28 are considered, instead of much more 
frequent EU-15 in the literature. The reason behind this is following: as all current 
EU members joined the European Union eventually, it would be fair to claim that 
their financial systems were gradually transformed to match the criteria of developed 
economies. However, as was said in the previous paragraph, the period when these 
countries were not members of the EU is captured by the dynamic classification. 
4.1. Replication of the paper by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) 
4.1.1.  Sample and data characteristics 
 
Identically to the study by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), all banking mergers in 
the EU-15 in 1990-2004 were included in the replication sample. Note that the EU 
was considered in its EU-15 configuration (as prior to the year 2004: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK). All of these countries joined 
the Eurozone on 01.01.1999, except Greece (joined the Eurozone in 2001), the UK, 
Sweden and Denmark (retained their own currencies). It is required that the bidder is 
listed on a public stock exchange in one of the 15 EU countries and that the bidders‘ 
share prices are available from Datastream. The minimum deal size is $1 million. To 
assess the impact of the structural changes in the banking M&A market after the 
introduction of the euro, the period of 1990-2004 is divided into 3 sub-periods: pre-
euro (1990–95), run-up to the euro (1996–98), and post-euro (1999–2004). All the 
deal-related information was also downloaded from Thomson Financial Database 
(announcement dates, countries of origin, payment type, deal value, etc.). After 
checking for the availability of the stock prices data, 898 bids survived these criteria. 
100 
  
Table 2 describes the distribution of M&A activities of the banks originating 
from the 15 EU countries in our sample. The cross-tabulation of acquisition bids 
shows that most of the sample bids are announced by banks based in Italy (178), 
Spain (166), UK (118), Germany (97) and France (96). The data further shows that 
Finland and Luxembourg have the least active M&A markets (1 and 10 bidders 
respectively).  
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Table 2. Distribution of merger deals by bidders’ and targets’ countries of origin (replication sample, 1990-2004). 
The table shows the geographical distribution of sample bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) during 1990–2004. New EU members include the ten countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. A bidder is included in the sample if it is categorised as a bank in the Thomson SDC database, is listed on a stock exchange in one of the 15 European member 
countries, and has participated in the M&A activities between 01.01.1990 and 31.12.2004. 
 
 
Target Nation 
                
Acquirer Nation Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK New EU Outside EU Total 
                   
Austria 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 12 
Belgium 0 17 0 0 6 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 0 0 1 2 8 41 
Denmark 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 21 
Finland 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
France 0 1 1 0 80 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 5 96 
Germany 1 1 0 0 6 34 2 0 7 0 1 0 5 0 4 12 24 97 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 36 
Ireland 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 17 
Italy 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 152 4 0 0 4 0 1 4 7 178 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 10 
Netherlands 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 5 2 0 0 1 1 18 33 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 21 3 0 0 1 1 28 
Spain 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 0 0 9 70 0 3 0 74 166 
Sweden 0 0 6 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 14 6 44 
UK 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 3 3 0 1 1 5 1 61 2 33 118 
Total 5 21 22 5 108 45 32 12 176 5 13 34 92 16 76 49 187 898 
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Table 3. Distribution of sample deals by bidders’ and targets’ countries of origin (sample of Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009). 
The table shows the geographical distribution of sample bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) during 1990–2004. New EU members include the ten countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. A bidder is included in the sample if it is categorised as a bank in the SDC database, is listed on a stock exchange in one of the 15 European member countries, 
and has participated in the M&A activities between 01.01.1990 and 31.12.2004. 
 
 
Target Nation 
                
Acquirer Nation Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK New EU Outside EU Total 
Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 10 
Belgium 0 8 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 7 3 28 
Denmark 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 11 
Finland 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
France 0 5 1 0 119 4 3 1 4 0 1 0 6 0 9 3 34 190 
Germany 1 1 0 0 6 34 2 0 9 0 0 0 6 0 6 11 30 106 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 10 
Italy 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 168 4 0 0 5 0 1 4 11 199 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 8 
Netherlands 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 5 2 0 0 1 1 20 36 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 2 14 
Spain 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 2 0 0 6 45 0 3 0 41 101 
Sweden 0 0 6 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 15 8 54 
UK 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 3 4 0 2 1 7 1 123 0 44 193 
Total 2 17 15 6 142 48 5 10 191 5 11 20 73 22 146 53 197 963 
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Table 4a. Sample characteristics. 
Bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) 
during 1990–2004 are included in the sample. The sample ensures that the bidder is categorised as a bank in the SDC database, listed on a stock exchange in one of the 15 European member countries, bidders‘ share 
price is available from Datastream, and the value of the takeover deal is at least $1 million. For a given deal, the deal value is reported in US dollars. The sub-sample periods are: pre-euro (1990–95), run-up to the euro 
(1996–98), and post-euro (1999–2004) 
 
Panel A. Distribution of deals by bidder’s nation (replication sample). 
 Domestic target bidders Foreign target bidders All bidders 
 Listed Unlisted Total Listed Unlisted Total Listed Unlisted Total 
Pre-euro 63 87 150 29 52 81 92 139 231 
Run-up to the euro 35 47 82 56 53 109 91 100 191 
Post-euro 95 159 254 102 120 222 197 279 476 
Total 193 293 486 187 225 412 380 518 898 
 
Panel B. Distribution of deals by bidder’s nation (sample by Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009). 
 Domestic target bidders Foreign target bidders All bidders 
 Listed Unlisted Total Listed Unlisted Total Listed Unlisted Total 
Pre-euro 79 77 156 34 52 86 113 129 242 
Run-up to the euro 43 52 95 33 48 81 76 100 176 
Post-euro 120 179 299 103 143 246 223 322 545 
Total 242 308 550 170 243 413 412 551 963 
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Table 4b. Sample characteristics (continued). 
 
Bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) 
during 1990–2004 are included in the sample. The sample ensures that the bidder is categorised as a bank in the SDC database, listed on a stock exchange in one of the 15 European member countries, bidders‘ share 
price is available from Datastream, and the value of the takeover deal is at least $1 million. For a given deal, the deal value is reported in US dollars. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics by bidder’s nation (replication sample). 
 
 Domestic bidders Foreign bidders All bidders 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. 
Shares acquired 
(%) 
50.61 46.82 37.50 48.09 36.00 39.37 49.44 42.30 38.37 
Deal Value (in $ 
million) 
712.68 88.72 2477.19 381.40 103.75 1070.07 560.69 98.43 1967.2 
MV of bidders (in 
million $) 
12999.43 3852.46 23100.25 29214.22 20180.39 33027.02 20636.08 6601.5 29267.42 
Raw return (-1;+1) 
in days (%) 
0.103 0.149 0.052 0.471 0.376 0.044 0.272 0.234 0.049 
Raw return               
(-20;+20) in days 
(%) 
1.830 1.806 0.136 2.96 2.468 0.193 2.349 2.196 0.165 
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Table 4b. Sample characteristics (continued). 
 
Bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) 
during 1990–2004 are included in the sample. The sample ensures that the bidder is categorised as a bank in the SDC database, listed on a stock exchange in one of the 15 European member countries, bidders‘ share 
price is available from Datastream, and the value of the takeover deal is at least $1 million. For a given deal, the deal value is reported in US dollars. 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics by bidder’s nation (sample by Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009). 
 
 Domestic bidders Foreign bidders All bidders 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. 
Shares acquired 
(%) 
46.34 34.75 40.12 48.48 40.00 39.32 47.26 37.60 39.78 
Deal Value (in $ 
million) 
425.52 45.54 1473.01 204.27 46.95 628.36 330.63 46.28 1191.37 
MV of bidders (in 
million $) 
5318.94 2921.18 6838.87 10266.56 7870.47 11198.52 7440.82 5354.75 9295.25 
Raw return (-1;+1) 
in days (%) 
-0.063 0.000 4.981 0.367 0.553 3.769 0.121 0.037 4.504 
Raw return               
(-20;+20) in days 
(%) 
1.840 1.637 12.075 1.960 1.788 11.459 1.892 1.771 11.809 
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Generally, the differences in the number of M&A‘s between the replicated 
sample (Table 2; Table 4a, Panel A; Table 4b, Panel A) and an original sample of 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009)(Table 3; Table 4a, Panel B; Table 4b, Panel B) can be 
explained by the several reasons. Firstly, it seems that Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) 
utilised some additional filter while collecting data, or otherwise omitted the filter 
that authors mentioned in the article. It is quite hard to speculate upon the possible 
filters that were not applied by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009). For instance, my sample 
includes 36 deals with Greek bidders, whereas the sample by Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009) does not include any Greek acquirers at all. Possibly, Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009) filtered all the state- or government-related targets and bidders, and this filter 
was not explicitly indicated in the respective section of the research paper. 
Furthermore, as can be seen from a comparison of UK and French acquirers, 
Ekkayokkaya, et al. (2009) included a larger number of banking mergers into their 
sample. In the cases of the UK or France, these ―excess‖ takeovers can be some kind 
of private transactions that were re-classified or underwent status-changing 
adjustments in the Datastream database.  
Secondly, as was discovered in the private communication with the Thomson 
Reuters data centre officials, differences in samples might be the consequence of 
major data reorganisations and optimisations in the Thomson Reuters M&A database 
(SDC and Datastream). For instance, if a company was acquired in the past, it is 
sometimes reassigned with another data code or eliminated from the database after a 
particular period of time. If the bidder becomes a target in the future, the number of 
possible M&A transaction in the potential sample decreases even more. Furthermore, 
Thomson Financial can change the codes, identifiers, industrial classification or other 
internal information about the company at any point of time, so that the past mergers 
can be classified in another way, preventing the researcher from building a sample 
exactly matching to a given one.  
Thirdly, and it is quite a disappointing shortcoming, Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) 
do not mention the minimum stake of shares that an acquirer should purchase to 
classify the transaction as ―merger‖ and not just ―portfolio investment‖. In this thesis, 
a widely accepted threshold of 50% + 1 share is utilised in order to demonstrate the 
change of corporate control in an acquisition. 
Table 4a shows that 486 bids involved domestic targets and 412 are aimed at 
foreign targets, which provide evidence that domestic and cross-border mergers are 
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almost equally distributed in the sample. Table 4b also reports that domestic deals 
are generally larger than cross-border takeovers ($712 million and $381 million 
respectively), while the average merger volume is almost $560 million. This 
observation provides evidence that European banks are more likely to pursue the 
strategy of international expansion by acquiring small foreign targets and entering 
new markets by means of M&A‘s within the EU borders. Table 4b also shows the 
raw returns of bidder banks around the announcement for the (-1;+1) event window. 
It is obvious, that bidders of domestic targets gain +0.103% raw return, while bidders 
of foreign targets gain +0.38%, which is in line with the initial findings of 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), who reported lower raw returns for domestic mergers 
(−0.063%) comparing to the foreign deals (+0.367%). The event period of (-20;+20) 
days shows nearly the same results: cross-border mergers outperform domestic deals 
–2.47% and 1.83% respectively, although the difference is negligible.  
4.1.2.  Empirical results 
By replicating the paper by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), this section aims to 
investigate and to measure the role of the introduction of the euro in the European 
market of the banking M&A‘s. The structural changes were observable after the 
creation of the single currency zone: currency risks decreased, new regulatory 
mechanisms reduced the influence of the international barriers and encouraged cross-
border expansion. The primary goal is to examine the relationship of these changes 
with the short-run M&A‘s outcomes for the bidders.  
4.1.2.1. The impact of the introduction of the euro on bidders’ gains 
Table 5 demonstrates announcement period BHARs for all bidders, which are 
divided according to the listing status of the target (Table 5, Panel A). The estimates 
show that on average the EU banks do not add any significant value to shareholders‘ 
wealth after takeovers. Being more precise, average announcement period abnormal 
returns of +0.137% are statistically insignificant (in the event window of (-1;+1)). 
This finding is consistent with the existing literature on M&A's which suggests that 
bidders are unable to benefit significantly from acquisitions (Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia, 2000; Campa and Hernando, 2006). Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider 
the M&A outcomes for bidders in each of the sub-periods before and after the 
introduction of the euro.  
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The obtained findings differ from the result in Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009). The 
estimates show differences in bidders‘ buy-and-hold returns across the above-
mentioned periods. Banks, that were involved in M&A deals in the pre-euro era 
(1990-1995) and in the period after the adoption of the common currency (1999-
2004), show insignificant value destruction (-0.054% and -0.068% respectively) to 
their shareholders‘ wealth. These results provide evidence contrary to the initial 
hypothesis and to the findings by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), who testified that the 
abnormal returns were positive and significant during ―pre-euro‖ and ―run-up to the 
euro‖ periods, and the increased competition decreased average post-merger 
outcomes after 1999 (see Table 5, Panel A). Our findings clearly reflect the existence 
of other phenomenon – mergers in the period directly preceding the introduction of 
the euro (1996-1998) demonstrated significant positive gains of almost +1.291% for 
acquirers‘ shareholders. These findings show that the positive structural changes 
related to the introduction of euro (elimination of cross-border barriers, steep 
decrease in currency risks) were anticipated by the banks. The market investors have 
also rewarded these mergers with higher abnormal returns. On the other hand, the 
banks that decided to expand by means of M&A‘s after the official announcement of 
the common EU currency, faced the increased competition and were not able to 
increase their value.  
Recent studies on M&A‘s show that acquirers‘ gains are influenced by the 
target status (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2006). The sample was divided 
according to the listed status of the target. The results are reported in Table 5, Panel 
A. It shows that bidders of listed targets gain higher abnormal returns than bidders on 
unlisted targets: an average abnormal return for the bidders on the unlisted target is 
+0.045%, whereas listed target firms bring bidders the abnormal return of +0.262%. 
These findings can be explained by the fact, that although the takeover of the unlisted 
target is more wealth-enhancing in theory, the synergy gains are very difficult to be 
materialised in practice (because of costly procedures of due diligence and legal 
compliance). Subsequent analysis demonstrates that the gains from unlisted target 
acquisitions are lower in all analysed periods. During the run-up to the euro period, 
the bidders of both unlisted and listed targets experienced significant gains (+0.93% 
and +1.291% respectively). However, the excess returns in the pre-euro era were 
resulting in insignificant value destruction (around -0.053% each). Our findings 
differ from the results by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), showing that the acquisitions of 
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the listed targets were value-generating for the bidders. Our results were also unable 
to support positive value gains for the bidders of unlisted targets in 1990-1995. The 
difference between the replication sample and the findings by Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009) can be explained by probable discrepancies in the sample, caused by omitted 
information and selection criteria in the initial paper. 
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Table 5. Excess returns of European banks by target status and relatedness of the business of merger partners. 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) excess returns (in %) of the European bank acquirers are reported for the sub-samples constructed according to the listing status of target (unlisted and listed) (panel 
A) and relatedness of the business of merger partners (diversified or focused target) (panel B). The sub-sample periods are pre-euro (1990–95), the run-up to the euro (1996–98), and post-euro (1999–2004). Excess 
returns (AR) are adjusted for the market movement as in the following equation: 
               
where    is the change in the share price of bidder i and    is the return on a representative market portfolio. Market return is estimated using the Datastream market index of the bidders‘ country. T-test of mean 
equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. ‗∗∗∗’, ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘ represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Excess returns (%) of all bidders by listing status of target 
Euro period 
Target status 
Replication 
sample (1990-
2004) 
Sample of Ekkayokkaya et 
al. (2009) 
Replication 
sample (1990-
2004) 
Sample of Ekkayokkaya et 
al. (2009) 
Replication 
sample (1990-
2004) 
Sample of Ekkayokkaya et 
al. (2009) 
Listed Unlisted All targets 
Pre-euro -0.053 0.083 -0.056 0.523** -0.054 0.317* 
N 92 113 139 129 231 242 
Run-up to the 
euro 
1.291** -0.030 0.930** 0.562* 1.102** 0.307 
N 91 76 100 100 191 176 
Post-euro -0.068 -0.515 -0.222 0.036 -0.158 -0.189 
N 197 223 279 322 476 545 
Total 0.262 -0.262 0.045 0.246* 0.137 0.029 
N 380 412 518 551 898 963 
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Table 5. (continued). 
Panel B: Abnormal returns (%) of all bidders (focused or diversifying deals)(replication sample, 1990-2004) 
Euro period 
Focused deals (bank-
bank) 
Diversifying deals 
Focused - 
Diversified Insurance Investments Financial Services Others 
All diversifying 
targets 
Pre-euro -0.006 -0.389 -0.233 0.905 -0.089 -0.093 0.087 
N 102 18 35 10 66 129  
Run-up to 
the euro 
1.356** 1.890 0.432 -0.443 1.098*** 0.772* 0.584** 
N 108 8 27 10 38 83  
Post-euro -0.679** 1.374** -0.194 0.684 0.400 0.368** -1.046** 
N 239 33 82 31 91 237  
Total -0.036 0.906* -0.086 0.506 0.371** 0.310* -0.346* 
N 449 59 144 51 195 449  
 
Panel C: Abnormal returns (%) of all bidders (focused or diversifying deals)(sample by Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009) 
Euro period 
Focused deals (bank-
bank) 
Diversifying deals 
Focused - 
Diversified Insurance Investments Financial Services Others All targets 
Pre-euro 0.218 0.041 0.487 2.449 0.405 0.440** -0.221 
N 134 16 42 3 47 108  
Run-up to 
the euro 
0.214 -0.562 -0.367 2.146 1.175** 0.435 -0.222 
N 102 7 32 7 28 74  
Post-euro -0.717** 0.683 0.752* 1.000 0.348 0.653** -1.370** 
N 335 36 93 22 59 210  
Total -0.331** 0.361 0.471* 1.387** 0.541** 0.553** -0.884* 
N 571 59 167 32 134 392  
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4.1.2.2. Diversified vs. focused mergers.  
The sample is divided equally between focused and diversifying deals (449 
deals in each subsample). Among the latter, investment companies comprise 16% 
and 6.6% belong to the insurance sector. Results (Table 5, panel B) show that 
focused deals result in insignificant losses around -0.0036% in the (-1;+1) event 
window surrounding the bid announcement. In contrast, the abnormal returns for 
bidders involved into diversifying bids are much higher (significant +0.9% for 
insurance targets, insignificant -0.086% for investment targets and insignificant 
negative -0.506% for deals with financial services companies). Considering the 
factor of the euro introduction, the only period that shows significant abnormal 
returns is the run-up period (average gain of +0.58%); while in the pre-euro period 
BHARs were almost equal to zero, and after the adoption of the euro the banks 
experiences average losses of almost -1%. Our findings are in line with Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009): diversifying deals are outperforming focused acquisitions in all 
analysed periods, except pre-euro period. Banks announcing focused deals 
experienced a significant loss (-0.679%) in the post-euro era, while generating gains 
of +1.356% in the run-up period. Summarising, these results testify that there was no 
significant difference in the abnormal returns in pre-euro period, although 
diversifying deals significantly outperformed focused deals in the run-up to euro and 
the post-euro periods. It allows me to conclude that the introduction of the euro 
motivated the banks to diversify more actively into segments of financial services 
(insurance asset management etc.), resulting in more value-gaining acquisitions. 
According to the estimation of market investors, the decision of bidder banks to 
diversify into other subsectors of the financial industry prior to the introduction of 
the euro is rewarded by higher returns in the period around the deal announcement.   
4.1.2.3. Domestic vs. foreign acquisitions  
This subsection tests the initial hypothesis of whether gains from the domestic 
acquisitions depend on the target‘s country of origin relatively to the bidder‘s 
country of origin in the pre-euro period, but not in the post-euro period. The 
comparison between domestic and cross-border deals is performed for the total 
sample (Table 6, panel A) and separately for the subsamples of focused and 
diversifying acquisitions (Table 6, panels B and C). Findings for the whole sample 
provide evidence that on average domestic mergers bring lower abnormal returns 
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than cross-border acquisitions (+0.08% and +0.204% respectively). These 
estimations are in contrast with the results obtained by Beitel et al. (2004) who 
revealed significant gains to domestic target bidders. Furthermore, gains for domestic 
bidders are much higher in the run-up period (significant +1.747%), while domestic 
bidders suffer insignificant losses in other periods. Interestingly, foreign bidders 
show insignificant positive abnormal returns in all the analysed periods. The above-
mentioned results can be explained in the following way. During the period of pre-
euro era, European banks accumulated important information on the market of 
banking services in other EU countries. Particularly, the wide speculations in the 
high government circles motivated banking institutions to anticipate decrease in the 
regulatory level. Further, banking sector experienced a ―rush out‖ to enter foreign 
markets immediately after the official introduction of the euro. However, high 
competition decreased the positive outcomes of mergers that occurred after the 
adoption of the euro, resulting in the underperformance of the domestic takeovers. 
 
Table 6. Abnormal returns of bidders by targets’ country of origin and 
relatedness of business 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) excess returns (in %) of European bank acquirers are reported for the sub-
samples according to the geographic registration of the target (domestic and foreign) in general (panel A) and for focused 
(Panel B) and diversifying (Panel C) M&A‘s separately. The sub-sample periods are pre-euro (1990–95), the run-up to the euro 
(1996–98), and post-euro (1999–2004). Excess returns (AR) are adjusted for the market movement as in the following equation: 
              
where    is the change in the share price of bidder i and    is the return on a representative market portfolio. Market 
return is estimated using the Datastream market index of the bidders‘ country. T-test of mean equal to zero versus not equal to 
zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. ‗∗∗∗’, ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘ represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: All bidders of domestic and foreign targets 
Euro period 
Domestic targets Foreign targets Domestic vs. foreign 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-
2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Pre-euro -0.138 0.115 0.101 0.685** -0.24 -0.570 
N 150 156 81 86   
Run-up to 
the euro 
1.747*** 0.597 0.618 -0.033 1.129* 0.630 
N 82 95 109 81   
Post-euro -0.330 -0.309 0.039 -0.044 -0.368 -0.264 
N 254 299 222 246   
Total 0.080 -0.032 0.204 0.110 -0.124 -0.142 
N 486 550 412 413   
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Focused bidders broken down by targets’ country of origin 
Euro period 
Domestic targets Foreign targets Domestic vs. foreign 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-
2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-
2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Pre-euro -0.223 -0.086 0.248 0.699** -0.471 -0.785 
N 55 82 47 52   
Run-up to 
the euro 
2.624** 0.710 0.695 -0.345 1.929* 1.054 
N 37 54 71 48   
Post-euro -0.957* -0.992** -0.416 -0.382* -0.541* -0.610 
N 116 184 123 151   
Total -0.126 -0.473 0.041 -0.151 -0.167 -0.322 
N 208 320 241 251   
 
Panel C: Diversifying bidders broken down by targets’ country of origin 
Euro period 
Domestic targets Foreign targets Domestic vs. foreign 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-
2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Replication 
sample 
(1990-2004) 
Sample of 
Ekkayokkaya 
et al. (2009) 
Pre-euro -0.09 0.337 -0.102 0.663* 0.012 -0.326 
N 95 74 34 34   
Run-up to 
the euro 
1.025** 0.448 0.472 0.420 0.553** 0.028 
N 45 41 38 33   
Post-euro 0.198 0.785** 0.604* 0.493* -0.406 0.292 
N 138 115 99 95   
Total 0.233 0.581** 0.435 0.514** -0.201 0.067 
N 278 230 171 162   
 
Furthermore, results in the Panel B reveal similar trends for the subsample of 
focused deals. Interestingly, acquirers of the foreign targets suffer from negative 
abnormal returns during all three analysed periods, except the run-up period, when 
acquirers in average gained +2.62% from the merger deals. This can be explained by 
high competition between large financial institutions for the foreign target banks, 
giving quick access to other national markets. The observed pattern for domestic 
focused mergers is almost identical to the one reported in Panel A: a dramatic rise in 
the gains for the run-up to the euro period and fall during the post-euro period for 
focused bidders are present in the results. This phenomenon can be explained by high 
competition that reached its peak during the first several years immediately after the 
adoption of the euro, when European banks were trying to implement their plans for 
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strategic growth. The market investors considered the materialisation of the post-
merger synergetic gains quite unlikely for the focused mergers.  
The results for diversifying deals (panel C) shows significant positive BHARs 
to bidders of domestic targets in all investigated periods, except the pre-euro period. 
Domestic diversifying deals are significantly positive in the run-up period 
(+1.025%), while cross-border diversifying deals allow bidders to experience 
significant positive +0.604% in the post-euro period. Furthermore, the difference in 
returns for the acquirers of domestic and foreign targets is significant for the ―run-
up‖ period. Overall, the European banks gain more from diversifying bids (+0.233% 
for domestic bids and +0.435% for cross-border bids, comparing to the respective 
ARs of -0.126% and +0.041%). As a result, it can be concluded that some regulation 
barriers in the European banking sector still remain, and the involvement into the 
strategically promising cross-border deal is highly appreciated by the market 
investors. It can also be speculated that competition in the cross-border mergers is 
lower due to a number of various risks apart from eliminated exchange rate risk, 
resulting in higher abnormal returns. 
4.1.2.4. Deals within the Eurozone versus outside the Eurozone 
During last two decades, EU authorities attempted to reduce cross-border 
barriers and stimulate consolidation in the banking sector (Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009). 
Particularly, in the context of the introduction of the euro, the most obvious 
consequence for EU-15 countries is the difference between abnormal returns for 
bidders acquiring Eurozone targets or targets outside the Eurozone. This hypothesis 
relies on the presupposition that mergers inside and outside the currency union 
should differ substantially. The investigation on the role of Eurozone as a factor in 
the short-run merger outcomes for the banking bidders is provided below.  
Table 7 presents announcement period abnormal buy-and-hold returns for four 
groups of M&A deals to reflect all possible configurations of mergers occurring in 
the EU:  
1) bidder and target are both based in the Eurozone;  
2) bidder is based outside the Eurozone; target originates from the 
Eurozone;  
3) bidder is based in the Eurozone, the target is outside the Eurozone, but 
within the EU (namely UK, Sweden, Denmark);  
116 
  
4) bidder is based in the Eurozone; the target is outside the EU.  
The findings testify that the Eurozone-based banks bidding for targets within 
the Eurozone experience losses in the both periods of pre-euro and post-euro eras, 
except for significant positive abnormal return for the Eurozone bidders acquiring the 
Eurozone targets (+1.49%) during the run-up to the euro period (1996-1998). The 
above-mentioned findings imply that the elimination of currency-related risk along 
with reduced regulatory barriers motivated the intensification in competition among 
bidder banks and resulted in higher merger premiums and lower returns to the 
bidders‘ shareholders in the period after the adoption of the common currency. 
Furthermore, non-Eurozone bidders outperform Eurozone bidders in all investigated 
periods except for run-up period, concluding upon the existence of tight competition 
over EU target banks in the European Union. On the other hand, non-Eurozone 
bidders experience significant gains around +0.43% on average and outperform 
Eurozone-based banks in general. These results support the initial implication by 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), that although the Eurozone banking institutions possess 
strong competitive advantages and strong knowledge of the markets they are 
operating in, non-Eurozone banks are able to gain higher excess returns, probably 
because of less bureaucratized merger regulations in the UK, Denmark and Sweden. 
In other words, Scandinavian and British banks are able to demonstrate better 
competitive advantages to the market investors, resulting in higher abnormal returns 
and wealth gains for acquirers around the announcement date (in comparison with 
bidders based in the Eurozone). Additionally, more articulated differences between 
the markets of Eurozone members and the regulatory regimes can be the issue. 
In contrast to the findings above, the EU banks acquiring targets from the UK, 
Denmark and Sweden) demonstrate significant positive abnormal returns (+0.4%). 
On average, bidders that are involved in takeovers of non-EU targets demonstrate the 
highest wealth gains (almost +0.66%), primarily because of the fact, that expansion 
into emerging economies is considered by the market investors as a positive strategic 
signal. These results support the initial hypotheses by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009). 
Firstly, the acquisitions of the Eurozone targets were more profitable in the pre-euro 
period (1990-1995), than in the post-euro period (1999-2004)(-0.17% and -0.43% 
respectively, although the results are insignificant). Interestingly, the particular ―run-
up‖ effect was definitely observed in 1996-1998, when a specifically positive post-
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merger behaviour was observed, resulting in average +1.36% gains for the acquirers. 
This finding can be the indirect evidence that banks anticipated the introduction of 
the euro and subsequent intensification in competition, thus aiming to finalise the 
merger deals before final adoption of the common currency. Secondly, the short-run 
gains for the bidders acquiring EU targets are less than short-run gains for the 
acquirers of the non-Eurozone and non-EU targets. This finding also can be 
explained by the growth in competition after the introduction of the euro.  
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Table 7. Abnormal returns of bidders broken down by target’s belonging to the Eurozone 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) excess returns (in %) of European bank acquirers are reported according to the criteria of target registration in the Eurozone; in the EU, but not in the Eurozone; or 
outside the EU. The sub-sample periods are pre-euro (1990–95), the run-up to the euro (1996–98), and post-euro (1999–2004). Excess returns (AR) are adjusted for the market movement as in the following equation: 
              
where    is the change in the share price of bidder i and    is the return on a representative market portfolio. Market return is estimated using the Datastream market index of the bidders‘ country. T-test of mean 
equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘ represent significance at 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A. Replication sample (1990-2004) 
 
Euro period 
Targets in the Eurozone 
 
 
Targets outside the Eurozone  
 
Bidders from the 
Eurozone 
Bidders from the EU, but 
outside the Eurozone 
All 
Bidders in the Eurozone,  
EU targets outside 
Eurozone 
Bidders in the 
Eurozone,  
Non-EU 
targets 
All All targets 
Pre-euro -0.274 1.220 -0.17 -0.24 0.468 0.191 -0.054 
N 146 11 157 29 45 74 231 
Run-up to the 
euro 
1.488*** -0.639 1.361*** 0.451* 1.650 0.899 1.102** 
N 79 5 84 67 40 107 191 
Post-euro -0.44 -0.062 -0.43 0.127 0.328 0.221 -0.158 
N 270 7 277 106 93 199 476 
Total -0.083 0.426* -0.061 0.182** 0.661 0.406* 0.137 
N 495 23 518 202 178 380 898 
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Table 7. (continued) 
 
Panel B. Sample by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) 
 
Euro period 
Targets in the Eurozone 
 
 
Targets outside the Eurozone  
 
Bidders in the 
Eurozone 
Bidders from the EU, but 
outside the Eurozone 
All 
Bidders in the Eurozone,  
EU targets outside 
Eurozone 
Bidders in the 
Eurozone,  
Non-EU 
targets 
All All targets 
Pre-euro 0.004 1.937** 0.189 0.529 0.395 0.482* 0.317* 
N 123 13 136 69 37 106 242 
Run-up to the 
euro 
-0.121 -0.165 -0.125 1.614* 0.119 0.658* 0.307 
N 72 7 79 35 62 97 176 
Post-euro -0.524* -0.433 0.522* 0.343 0.225 0.266 -0.189 
N 306 9 315 79 151 230 545 
Total -0.337* 0.694 -0.028 0.656** 0.224 0.407** 0.029 
N 501 29 530 183 250 433 963 
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4.1.3. Regression analysis 
Further, following Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), additional investigation had to 
be performed to provide a comprehensive analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
around the announcement date for bank M&As, taking into consideration a set of 
additional variables, particularly the payment type (cash/shares), acquisition types 
(domestic/cross-border; focused/diversified), target listed status. The factors of deal 
value, relative size and market return on the announcement date are included in the 
regression analysis. Furthermore, the dummies for periods of excessively low (1992, 
2000, 2001, 2002) and high market returns (1993, 1998, 2003) are introduced as 
well. The cross-sectional framework is deployed. The key idea is to regress bidders‘ 
buy-and-hold returns    around the announcement date to the set of explanatory 
variables   .    is the 3-day holding period return of the bidder i and the constant α 
represents the average excess returns to bidders after controlling for the effects of the 
explanatory variables. Control variables that are included into vector    are presented 
in Table 8.  
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Table 8. Factors affecting bidders’ gains. 
 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) returns (in percentage) of European banks engaged in  takeover bids are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a cross-sectional framework as in the following equation. 
       ∑  
 
   
    
   is the 3-day holding period gross return of the bidder from bid i. The vector of explanatory variables    includes 
market return around the announcement of bid, two dummies representing the methods of payment (cash and shares) used in the 
deal. Further dummy variables included in the model represent diversifying versus focused acquisitions, listed versus unlisted 
targets, bidders and targets are from the Eurozone, and domestic versus foreign targets. Two further dummies are included to 
represent the years of abnormally low (1992, 2000, 2001 and 2002) and abnormally high stock market returns (1993, 1998 and 
2003) to control for their possible implications. Regression is estimated using a robust procedure that controls for potential 
effects of outliers in the dataset. The equation is estimated for three subsamples and the full sample: the full sample period 
(1990–2004), pre-euro period (1990–95), run-up to the euro period (1996–98) and post-euro period (1999–2004). The constant 
  represents average excess returns of bidders after controlling for the effects of the explanatory variables. ‗∗∗∗‘, ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘  
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables 
Replication sample (1990-2004) 
Sample by Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009) 
All periods 
Pre-
euro 
Run-up 
to the 
euro 
Post-
euro 
All 
periods 
Pre-
euro 
Run-
up to 
the 
euro 
Post-
euro 
Constant 0.154 -0.022 -0.713 0.381 1.119 1.622 1.064 0.183 
Market 
return 
0.138* 0.459*** -0.158 0.010 0.942** 1.146** 1.227** 0.815** 
Cash deal -0.297 0.009 -0.851 -0.248 0.881 0.928 0.545 0.912 
Shares deal 0.557 3.234** -0.096 0.008 -0.088 0.740 -0.179 -0.314 
Relative 
deal size 
-0.001 -2.106*** -0.052 0.056 0.162** 0.138 0.233 0.167* 
Deal value 0.027 -0.003 0.397*** -0.015 -0.210** -0.303** 0.203 -0.288** 
Focused 
deal 
-0.198 0.469 -0.301 -0.536* 0.524* 0.082 0.340 0.843** 
Listed 
target 
-0.152 -0.004 0.693 -0.391 -0.097 -0.022 -0.954* 0.145 
Eurozone 
bidder and 
target 
0.335 0.415 -0.125 0.263 -0.399* -0.157 -1.370 -0.340 
Domestic 
target 
-0.198 -0.377 -0.580 -0.030 -0.078 -0.415 1.351 -0.227 
Interaction 
(shares × 
listed target 
dummy)  
-0.813 -2.984** -0.443 -0.697 -0.773 -1.018 -0.197 1.019 
Years of 
high 
market 
returns 
0.066 -0.063 -0.238 -0.003 0.086 0.605 0.595 -0.472 
Years of 
low market 
returns 
-0.180 0.009  0.058 -0.116 -0.061  -0.299 
Adjusted    2.04 6.8 7.9 3.8 25.72 31.56 44.83 19.30 
N 878 219 190 469 912 232 165 515 
 
The obtained results differ from the initial findings by Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009). As can be seen from Table 8, the estimates for the total replication sample 
failed to show significant influence of the deal value, relative size and 
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focused/diversified type of merger (in contrast to Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009). The 
only variable with significance in line with the results by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) 
is market return, which is positively correlated with the expected abnormal buy-and-
hold return, implying that the periods of abnormal market growth result in higher 
gains to the acquirers. There can be several possible explanations considering the 
discrepancies between the results for replications sample and the findings by 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009). Firstly, as was mentioned previously, the database-related 
differences in selected merger deals and probable omission of other criteria by 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009)(including government-sponsored acquisitions, minimum 
equity stake etc.) resulted in different sample, containing other banks. Secondly, the 
differences in the final estimates and their significance can also originate from the 
changes in Thomson Reuters‘ approach to measure Datastream Market index 
(utilised in Ekkayokaya et al., 2009 and this chapter as a benchmark to measure 
abnormal returns).   
Considering other obtained results, the model provides strong evidence in 
favour of the positive correlation between the deal value and excess returns in the 
periods of 1996-1998, implying that larger deals were more likely to benefit from 
size and scope effect in the pre-euro period, resulting in higher gains to the 
shareholders‘ wealth. It is also possible co conclude that the adoption of the 
European common currency caused a downward pressure on the short-run abnormal 
returns for focused banking mergers in 2000-2004, as the competition for the 
banking assets intensified. Additionally, it is also possible to confirm, that 
overvaluation-driven mergers result in much lower abnormal returns (as was initially 
found in Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Ismail and Davidson (2005) and other 
researchers), as the coefficient of ―interaction‖ variable is negative and significant. In 
the analysis of the post-euro period, another factor, that is significant and negatively 
correlated with the bidders‘ BHARs, is the diversification status of the merger deal – 
focused acquisitions seem to destroy bidders‘ value. Overall, although our estimates 
are different to the findings by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) for the total sample, it is 
still possible to conclude from the regression analysis that the introduction of the 
euro played a negative role in the short-run wealth gains for the bidders involved in 
M&A‘s in 1999-2004. Market movements and the deal value can also be considered 
as a crucial factor in determining short-run merger success or failure.  
  
123 
 
4.2. Extended sample (1990-2015) 
 
The previous subsection replicated the study by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) in 
an attempt to re-test the set of hypothesis defining the influence of the introduction of 
the euro on the market of the European banking M&A‘s. The adoption of the 
common currency was only one of the specific features of the last two decades, 
which were characterised by deregulation, technology development and 
consolidation of the market. These positive changes were also driving factors of the 
global growth in the M&A activities (in both volume and number of the deals), often 
referred to as ―merger waves‖ (Gugler et al., 2012). The European financial sector 
experienced two large increases in merger activities: 1992-2000 and 2002-2007, 
which coincided with 5
th
 and 6
th
 global merger waves respectively. Both these waves 
came to an end because of the financial crises: the ―dot.com‖ bubble in 2001-2002 
and the global financial crisis in 2007-2009. Thus, it would be logical to conclude 
that merger activities are exposed to powerful external shocks of industry-wide 
scope, that influence the number and volume of the mergers. In a broader sense, the 
paper of Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) follows this approach, studying the impact of 
external shock (introduction of the euro) on the merger outcomes for bidder banks in 
the European Union. It would be interesting to apply the same framework to the 
recent global financial crisis (2007-2009) and to investigate its influence on the 
bidders‘ wealth after the M&A‘s.  
There are several reasons why studying the financial crisis and its connections 
with mergers can be advantageous for researchers. Theoretically, M&A‘s during the 
crisis should be finalised by strong banks due to the liquidity shortage. Thus, two 
possible hypotheses can be made, following Beltratti and Paladino (2013). Firstly, 
positive changes in the shareholders‘ wealth should be easier to detect, as takeovers 
are executed with lower premiums and stock prices. Furthermore, only strong and 
financially stable banks can afford strategic growth during financial crisis – thus 
market has to anticipate easier post-merger target integration and materialisation of 
the synergy gains (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Secondly, potential buyers were 
cautious due to opacity in banks‘ assets and high levels of market uncertainty. As a 
result, it can be hypothesised that the market should reward higher the deals that 
were finalised under such an adverse market conditions.  
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Another aspect that should be mentioned in the context of this subsection is the 
enlargement of the EU. Several waves of enlargement incorporated 28 states into the 
European Union. Theoretically, the harmonisation of the financial sector and better 
supervision should have been the natural consequences of these processes. Although 
banking systems of the EU members have different size, regulation systems and 
efficiency levels, all of them can be considered in their entirety, as any member of 
the EU fulfilled the set of so-called ―Copenhagen criteria‖ prior to the joining, which 
required from the candidates to reach high standards of economy and financial 
sector. Furthermore, the strategy to become the EU members and to fulfil the 
necessary criteria was adopted in the mid-1990s in the majority of countries that 
joined in 2005 and 2007. For instance, the application to the EU was submitted by 
Malta and Cyprus in 1990, Poland and Hungary in 1994, by Slovakia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania – in 1995, by Slovenia and Czech Republic 
– in 1996. It was obvious that the strategic vector of development was directly 
oriented to be incorporated into the European financial system. Thus, because of the 
above-mentioned factors and due to economic and social similarities, it would be 
also crucial to consider the EU as a common area of merger activities and to study 
M&A‘s during the whole interval between first attempts to harmonise financial 
sector and modern days (in other words, between 1990 and 2015). No studies in the 
field of M&A‘s have assessed the scope of EU-28 previously. 
4.2.1. Sample and data characteristics 
Consequently, following the approach taken by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), the 
sample is constructed according to the similar principles: all banking M&A deals for 
the members of the EU-28 were collected (instead of the EU-15 format). Data was 
collected from Thomson Financial and Datastream for the period of 01.01.1990 and 
31.12.2015. 1479 deals with full deal-related and stock data survived the filtering 
procedures. To capture the impact of the global financial crisis on the M&A 
outcomes in the broad configuration of the European Union (EU-28), the sample was 
split into four periods: the period of initial growth (1990-2000), pre-crisis period 
(2001-October 2007), the period of the financial crisis (November 2007-December 
2009), post-crisis period (2010-2015)(according to the crisis-related periodization 
mentioned by Saccomanni, 2011). With respect to the periodization mentioned 
above, it would be possible to distinguish between various periods in the European 
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financial history and to compare the short-term outcomes for the mergers in different 
market conditions. 
Table 9 shows the distribution of M&A activities of the bidder banks by the 
country where they are headquartered. The cross-tabulation table of deals allows 
concluding that most of the sample bids are announced by banks based in Italy (303), 
Spain (253), UK (172), Germany (152) and France (139). The data further shows that 
Slovenia and Malta have the least active M&A markets (1 bidder and 2 targets and 1 
bidder and 4 targets respectively), while Italy and Spain underwent the most active 
consolidation (303 and 252 bidders originated from these states respectively). 
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Table 9. Distribution of sample deals by bidders’ and targets’ countries of origin (extended sample, 1990-2015). 
The table shows the geographical distribution of sample bids announced by banks based within the European Union-28 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK, and Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) in 1990–2015. 
New EU members include the 13 countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004, 1 January 2007 and 1 January 2013: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. A bidder is included in the sample if it is categorised as a bank in the SDC database, is listed on a stock exchange in one of the 28 European member countries, and has participated in the 
M&A activities between 01.01.1990 and 31.12.2015. 
 
 Target Nation                              
Acquirer Nation AT BE BG CRO CY CZ DN EST FIN FR GER GR HUN IRL IT LV LT LUX MLT NED POL PT RO SK SLO SP SW UK New EU Outside EU Total 
   
       
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
      
AT 3 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 14 9 27 
BE 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 15 54 
BG 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 
CRO 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
CY 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 4 15 
CZ 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 0 8 
DN 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 36 
EST 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
FIN 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 
FR 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 97 0 3 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 17 139 
GER 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 52 2 0 1 8 0 0 1 0 2 12 0 0 0 0 10 0 7 12 46 152 
GR 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 9 16 70 
HUN 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 6 11 
IRL 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 8 28 
IT 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 1 0 261 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 5 0 1 8 15 303 
LT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 5 
LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 11 
MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
NED 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 23 41 
POL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 1 33 
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 26 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 2 37 
SLO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
SP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 0 0 0 115 1 5 2 109 253 
SW 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 7 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 19 0 18 13 66 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 9 2 81 3 55 172 
Total 6 22 9 8 8 10 40 11 11 132 67 54 5 14 295 5 7 6 4 15 61 45 8 6 2 150 26 105 144 347 1479 
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Table 10. Sample characteristics. 
Bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) during 1990–2015 are included in the sample. The sample ensures that the bidder is 
categorised as a bank in the Thomson SDC database, listed on a stock exchange in one of the 28 European member countries, bidders‘ share price is available from Datastream, and the value of the takeover deal is at 
least $1 million. For a given deal, the deal value is reported in US dollars. 
 
Panel A. Distribution of deals by bidder’s nation. 
 Bidders on domestic targets Bidders on foreign targets All bidders 
 Listed Unlisted Total Listed Unlisted Total Listed Unlisted Total 
Initial growth 148 208 356 140 164 304 288 372 660 
Pre-crisis 75 159 234 105 172 277 180 331 511 
Financial crisis 29 31 60 31 34 65 60 65 125 
Post-crisis 36 83 119 26 38 64 62 121 183 
          
Total 288 481 769 302 408 710 590 889 1479 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics by bidder’s nation. 
 Domestic bidders Foreign bidders All bidders 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. 
Shares acquired (%) 53.19 50 38.12 52.36 50 39.52 52.79 50 38.80 
Deal Value (in $ million) 662.32 83.33 2506.88 457.68 119.98 1232.1 564.08 103.31 2001.05 
MV of bidders (in million $) 12244.5 4184.74 20301.9 24951.2 12724.4 29263.0 18331.8 7705.14 25784.8 
Raw return (-1;+1) in days (%) -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.05 
Raw return (-20;+20) in days (%) 0.82 1.07 0.19 0.36 1.77 0.22 0.60 1.55 0.21 
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Table 10, Panel A demonstrates the approximate parity between domestic and 
cross-border M&A‘s (769 and 710 deals respectively). Concerning the deal-related 
characteristics of the sample, it was found that domestic mergers are larger than 
cross-border ($662.32 million and $457.68 million respectively). Further, as was 
initially expected, it can be confirmed that foreign M&A‘s are fulfilled by larger 
bidders (primarily due to wider range of risks connected to the international financial 
expansion and larger resources): an average market value of a domestic bidder is 
almost $12.2 billion, whereas average market value of the acquirers involved in 
cross-border takeovers is almost $24.9 billion. After comparison with the sample 
characteristic in Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), it can be also concluded that both 
average deal value and acquirer size are higher in extended sample – the volume and 
number of banking M&A‘s experienced growth in 2004-2015 ($330 million for the 
period of 1990-2004 and $564 million for the period of 1990-2015).  
4.2.2. Empirical results 
Following and extending the study by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), the 
subsequent part of the chapter provides the empirical results. Following the initial 
paper by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), the short-run behaviour of the abnormal returns 
around the announcement date is studied, involving investigation of the key deal-
related aspects – geographic factor (domestic/cross-border), merger type 
(focused/diversified) and the factor of the Eurozone. The findings would give a 
chance to compare the merger outcomes between periods, and, importantly, to 
establish whether M&A‘s during the financial crisis are value-creating for the 
acquirers. 
4.2.2.1. The impact of the financial crisis on the changes in bidders’ 
shareholders’ wealth 
Table 11 demonstrates announcement period abnormal returns for all bidders 
divided by the listing status criteria. As the findings show, it is possible to conclude 
that on average, gains from banking M&A‘s are indistinguishable from zero for the 
acquirers, as average BHAR is approximately -0.062% in the (-1;+1) event window 
around the announcement date. Furthermore, the acquisition of both listed and 
unlisted target produces almost no results for the short-term merger performance: the 
changes in bidders‘ shareholders‘ wealth insignificant and close to zero (-0.07% and 
-0.057% respectively). Further, it was found that on average the banking M&A 
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during the financial crisis are value-destroying for the bidders merging with both 
listed and unlisted targets )(-1.5% for bidders acquiring listed targets and -0.79% for 
the bidders acquiring private targets). This is in line with findings by Beltratti and 
Paladino (2013), confirming the idea of an extremely pessimistic and sceptical 
attitude of market investors towards strategic growth during the periods of crisis.  
The evidence does not confirm the results in Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
and Lensink and Maslennikova (2008), who testified that acquisitions of the unlisted 
are more value-destroying for the bidders. The estimates of our sample show that 
difference for bidders between listed and unlisted targets is insignificant in all 
periods except the financial crisis, when private targets generated lower wealth losses 
for the acquirers (-0.795% comparing with -1.526% for mergers with public targets) 
and others.  
 
Table 11. Excess returns of European banks by target status. 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) excess returns (in %) of European bank acquirers are reported by sub-
sample periods and according to the criteria of the target listed status (unlisted and listed). The sub-sample periods are initial 
growth period (1990-2000) pre-crisis (2001-Aug 2007), the financial crisis (Sept 2007-2009), and post-crisis (2010–2015). 
Excess returns (AR) are adjusted for the market movement as in the following equation: 
               
where    is the change in the share price of bidder i and    is the return on a representative market portfolio. Market 
return is estimated using the Datastream market index of the bidders‘ country. T-test of mean equal to zero versus not equal to 
zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. ‗∗∗∗‘ ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘ represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Euro period 
Target status 
All targets 
Listed Unlisted 
Initial growth 0.299 0.193 0.239 
N 288 372 660 
Pre-crisis -0.012 -0.253 -0.164 
N 180 331 511 
Financial crisis -1.526 -0.795* -1.146** 
N 60 65 125 
Post-crisis -0.576 0.103 -0.127 
N 62 121 183 
Total -0.070 -0.057 -0.062 
N 590 889 1479 
 
4.2.2.2. Diversification vs. focused acquisitions.  
Industrial relatedness is considered as one of the factors influencing the 
bidders‘ abnormal returns in the short run. The sample includes almost an equal 
number of focused and diversifying deals (742 and 737 deals respectively). It is 
worth mentioning that the term ―diversifying‖ is considered as applicable only to the 
financial industry, ignoring non-financial companies. Thus, for instance, a merger 
between a bank and an insurance company is considered as ―diversifying‖, while 
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only bank-to-bank takeovers are considered focused. Among the diversified deals, 
almost 6.3% of targets are insurance companies, 6.9% - investment firms, 15.7% 
belong to the financial services subsector. The results testify that focused bidders 
result in negative abnormal results of  -0.288% on average, whereas diversifying 
mergers bring insignificant gains of almost +0.165%. Interestingly, the larger 
abnormal returns for the acquirers are gained in the mergers with insurance 
companies (+0.51%) and investment companies (significant +0.809%). 
Considering the factor of the financial crisis, the findings provide important 
insights. First, on average, focused deals resulted in losses of almost -0.64% in 2007-
2009, while diversified deals bring abnormal returns almost close to zero (+0.04%). 
Furthermore, diversified mergers outperform focused acquisitions in all sub-periods 
except the financial crisis (focused deals result in losses of almost -0.74%, while 
diversifying mergers are value-destroying by almost -1.5% in 2007-2009). The 
possible explanations can be based on the assumption that markets are awarding the 
diversification into the subsectors other than banking during the non-crisis periods, 
but the period of the crisis requires the decisions of the minimal risk, thus resulting in 
lower losses from focused deals. Secondly, the bidders acquiring investment 
companies were able to demonstrate remarkable gains of +1.5% to the bidders‘ 
shareholders‘ wealth during the period of the financial crisis (2007-2009), being the 
only subsector able to result in value growth after the M&A‘s. The most probable 
reason is following: the market considered the decision to diversify into the subsector 
of investment companies as a positive sign and anticipated valuable future synergy 
gains. In other words, as the banking industry, financial services companies and 
insurance companies were suffering from severe liquidity shortages and ―bad assets‖ 
on their balance sheets, the investments companies were considered by investors as 
relatively successful subsector. Summarising, these findings show that the period of 
the financial crisis was especially value-destroying for all types of the merger deals.  
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Table 12. Excess returns of European banks by relatedness of business. 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) excess returns (in %) of European bank acquirers are reported by sub-
sample periods and according to the criteria of the diversification status (focused and diversifying). The sub-sample periods are 
initial growth period (1990-2000) pre-crisis (2001-Aug 2007), the financial crisis (Sept 2007-2009), and post-crisis (2010–
2015). Excess returns (AR) are adjusted for the market movement as in the following equation: 
               
where    is the change in the share price of bidder i and    is the return on a representative market portfolio. Market 
return is estimated using the Datastream market index of the bidders‘ country. T-test of mean equal to zero versus not equal to 
zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. ‗∗∗∗‘ ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘ represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Euro 
period 
Focused 
deals (bank-
bank) 
Diversifying deals 
Focused - 
Diversified Insurance Investments Financial 
Services 
Others 
All 
diversifying 
targets 
Initial 
growth 
0.157 1.050** 0.086 -0.106 0.418 0.320* -0.163 
N 327 49 32 101 151 333  
Pre-
crisis 
-0.585*** 0.804 0.977 0.132 -0.047 0.276 -0.861 
N 261 27 41 88 94 250  
Financial 
crisis 
-0.74 -2.548 1.517 -1.055** -2.613 -1.546* 0.806* 
N 62 8 12 11 32 63  
Post-
crisis 
-0.724 -0.488 1.239 1.022 -0.216 0.477 -1.201* 
N 92 10 18 32 31 91  
Total -0.288 0.510 0.809* 0.095 -0.103 0.165 -0.676 
N 742 94 103 232 308 737  
 
4.2.2.3. Domestic vs. foreign acquisitions  
Further, attention should be focused on the domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions and the difference in the short run post-merger outcomes between them 
in the. Primarily, the initial goal was to establish whether domestic M&A‘s 
outperforms cross-border takeovers and whether this is true for the period of the 
financial crisis. The results for the total sample are listed in Table 13, Panel A for 
focused and diversifying mergers in Table 13, Panels B and C respectively. It was 
found that BHARs for both domestic and cross-border M&A‘s are close to zero on 
average. Interestingly, abnormal returns are higher for the cross-border deals in1990-
2001 and 2007-2009, whereas the periods of 2001-2006 and 2010-2015 resulted in 
higher CARs for the domestic takeovers. It is noteworthy, that cross-border merger 
outperformed domestic M&A‘s during the financial crisis, although both acquisition 
types resulted in value destruction for the acquirers‘ shareholders. These findings 
support the previous results that testify general deterioration of the M&A‘s 
performance in the banking sector in 2007-2009. Negative abnormal returns 
primarily provide evidence that market investors tend to assess negatively the 
attempts to grow extensively by being involved in M&A during the period of the 
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economic downturn, and estimating cross-border takeovers in especially sceptical 
manner. 
Table 13. Abnormal returns of bidders by targets’ country of origin and 
relatedness of business. 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) excess returns (in percentage) of European bank acquirers are reported by 
sub-sample periods and according to the criteria of geographic location (domestic and foreign) for total sample (panel A) and 
for focused (panel B) and diversified mergers (panel C) separately. The sub-sample periods are initial growth period (1990-
2000), pre-crisis (2001-Aug 2007), the financial crisis (Sept 2007-2009), and post-crisis (2010–2015). Excess returns (AR) are 
adjusted for the market movement as in the following equation: 
               
where    is the change in the share price of bidder i and    is the return on a representative market portfolio. Market 
return is estimated using the Datastream market index of the bidders‘ country. T-test of mean equal to zero versus not equal to 
zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. ‗∗∗∗‘ ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘ represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: All bidders of domestic and foreign targets 
Euro period Domestic targets Foreign targets Domestic vs. foreign 
Initial growth 0.197 0.290 -0.093 
N 356 304  
Pre-crisis -0.148 -0.178 0.03 
N 234 277  
Financial crisis -1.467** -0.85 -0.616* 
N 60 65  
Post-crisis -0.017 -0.332 0.315 
N 119 64  
Total -0.071 -0.053 -0.018 
N 769 710  
 
Panel B: Focused bidders broken down by targets’ country of origin 
Euro period Domestic targets Foreign targets Domestic vs. foreign 
Initial growth -0.014 0.293 -0.307 
N 145 182  
Pre-crisis -0.548* -0.61** 0.063* 
N 103 158  
Financial crisis -2.025** 0.546 -2.572* 
N 31 31  
Post-crisis -0.701 -0.771 0.07 
N 61 31  
Total -0.482 -0.124 -0.358 
N 340 402  
 
Panel C: Diversifying bidders broken down by targets’ country of origin 
Euro period Domestic targets Foreign targets Domestic vs. foreign 
Initial growth 0.341 0.284 0.057 
N 211 122  
Pre-crisis 0.166 0.397 -0.23 
N 131 119  
Financial crisis -0.869 -2.123 1.254 
N 29 34  
Post-crisis 0.703 0.081 0.622 
N 58 33  
Total 0.255 0.040 0.215 
N 429 308  
 
Furthermore, results in the Panel B reveal that focused M&A‘s were value-
destroying for the bidders‘ value in nearly all analysed periods for both domestic and 
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international acquisitions (with the only exception of focused cross-border deals 
during the financial crisis, which resulted in BHARs of almost +0.546%). This 
interesting finding provides evidence that the process of geographical diversification 
is highly encouraged by the market, allowing companies to benefit from the market 
presence in several regulation regimes. Simultaneously, the market is quite sceptical 
to the bank-to-bank mergers within one country, as only further losses due to the 
macroeconomic instability can be expected, especially during the period of the 
financial crisis. Considering the subsample of diversifying deals with respect to the 
financial crisis, it was found that domestic acquisitions outperform cross-border deals 
in all periods except pre-crisis (2001-2006)(this period is widely characterised as the 
largest M&A boom in the EU, when plenty of banks decided to expand into other 
subsectors of the financial industry (Lensink and Maslennikova, 2008)). The 
conclusion can be following: it is more economically promising (from the market 
investors‘ point of view) to be involved in focused international mergers 
(international risks were considered to be lower than risks connected to industrial 
relatedness), whereas during the post-crisis period it is more profitable to be involved 
in domestic diversifying mergers (international risks are considered to be higher than 
risks connected to industrial relatedness). 
4.2.2.4. Deals within the Eurozone versus outside the Eurozone 
The classification identical to the one in Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) and to the 
one used in the previous chapter is implemented in this part of the thesis. Table 14 
shows announcement period abnormal returns separately for four groups for M&A‘s: 
bidder and target based in the Eurozone; bidder based outside the Eurozone, target 
within the Eurozone; target outside the Eurozone but within the EU; target outside 
the EU.  
Firstly, Eurozone-to-Eurozone mergers are value-destroying or resulting in 
zero abnormal returns in all periods, peaking to almost -1.269% in 2007-2009. 
Secondly, the mergers between Eurozone targets and non-Eurozone bidders are 
value-enhancing in pre-crisis and post-crisis period, however resulting in disastrous -
5.8% losses for the acquirers during the financial crisis. This finding enables to 
conclude that the attempt to buy Eurozone-based target by a bank from the UK, 
Denmark or Sweden during the financial crisis was considered as a strategic failure 
(primarily because of situation when a bank from more stable environments (EU 
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countries outside the Eurozone) enters the less stable market (Eurozone)). On the 
other hand, the acquisitions of targets from the above-mentioned countries were 
resulting in significant +2.317% for the bidders from the EU, which demonstrates the 
differences in the regulation and merger control between Eurozone and non-
Eurozone countries. This positive market reaction can also be connected to the post-
crisis attempts to diversify internationally by entering the markets that are 
independent of the negative consequences of the pan-EU recession. However, all 
types of mergers destroy acquirers‘ value (if mergers of the fifth global wave (2001-
2007) and the further periods (2007-2009 and 2010-2015) are considered). 
 
Table 14. Abnormal returns of bidders broken down by target’s belonging 
to the Eurozone 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) excess returns (in percentage) of European bank acquirers are reported by 
sub-sample periods and according to the criteria of target registration in the Eurozone; in the EU, but not in the Eurozone; and 
outside the EU. The sub-sample periods are initial growth period (1990-2000), pre-crisis (2001-Aug 2007), the financial crisis 
(Sept 2007-2009), and post-crisis (2010–2015). Excess returns (AR) are adjusted for the market movement as in the following 
equation: 
               
where    is the change in the share price of bidder i and    is the return on a representative market portfolio. Market 
return is estimated using the Datastream market index of the bidders‘ country. T-test of mean equal to zero versus not equal to 
zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. ‗∗∗∗‘ ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘ represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
 
Euro 
period 
Targets in the Eurozone 
 
All 
Targets outside the 
Eurozone 
All 
 
Bidders in the 
Eurozone 
Bidders 
outside the 
Eurozone 
EU targets 
outside 
Eurozone 
Non-EU 
targets 
All targets 
Initial 
growth 
0.054 0.401 0.075 0.732* 0.029 0.437* 0.239 
N 338 22 360 174 126 300 660 
Pre-crisis -0.144 0.184 -0.13 -0.631 -0.095* -0.201 -0.164 
N 257 11 268 75 168 243 511 
Financial 
crisis 
-1.269** -5.816 
-
1.545** 
-1.049 -0.558 -0.700 -1.146** 
N 62 4 66 17 42 59 125 
Post-crisis -0.302 1.692 -0.245 2.317** -0.81 0.032** -0.127 
N 102 3 105 21 57 78 183 
Total -0.169 -0.184 -0.170 0.386** -0.172 0.064 -0.062 
N 759 40 799 287 393 680 1479 
4.2.3. Regression analysis 
Following the study by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), an additional investigation 
is performed to study the role of the factors that contribute to the short-run post-
merger performance around the announcement date. A set of variables, identical to 
the previous chapter and Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), is deployed.  
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Table 15. Factors affecting bidders’ gains. 
Three days announcement period (−1 to +1) returns (in percentage) of European banks engaged in  takeover bids are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a cross-sectional framework as in the following equation: 
       ∑  
 
   
    
   is the 3-day holding period gross return of the bidder from bid i. The vector of explanatory variables    includes 
market return around the announcement of bid, two dummies representing the methods of payment (cash and shares) used in the 
deal. Further dummy variables included in the model represent diversifying versus focused acquisitions, listed versus unlisted 
targets, bidders and targets are from the Eurozone, and domestic versus foreign targets. Two further dummies are included to 
represent the years of extremely low (1992, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 and 2011) and extremely high stock market returns (1993, 
1998, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2013) to control for their possible implications. Regression is estimated using a robust procedure 
that controls for potential effects of outliers in the dataset. The equation is estimated for two groups of  subsamples and the full 
sample: 1) initial growth period (1990-2000), 2) pre-crisis period (2001-Aug 2007), 3) crisis period (Sept 2007-2009) and 4) 
post-crisis period (2010-2015). The constant   represents average excess returns of bidders after controlling for the effects of 
the explanatory variables. ‗∗∗∗‘ ‗∗∗‘, ‗∗‘ represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variables 
All 
periods 
Initial 
growth 
Pre-crisis 
Financial 
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Constant 0.191 0.029 0.313 0.582 -0.380 
Market return -0.101** -0.190** 0.0251 -0.1317 -0.1964 
Cash deal -0.248 -0.094 -0.424* -0.860 0.342 
Shares deal -0.153 1.413** -0.963* -0.421 -0.026 
Relative deal size -0.002 0.015 -0.001 -0.278 -0.004 
Deal value 0.021 0.031 0.028 -0.673*** 0.141 
Focused deal -0.255* -0.131 -0.301 0.692 -0.796* 
Listed target -0.294* -0.058 -0.312 -0.186 -0.691 
Eurozone bidder and target 0.006 0.137 -0.197 -0.497 -0.148 
Domestic target 0.117 -0.041 0.251 2.172* 0.175 
Interaction 0.335 -1.422* 0.289 0.000 1.720 
Years of high market returns 0.103 0.150 -0.154 1.896 0.924* 
Years of low market returns -0.361** 0.028 -0.380 0.466 -0.603 
Adjusted    1.8* 2.5 4.2** 13.9* 5.5 
N 1457 646 493 125 183 
 
Following conclusions can be drawn from the results above (Table 15). The 
BHARs are in an inverse relationship with the market returns. This finding implies 
that lower abnormal returns for the bidders are more likely to occur during the 
periods of rapid movements of the market. Significant dummy variable of negative 
market returns (at 5% level) provide further information that mergers are value 
destroying for the acquirers if mergers are finalised during the years of  abnormally 
low market returns. In other words, a weak market is per se a negative factor for the 
mergers‘ success in the European banking sector. It can also be interpreted in the 
following way: these findings support the hypothesis that mergers that are announced 
during the periods of depressed financial markets result in value destruction for the 
bidders‘ shareholders by default. In this particular case, the regression analysis shows 
that mergers announced in 1992, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 and 2011 were expected to 
be unsuccessful. 
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According to the findings of regression analysis of the replicated sample 
(1990-2004) in the previous chapter, the mergers with listed banks are more likely to 
result in minimum abnormal returns (focused mergers are considered too risky and 
value-destroying by the market). 
The analysis was each of the sub-periods was also conducted. It is noteworthy 
that the results show strong evidence in favour of the value-driven merger wave in 
the European financial sector in 1990-2001. The positive and significant correlation 
in the estimate shows that banks were paying with their stock for the deals, resulting 
in higher rewards by the market investors. This finding is in contrast with the general 
line of the literature, which claims that cash-financed M&A‘s are more value-
generating (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; Beitel et al., 2004; Campa and 
Hernando, 2006) 
The period of the financial crisis (2007-2009) was characterised by significant 
negative coefficient of the deal value variable (at 1% level) implying that the 
―inverse size effect‖ (Beitel et al., 2004) exists: larger acquirers are less likely to 
experience higher wealth gains after the acquisitions, as the post-merger integration 
costs are higher and the merger structures are more complex. In other words, this 
result can be interpreted as an indirect support to the hypothesis of ―ineffective 
management‖ of the acquirers. The market investors tend to consider larger deals as 
less effective and less substantiated, been more likely to relate to them as reflections 
of the ―empire-building‖ tendencies. As a result, larger deals generate lower gains for 
acquirers‘ shareholders. Furthermore, domestic deals were considered as mergers 
with lower risks, acting as a ―safe heaven‖ for distressed banking institutions.  
4.3. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to replicate the study by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) and to 
re-test several hypotheses related to the influence of the introduction of the euro on 
the European banking M&A‘s. Furthermore, the initial sample of 1990-2004 was 
extended to cover the period up to 2015. Additionally, the EU was considered in its 
present borders (so-called ―EU-28‖), including newly-joined countries from the 
Central and Eastern Europe to ensure the integrity of the EU.  
The replication procedure resulted in supportive findings for the paper by 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009). For instance, it was confirmed that M&A‘s do not create 
significant value for the bidders‘ shareholders. Also, it can be concluded that the 
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most wealth-gaining European banking acquisitions were finalised in the run-up 
period (1996-1998). Meanwhile, no significant positive changes in the bidders‘ 
shareholders wealth in mergers during the pre-euro period (1990-1995) and the post-
euro period (1999-2004) were found. Furthermore, in line with the findings by 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), the process of acquiring private targets generates higher 
gains for the bidders. It was also found that diversifying mergers were more 
successful in the short-term value creation, particularly involving targets from 
insurance and financial services, which managed to bring positive value gains for the 
involved companies. The regression analysis demonstrated that acquirers‘ gains are 
mainly dependent on the market movement, size of the deal and the listed status of 
the targets. In line with the conclusions by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), the evidence 
shows that higher market returns were the core factors that ensured higher BHARs. 
Furthermore, the obtained results differ from findings by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), 
as the calculations in this chapter indicate that larger deals are able to generate higher 
wealth gains for the bidders, especially in the pre-euro period (1990-1995). Overall, 
it was found that the introduction of the euro had a negative impact on the outcomes 
of the European banking mergers, as the competition increased after 1999, provoking 
fierce rivalry between the EU banks over the limited targets in the Eurozone and 
eliminating opportunities for wealth growth in the short run (for the acquisitions in 
2000-2004). This finding is in contrast to the most recent paper by Perera et al., 
(2013), who testified growth in abnormal returns for the banks involved in mergers 
after the adoption of the common currency. However, the comparability can be 
distorted due to the fact that Perera et al., (2013) included non-bank mergers into the 
sample. 
The analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on the European banking 
M&A‘s has also provided some interesting findings. On average, acquirers 
experienced losses of almost -1.15% in the shareholders‘ wealth around the 
announcement date in 2007-2009, which clearly differs from zero-close abnormal 
returns before and after the crisis. Both focused and diversifying M&A‘s were value-
destroying; however, the only type of targets, that was able to bring positive (but yet 
insignificant) gains to the bidders, was the subsector of investment companies. This 
finding provides evidence that market was able to react positively on the deals 
announced during the crisis, thus showing optimistic attitude to the efforts to 
diversify into the industries less exposed to the liquidity crisis. The outcomes for 
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domestic and cross-border M&A‘s were almost equal in pre- and post-crisis periods, 
but domestic takeovers resulted in significant losses for the acquirers‘ shareholders 
during the financial crisis. Generally, the average BHARs did not recover to the pre-
crisis levels, serving as the evidence of structural problems with liquidity and 
inefficient regulation in the European financial sector for the post-crisis period as 
well.  
The regression analysis has shown that the overvaluation-driven wave of 
takeovers was confirmed between 1991 and 2001 during the 5
th
 global merger wave. 
One of the most significant factors to define the behaviour of bidders‘ wealth 
changes during the financial crisis (2007-2009) was the negative correlation between 
deal value and abnormal returns. This finding confirms the theory that post-merger 
integration and materialisation of synergies is more difficult to achieve in the large-
scale banking deals. Similar negative expectations were persisting during the post-
merger period (2010-2015), when focused deals were value-destroying, as the market 
was sceptical towards the deals without diversification and possibly was hedging 
itself against the repetition of the unsolved crisis-related problems.  
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5. Re-evaluating the short-term changes in shareholders’ wealth of the 
European merging banks (following Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 
2013) 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the replication and further extension of the paper 
by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), which researched the value changes for 
the banks involved into mergers and acquisitions in the European Union between 
1990 and 2004. The key idea was to establish the impact of major external and 
internal factors (deal configuration, country of origin, method of payment etc.) on the 
changes of banks‘ value around the announcement. Furthermore, the combined 
approach was implemented: first, stock market data was used to calculate abnormal 
returns and to establish, whether different types of banking mergers create value; 
further, accounting data was applied into the regression analysis framework to define 
the ―optimal configuration‖ of the merging bank (i.e. to establish the bank with the 
particular accounting variables that maximise the growth in value). Chapter 5.1 
replicates the initial paper by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) and covers 
the period of 1990-2004. Further, chapter 5.2 extends the initial research, considering 
banking mergers in 1990-2015 in broader, modern configuration of the European 
Union – EU-28. Similarly to chapter 4.2, implementing extended period gives an 
opportunity to analyse the impact of the global financial crisis on the M&A outcomes 
The data is collected from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database and 
include stock prices of all banks that are involved into M&A‘s between 1990 and 
2015, as well as stock market indices. The key selected methodology was event study 
(market return model), assessing the abnormal returns of bidders and targets around 
the merger announcement date with market return model, used previously by Fuller 
et al. (2002) and Faccio et al. (2006). Obtained CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) 
were included into regression analysis framework revealing the changes in the 
shareholders‘ wealth and the factors of M&A‘s success or failure.  
Considering the methodology used in chapter 5, Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou (2013) undertook a complex approach, combining the frequently 
utilised event study methodology and accounting-based data to compare the pre-
merger and post-merger performance of the selected banks. On the one hand, the 
event study methodology estimates the market assessment of the mergers with the 
help of market model previously used in Beitel et al., (2004), Lepetit et al., (2004), 
Campa and Hernando (2006):  
140 
 
 
               ,                                                       (22) 
 
where:     is the expected return of share i at day t,     is the return of the 
market portfolio at day t,   ,    are the coefficients of the model,    is a statistical 
error term. Further, OLS and GARCH estimations are applied to assess the ―normal‖ 
behaviour of the stocks in the sample. Afterwards, abnormal returns are calculated: 
 
            ̂, ,                                                                (23) 
 
where     is the real return,    ̂ – estimated return. 
Importantly, asymmetric GARCH estimation technique controls for the time-
varying variance and periods of high volatility (following Bollerslev, 1986). 
Obtained abnormal returns would be finally used as criteria to assess the success of 
failure of the acquisition. The specification of asymmetric GARCH model is 
following the model first described in Nelson (1991), and often referred to as 
―EGARCH model‖: 
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where     – normal return;     – market return,     – coefficient,     – 
residuals of mean equation,       – coefficients in variance equation,      – 
conditional variance,   denotes a vector of parameters needed to specify the 
probability distribution.  ,  ,  ,   are parameters.   is a constant,   represents 
magnitude effect,   measures the persistence in conditional volatility irrespective of 
the market conditions,   measures the asymmetry or the leverage effect (if    , 
model becomes symmetric GARCH). The key point of asymmetric EGARCH model 
is its ability to capture the effect, when market reacts to the bad news in a more 
powerful way than for the good news.   
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Afterwards, obtained CARs are incorporated into the regression analysis along 
with deal-specific data and accounting ratios. This complex approach combines the 
market-based approach and accounting data approach and allows the researcher to 
obtain a comprehensive estimation of the merger outcomes. 
5.1. Replication of the paper by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou 
(2013) 
5.1.1. Sample and data characteristics 
The sample for the replication is collected from Thomson Financial Database 
and Datastream, identically to sample by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) 
and the selection criteria in the paper. All banking merger deals between 01.01.1990 
and 31.12.2004 are collected. Both bidder and target are categorised as banking 
institutions and are registered in the EU-15 (as on 01.01.2004). Furthermore, at least 
one involved company is publicly listed in one of the EU countries, and the share 
prices are available from Datastream or Bloomberg. Only one deal is selected for a 
particular bidder in order to isolate the information content of specific deals. 
Furthermore, all accounting-related information on the merging banks was 
downloaded from Datastream and Bloomberg. After filtering procedures, 197 bids 
survived these criteria. This number is close to the sample in the paper by 
Asimakopoulos and Atahasoglou (2013), who worked with 170 banking M&A‘s. 
Table 16 describes the distribution of M&A activities of the banks originating 
from the 15 EU countries in our sample. The cross-tabulation of acquisition bids 
shows that most of the sample bids are announced by banks based in Italy (69), Spain 
(23), Germany (22) and France (21), whereas Finland, Greece and Luxembourg have 
the least active M&A markets (only one merger by banks originating from these 
countries).  
The results in Table 17 show that average deal size is approximately $940.84 
million. Domestic deals are generally larger than cross-border acquisitions ($1089.43 
million and $588.92 million respectively). Table 17 also demonstrates that larger 
bidders are involved in cross-border mergers implying that larger banks are able to 
take risks linked with cross-border growth – an average size of the domestic acquirer 
is nearly $7.9 billion, while typical cross-border bidder is $13.1 billion. Furthermore, 
domestic deals result in larger number of acquired shares, comparing to the cross-
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border deals (56.98% and 40.91% respectively), meaning that banks are usually not 
taking control of the foreign targets, and rather grow their ownership stake gradually. 
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Table 16. Distribution of sample deals by bidders’ and targets’ countries of origin (replication sample). 
The table shows the geographical distribution of sample bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) and target originates from EU-15 or new European Union members between1990 and 2004. New EU members include the ten countries that joined 
the EU on 1 May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. A bidder is included in the sample if it is categorised as a bank in the SDC database, either 
bidder or targets are listed on a stock exchange in one of the above-mentioned 25 European member countries, and has participated in the M&A activities between 01.01.1990 and 31.12.2004. 
 
 
Target Nation 
                 
Acquirer Nation Austria Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Lithuania Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovakia Spain Sweden UK Total 
Austria 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 7 
Belgium 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
Denmark 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 10 
Finland 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
France 0 0 0 0 17 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 
Germany 1 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 0 0 2 0 0 22 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Italy 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 60 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 69 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 7 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 15 0 3 23 
Sweden 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 13 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 8 
Total 6 10 2 1 24 12 2 3 2 68 1 2 14 6 7 22 6 9 197 
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Table 17. Sample characteristics. 
Bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) during 1990–2004 are included in 
the sample. A bidder is included in the sample if it is categorised as a bank in the SDC database, either bidder or targets are 
listed on a stock exchange in one of the EU-25 countries, and has participated in the M&A activities between 01.01.1990 and 
31.12.2004. For a given deal, the deal value is reported in US dollars. 
 
Panel A. Sample distribution of the European banking M&A announcement 
(replication sample). 
 
  Replication sample  
 
Sample in Asimakopoulos and  
Athanasoglou (2013) 
Bidders Total Listed targets Unlisted targets Total Listed targets Unlisted targets 
  Domestic Cross-
border 
Domestic Cross-
border 
 Domestic Cross-
border 
Domestic Cross-
border 
Listed 193 96 57 29 11 145 34 14 42 55 
Not 
listed 
4 2 2 - - 25 18 5 - - 
Total 197 98 59 29 11 170 52 19 42 55 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics (replication sample). 
 Domestic bidders Foreign bidders All bidders 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. 
Shares acquired 
(%) 
56.98 51.00 36.23 40.91 26.60 39.01 51.08 49.38 37.97 
Deal Value (in $ 
million) 
1089.43 248.61 2399.65 588.92 100.64 2539.32 940.84 153.82 2442.68 
MV of bidders (in 
million $) 
7935.90 3085.25 16230.96 13129.36 7905.53 12635.94 9771.97 4733.95 15230.04 
5.1.2. Empirical results 
5.1.2.1. M&A announcement and market reaction  
Similarly to the paper by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), behaviour 
of the cumulative abnormal returns for the (-20;+20), (-10;+10), (-20;0), (-10;0), (-
1;+1), (0) event windows for both targets and bidders was investigated, following 
classic event windows used by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000). The researchers 
follow the general framework widely accepted in the M&A studies: the 
announcement date is considered a date when the event of interest occurs (merger 
announcement), and the market reaction is assessed in various event windows to 
capture different reaction patterns in the periods before and after the particular dates. 
For instance, the (0) event window includes only the announcement day and 
estimates the market reaction only on the announcement date. The most frequently 
used event window of (-1;+1) accounts for possible market imperfections and widens 
the analysed time periods for a day prior to and after the merger announcement. 
Some other researchers advise using wider event windows to control for so-called 
―run-up periods‖ when market anticipates the merger or, alternatively, the news 
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disseminations is slow, and the reaction is detectable only after several days 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Thus, the aggregate reaction is distributed over plenty of days 
before and after the announcement, and the researcher has to study different event 
windows of a various length (Krivin et al., 2003). For instance, (-1;+1) event window 
was utilised by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Ismail and Davidson (2005), 
Hagendorff et al. (2009), Lensink and Maslennikova (2008), Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009), Beltratti and Paladino (2013), etc. To achieve precision in the process of 
capturing market reaction to the merger events, the same authors used longer event 
windows of (-20;+20)(Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; Schiereck and Strauss, 2000, 
Weese, 2007; Kolaric and Schiereck, 2013), (-10;+10)(Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 
2000; Beitel et al., 2004; Lorenz et al., 2006; Beltratti and Paladino, 2013) and 
asymmetric event windows of (-10,0) and (-20;0)(Amihud et al., 2002; Ismail and 
Davidson, 2007). 
The cumulative abnormal returns for each day of observation are reported in 
Figure 2 for the replication sample and in Figure 3 for the initial paper sample. In a 
similar manner, average CARs for bidders and targets are reported in Table 18a (for 
replication sample) and Table 18b (for Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013). 
Typical performance for both bidders and targets is obvious on Figure 2: the bidders 
experience almost no distinctive reaction on the announcement date, and the 
abnormal returns are decreasing 20 days after the announcement. On the other hand, 
similar to the results by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), the special run-up 
period is confirmed for targets (approximately beginning from - the 12
th
 day prior to 
the announcement). Hence, a dramatic rise of abnormal returns on -1
st
, 0 and 1
st
 days 
is observed, reaching +4.23% on the 2
nd
 day after the event date. This positive 
reaction by the market is consistent and stable up to the end of the investigated 
period of (-20;+20) days around the announcement. The only difference comparing 
to the results of Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) is that targets‘ positive 
CARs are preserved up to the end of the considered period, whereas the authors‘ data 
in the initial paper show a downward trend of ARs beginning from the 14
th
 day after 
the announcement. Consequently, it can be concluded that deal-related information 
can be gradually leaking to the market before the event date. This finding can be 
explained by the dissemination of the insider information and the market 
inefficiencies, the phenomena which are also observed in other studies on the 
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M&A‘s involving banks in the US and the EU (Campa and Hernando, 2006; Beltratti 
and Paladino, 2013). 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers and targets 
(replication sample, 1990-2004) 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers and targets 
(Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou sample) 
 
 
As reported in Table 18a, the reaction for bidder banks at event date is -0.13% 
and +0.01% under the OLS and GARCH estimation methods respectively. During 
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the largest event window of (-20;+20), the negative reaction of the market amounted 
to approximately -1.82% and -1.58% respectively. The findings are similar and even 
more pessimistic for acquirers than the initial results by Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou (2013) and the earlier studies by Cyba-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and 
Beitel et al., (2004), who also reported insignificant negative CARs for the bidder 
banks involved into M&A‘s. These results are also in line with Ismail and Davidson 
(2005) who testified that acquirers‘ abnormal returns are close to zero in the 
European market. 
Confirming the initial hypothesis by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), 
the results for the targets confirm that M&A‘s create value for the targets‘ 
shareholders. The abnormal returns at the event date are +0.61% and +0.86% for 
OLS and GARCH estimation methods respectively. If wider event windows are 
considered, CARs are even larger: +2.23% and +2.63% for (-1;+1) and even +4.01% 
and +5.06% for (-20;+20) event window. It is noteworthy that CARs are statistically 
significant in all event windows except event date and (-10;0). These results are in 
line with Ismail and Davidson (2005) and other papers investigating European 
M&A‘s, who confirmed significant value creation for the targets‘ shareholders.  
 
Table 18a. Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers and targets at 
various intervals (total sample, OLS estimation, replication sample, 1990-2004). 
 
Event 
window 
Acquirers (N=197) Targets (N=102) 
CAR (%) No. of deals CAR (%) No. of deals 
OLS GARCH 
With 
positive 
CAR 
(OLS) 
With negative 
CAR (OLS) 
OLS GARCH 
With 
positive 
CAR (OLS) 
With negative 
CAR (OLS) 
(-20;0) -1.17 -0.43 93 104 1.021,2 1.641,2 51 51 
(-10;0) -0.62 -0.26 94 103 0.51 0.92 50 52 
(-1;1) -0.09 0.08 95 102 2.231,2 2.631,2 57 45 
(0) -0.13 0.01 92 105 0.61 0.86 48 54 
(-10;10) -0.44 -0.28 98 99 2.811,2 3.741,2 51 51 
(-20;20) -1.821,2 -1.581,2 82 115 4.011,2 5.061,2 47 55 
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Table 18b. Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers and targets at 
various intervals (total sample, OLS estimation, Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou). 
 
Event 
window 
Acquirers (N=145) Targets (N=71) 
CAR (%) No. of deals CAR (%) No. of deals 
OLS 
GAR
CH 
With positive 
CAR (OLS) 
With negative 
CAR (OLS) 
OLS GARCH 
With positive 
CAR (OLS) 
With negative 
CAR (OLS) 
(-20;0) -0.33 -0.18 73 79 5.381,2 6.181,2 49 22 
(-10;0) -0.33 -0.28 71 81 4.221,2 4.611,2 48 23 
(-1;1) -0.23 -0.22 69 83 3.361,2 3.471,2 47 24 
(0) -0.08 -0.07 73 79 2.011,2 2.031,2 47 24 
(-10;10) -0.70 -0.59 64 88 6.021,2 6.691,2 48 23 
(-20;20) -0.79 -0.51 68 84 6.601,2 8.031,2 47 24 
Note: 1, 2 denote significance at the 5% level of significance for the BMP and the Corrado tests respectively. 
 
Overall, the results are in line with the existing literature on the European 
banking mergers. More precisely, the value creation for the targets is confirmed, 
while acquirers‘ gains are close to zero or insignificantly negative (Beitel et al., 
2004; Ismail & Davidson, 2005). The following explanation is highly probable: the 
increased competition in the European Union between 1990 and 2004 (primarily on 
the background of the homogenisation of the financial sector in the EU members, 
introduction of the euro, etc.) motivated bidders to be more risk-averse in terms of 
expansion, concentrating on the costs/profits rationalisation.  
To clarify the situation, several subsamples were investigated in order to shed 
light on the short-run post-merger performance. The criteria of the public status and 
diversification status were used to divide the total sample. The below-mentioned 
results relate to the GARCH estimation, as OLS results are biased downwards (as 
stated previously). The results for the subsamples of domestic and cross-border deals 
are reported separately for acquirers buying public and private targets in Tables 19a 
(for replication sample) and 19b (initial sample). It can be concluded that domestic 
deals outperform cross-border deals in the subsample of public target M&A‘s. For 
instance, average CARs for the bidders in on the event date are almost +0.11% and -
0.09% for domestic and cross-border mergers respectively, whereas the magnitude is 
even larger if consider (-20;+20) event window is considered (-0.75% and -2.31% 
respectively). It is obvious that gains for the acquirers do not persist for a long time, 
which is in line with Figure 2 described previously in this chapter. Such difference 
can be attributed to the number of risks related to the geographic expansion and 
international M&A‘s, which makes the market estimation of future gains more 
cautious for cross-border takeovers. On the other hand, the findings suggest opposite 
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results for the acquirers buying private targets. The CARs for event date are -0.39% 
for domestic deals and +0.48% for international takeovers. Possibly, the private 
targets contain larger opportunities to benefit from synergy gains and geographic risk 
diversification. However, the lack of information for private financial companies 
creates a barrier towards the studies of the market-related post-merger effects. These 
results provide an insight that organised stock exchange plays an extremely 
important role in providing a fair assessment of the merger deal.  
In general, the results are in line with the findings by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000), Beitel et al., (2004) and Lepetit et al. (2004), who explained the difference in 
CARs by cultural, legal and informational factors despite the intensified integration 
efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
 
Table 19a. Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers for different 
classifications of targets (GARCH estimation, replication sample, 1990-2004). 
 
Event 
window 
Target listed (N=155) Target not-listed (N=38) 
CAR (%) 
CAR 
difference 
CAR (%) 
CAR 
difference 
Domestic 
deals (N=96) 
Cross-border 
deals (N=57) 
Domestic 
deals (N=29) 
Cross-border 
deals (N=11) 
(-20;0) 0.04 -0.33 0.37 -2.341,2 -0.62 -1.71 
(-10;0) 0.10 -0.33 0.43 -1.58 0.07 -1.65 
(-1;1) 0.15 0.05 0.10 -0.39 0.58 -0.96 
(0) 0.11 -0.09 0.19 -0.39 0.48 -0.87 
(-10;10) 0.10 -0.37 0.46 -1.651,2 0.01 -1.65 
(-20;20) -0.75 -2.311,2 1.56** -2.321,2 -2.801,2 0.48 
 
Notes: 1, 2 denote significance at the 5% level of significance for the BMP and the Corrado tests respectively. * (**) 
denote significance at the 5% (10%) level of significance for the CAR difference (t-test). 
 
Table 19b. Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers for different 
classifications of targets (GARCH estimation, Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou). 
 
Event 
window 
Target listed (N=48) Target not-listed (N=97) 
CAR (%) 
CAR 
difference 
CAR (%) 
CAR 
difference 
Domestic deals 
(N=34) 
Cross-border 
deals (N=14) 
Domestic deals 
(N=42) 
Cross-border 
deals (N=55) 
(-20;0) 0.991 -0.42 1.41 -0.89 -0.15 0.74 
(-10;0) 0.771 -0.35 1.13 -0.77 -0.41 0.36 
(-1;1) 0.59 -0.60* 1.19 -0.50 -0.27 0.23 
(0) 0.31 -0.33 0.64 -0.26 -0.03 0.23 
(-10;10) 1.041 -0.87 1.91 -1.471,2 -0.651 0.83 
(-20;20) 1.231,2 -1.181,2 2.41** -1.601,2 -0.32 1.27 
 
Notes: 1, 2 denote significance at the 5% level of significance for the BMP and the Corrado tests respectively.  * (**) 
denote significance at the 5% (10%) level of significance for the CAR difference (t-test). 
 
 
150 
 
5.1.2.2. The determinants of value creation 
a) Estimations based on OLS 
The previous section provides interesting insights considering the short-term 
post-merger performance of the European banking mergers, and the results are in line 
with both replicated paper by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) and previous 
studies by Cyba-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Beitel et al. (2004), Campa and 
Hernando (2006) and other researchers of the European banking M&A‘s. Thus 
regression analysis was performed to estimate the influence of the deal-related and 
firm-related factors on the abnormal returns. (-1;+1) event window was selected 
primarily due to the relatively small period around the event date with absent 
information leakages and the direct comparability with the majority of other studies. 
The following explanatory variables were used, following Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou (2013). 
 
Table 20. Variables in the regression model 
Variable Description 
Target dummy 1 if bank is target, 0 otherwise 
Domestic merger 
dummy 
1 if merger is domestic, 0 otherwise 
Listed dummy 1 if bank is listed, 0 otherwise 
Hofstede cultural index 
Sociocultural index, developed by Hofstede (1990); consists of 4 weighted variables: 
power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance 
ROE Return on Equity (net income / shareholders‘ equity) 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Liquidity Loans-to-deposits ratio 
Loan loss provision Provisions-to-loans ratio 
Efficiency Operating expenses / operating income ratio 
Diversification Net interest margin / total income ratio 
Deal value Value of the merger (in $ billions) 
Year of positive returns 
dummy 
1 if a merger announced in a year with the stock market reported a positive return, 0 
otherwise 
Note that all accounting data variables were measured in the year prior to the year when the deal was 
announced. 
 
Further, univariate models were estimated to identify the sole potential effect 
of each variable and to establish the influence of each factor separately. These 
estimations helped to identify the factors that should be included in the multivariate 
model to establish the joint influence of parameters on the abnormal returns. The 
results suggest that all dummy variables with the exception of target status dummy 
have a negative effect on the CARs. The univariate regressions for the accounting 
data variables show similar results: all variables except liquidity proxy, provisions-
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to-loans ratio and deal value are negatively correlated with the abnormal returns. 
Considering the significance of the respective coefficients, it appears that target 
status, ROE and provisions-to-loans ratio are significant at 1% level, and bidder size 
is significant at 10% level. Overall, it appears that significant negative effect on the 
final CARs is caused by ROE and bank size, whereas provisions-to-loans and 
abnormally high market returns have a positive impact on the short-run CARs. The 
obtained findings indicate that the mergers between smaller, less profitable, less risk-
exposed banks are the most successful for bidders and targets. Obviously, these 
findings support the theory that smaller banks are easier to incorporate into the 
structure of the combined entity after the acquisitions and to reach synergy gains 
afterwards. Furthermore, the ―clustering‖ of more successful mergers can occur if the 
market itself is growing. The results from the replication sample mainly differ from 
the findings by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) only by the fact that 
provisions-to-loans and merger year were not significant in the initial paper.  
b) Estimation based on Probit method 
Further, a probit model is utilised to estimate the effects of the variables on the 
CARs for the (-1;+1) event window in terms of probabilities. Thus the medians for 
all bank-related characteristics are calculated, and the parameters are recalculated to 
the binary form. The variables take the value of 1 if it is higher than the median and 0 
otherwise. The reason behind this estimation is following: probit estimation can give 
a further, more detailed indication whether a probability of producing higher 
abnormal returns is increasing when the bank's characteristics are above or below 
their cross-section median. The results are reported in Tables 22a and 22b. It was 
revealed that the statistical significance is much weaker. In contrast to the study of 
Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), the only significant variable is the dummy 
reflecting abnormally high market returns. Thus, as in the OLS estimation, the 
probability of gaining positive CARs is increasing if the merger deal is announced 
during the years of the abnormal market growth. Although other variables were 
found to be insignificant, target status dummy and credit risk proxy are positively 
correlated with CARs, while domestic merger dummy, ROE, bank size, liquidity and 
efficiency ratios are negatively related to the abnormal short-run returns.   
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Table 21a. Factors explaining the abnormal returns for the (−1, +1) window (OLS estimation, replication sample, 1990-2004). 
c Target Dom Listed Cult ROE Size Liq Prov Eff Nii-Ti Value Year R^2 F 
-0.180 2.44***            0.027 8.61* 
0.918*  -0.693           0.002 0.45 
0.407   -0.242          0.000 0.10 
2.21    -0.026         0.001 0.96 
1.76***     -0.106***        0.025 7.28* 
7.97*      -0.415*       0.010 2.88* 
0.665       0.016      0.000 0.00 
-1.64***        2.90***     0.113 37.66* 
0.672         -0.152    0.000 0.12 
0.676*          -0.140   0.001 0.68 
0.872           0.154  0.002 0.02 
0.017            2.95*** 0.030 8.08* 
-8.25* 2.22**    0.015 0.289  2.97***    2.49*** 0.155 10.84*** 
-3.01     0.016 0.034  2.94***    2.59*** 0.136 11.69*** 
 
Table 21b. Factors explaining the abnormal returns for the (−1, +1) window (OLS estimation, Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou). 
c Target Dom Listed Cult ROE Size Liq Prov Eff Nii-Ti Value Year R^2 F 
-0.217 3.683*            0.101 26.084* 
0.131  1.469**           0.014 4.295** 
0.477   1.066          0.006 2.252 
0.056**    -0.012         0.005 1.173 
2.110*     -0.103***        0.009 3.057*** 
5.987*      -0.453*       0.022 6.140* 
1.001       - 0.042      0.001 0.46 
0.982***        -0.006     0.000 0.100 
1.046         -0.133    0.000 0.001 
- 1.143          3.801   0.005 2.193*** 
0.911**           0.004  0.000 0.150 
0.633            0.485 0.000 0.416 
0.094 3.387* 0.553   -0.003 -0.012       0.093 6.710 
5.160**  1.083**   -0.008*** -0.352***       0.032 3.504** 
 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
c is the constant of the equation, Target is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is a target and the value of 0 otherwise, Dom is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the M&A deal is a domestic one and the value of 0 
otherwise, Listed is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the bank lists its shares in an organised stock exchange and the value of 0 otherwise, Cult measures the cultural distance between the countries involved in the deal, ROE is the return of 
equity, Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Liq is the loans to deposits ratio, Prov is the provisions for loans losses to total loans ratio, Eff is the cost to income ratio, Nii_Ti is the contribution of interest related income to total 
income, Value is the value of the deal and YEAR is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the performance of the stock market was positive and the value of zero otherwise. 
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Table 22a. Factors explaining the abnormal returns for the (−1, +1) window (Probit estimation, replication sample, 1990-2004). 
c Target Dom Listed Cult ROE Size Liq Prov Eff Nii-Ti Value Year 
Pseudo 
R^2 
LR 
-0.0507 0.171            0.0030 1.27 
0.0132  -0.0132           0.0000 0.01 
-0.24235   0.2839          0.0066 1.82 
0.114    -0.216         0.0053 2.24 
0.0415     -0.0664        0.0005 0.21 
0.0914      -0.166       0.0032 1.33 
0.0415       -0.0664      0.0005 0.21 
-0.0415        0.0996     0.0011 0.48 
0.0249         -0.0332    0.0001 0.05 
-0.108          0.233   0.0062 2.60 
0.0083           -  0.0052 1.42 
-0.0957            0.485* 0.0180 7.52** 
-0.0706 -0.0164     -0.119 0.0046 0.0944 -0.0304 0.220   0.0090 3.76 
-0.0737      -0.116 0.0051 0.0938 -0.0297 0.211   0.0090 3.76 
 
Table 22b. Factors explaining the abnormal returns for the (−1, +1) window (Probit estimation, Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou). 
c Target Dom Listed Cult ROE Size Liq Prov Eff Nii-Ti Value Year 
Pseudo 
R^2 
LR 
-0.082 0.500*            0.024 7.486* 
- 0.025  0.176           0.003 1.086 
0.030   0.095          0.001 0.316 
0.139    -0.082         0.000 0.237 
0.112     -0.078        0.000 0.216 
0.225***      −0.453*       0.010 3.274 
0.180       -0.213      0.005 1.115 
- 0.067        0.283***     0.009 2.831 
0.2487**         -0.350**    0.014 3.421** 
- 0.0896          0.329**   0.012 3.815** 
0.0223           0.102  0.001 1.369 
            -0.006 0.000 0.139 
0.232 0.517*     −0.072 -0.025 0.173 -0.454** -0.028   0.055 17.086* 
0.318      -0.219 -0.238 0.181 -0.327*** 0.1119   0.036 11.283 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
c is the constant of the equation, Target is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is a target and the value of 0 otherwise, Dom is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the M&A deal is a domestic one and the value of 0 
otherwise, Listed is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the bank lists its shares in an organised stock exchange and the value of 0 otherwise, Cult measures the cultural distance between the countries involved in the deal, ROE is the return of 
equity, Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Liq is the loans to deposits ratio, Prov is the provisions for loans losses to total loans ratio, Eff is the cost to income ratio, Nii_Ti is the contribution of interest related income to total 
income, Value is the value of the deal and YEAR is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the performance of the stock market was positive and the value of zero otherwise.  
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c) Determinants of the share price reaction of acquirers and targets 
Although several interesting suggestions were presented in the analysis above, 
the findings results lack differentiation between the acquirers and targets. Thus, 
similarly to the paper by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), the matched 
sample should be analysed to establish the exact role of the determinants in short-run 
market reaction. A new sample of matched acquirers and targets was constructed, 
containing full data for the involved banking institutions. Basic descriptive statistics 
of these bank-related variables is reported in Table 23. The replication sample is 
smaller than a sample in Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), which can raise 
some issues considering the validity of the results, primarily linked with the 
completeness of the data in Datastream and Bloomberg databases.  
 
Table 23. Basic descriptive statistics for a matching sample of acquirers 
and targets (replication sample, 1990-2004). 
 Replication sample Sample by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) 
 Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff 
Rel-Nii-
Ti 
Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff 
Rel-Nii-
Ti 
Mean 1.81 1.09 1.22 1.47 4.69 2.10 2.41 1.28 1.16 0.82 0.88 0.85 
Median 1.02 1.08 1.03 0.94 0.80 0.67 1.42 1.19 1.05 0.69 0.89 0.83 
St. Dev 2.83 0.11 0.77 1.71 12.96 4.60 2.82 0.26 0.50 0.76 0.17 0.25 
Obs 21 21 21 21 21 21 48 48 48 48 48 48 
 
Notes: Relroe is the ratio of the ROE of the acquirers to the ROE of the targets, Relsize is the ratio of the natural 
logarithms of assets of the acquirers to the natural logarithm of assets of the targets, Relliq is the loans to deposits ratio of the 
acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Relprov is the provisions to total loans ratio of the acquirers divided by 
the respective ratio of the targets, Releff is the cost to income ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, 
Rel_Nii_Ti is the proportion of the interest-related income of the acquirers divided by the respective proportion of the targets. 
 
Table 24a reports the results of the regression analysis for the subsample of 
bidders. Again, univariate regression technique is applied first, further followed by a 
multivariate regression that includes significant variables from the univariate 
regression stage. Finally, multivariate probit estimation is utilised. The findings 
suggest that the fundamentals based on the accounting data provide a weak 
explanation of the short-run abnormal returns. Surprisingly, only profitability ratio 
(ROE) is significant in both univariate and multivariate models. It appears that the 
mergers with the lower difference in profitability between the bidder and target 
banks are able to generate higher abnormal returns for the bidders, as homogenous 
structures are easier to integrate in the post-merger period. The results are similar to 
the findings by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), suggesting that using 
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accounting variables is quite an ineffective method to predict the success or failure of 
the banking mergers in the short run. The similar findings are reported for the targets 
as well. In contrast to the initial study, the replication sample results failed to 
demonstrate significant variables in the probit estimation, although Asimakopoulos 
and Athanasoglou (2013) reported the higher difference in size to have a positive 
effect on CARs, and higher cost-to-income ratio and the higher difference in income 
diversification to have a negative effect on abnormal returns. It is noteworthy that 
previous attempts to study the influence of corporate accounting data on the post-
merger CARs have not come to clear conclusions, having produced zero or mixed 
evidence (Lepetit et al., 2004; Beitel et al., 2004). 
 
Table 24a. Factors explaining the abnormal returns of acquirers for the     
(−1, +1) window. 
Panel A: OLS estimation (replication sample, 1990-2004) 
c Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff Rel-Nii-Ti 
R^2-
adjusted 
F (LR for 
probit) 
-1.18*** -0.380*      0.144 0.26 
1.19  1.03     0.002 0.93 
-0.616   -0.087    0.001 0.44 
0.607    0.026   0.001 0.14 
0.464     0.814  0.001 1.00 
0.463      0.081 0.017 0.04 
0.671 -0.504* -2.81 -0.990 -0.061 0.056 0.125 0.223 0.38 
Probit estimation  
-0.474 0.311 -0.999 -0.385 -0.195 1.174 0.894 0.169 3.40 
 
Panel B: OLS estimation (Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013) 
c Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff Rel-Nii-Ti R^2-adjusted F (LR for probit) 
-0.772** 0.114      0.061 1.78 
-1.829  1.035     0.054 0.73 
0.492   -0.851    0.065 1.85 
-0.461    -0.042   0.012 0.91 
0.023     -0.032**  0.043 3.36** 
-0.615      0.132 0.001 0.45 
1.094 0.110 1.207 -0.893 -0.038 -0.029*** 0.201 0.052 1.11 
Probit estimation  
-0.381 0.069 1.292*** -0.931** -0.007 -0.021** 1.696** 0.213 15.25** 
 
Notes: Relroe is the ratio of the ROE of the acquirers to the ROE of the targets, Relsize is the ratio of the natural 
logarithms of assets of the acquirers to the natural logarithm of assets of the targets, Relliq is the loans to deposits ratio of the 
acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Relprov is the provisions to total loans ratio of the acquirers divided by 
the respective ratio of the targets, Releff is the cost to income ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, 
Rel_Nii_Ti is the proportion of the interest-related income of the acquirers divided by the respective proportion of the targets. 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
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Table 24b. Factors explaining the abnormal returns of targets for the (−1, 
+1) window (Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou). 
Panel A: OLS estimation (replication sample) 
c Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff Rel-Nii-Ti R^2-adjusted 
F (LR for 
probit) 
3.62 -0.318      0.012 1.85 
9.44  -5.89     0.007 2.89* 
4.32   -1.04    0.010 0.00 
2.68    0.246   0.003 0.18 
3.29     -0.0519  0.007 1.47 
2.92      -0.0606 0.001 0.92 
06.97 -0.383 -2.54 -1.61 2.11 -0.322 0.0517 0.096 0.38 
Probit estimation  
-1.188 1.231 -0.687 1.188 0.742 -0.315 0.122 0.1570 14.14** 
 
Panel B: OLS estimation (Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013) 
 
c Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff Rel-Nii-Ti R^2-adjusted F (LR for probit) 
3.889** -0.063      0.025 0.18 
-2.841  0.581     0.024 0.21 
3.779   0.017    0.028 0.01 
3.732**    0.021   0.025 0.01 
-1.081     0.548  0.022 0.53 
8.577      -0.642 0.027 0.98 
-7.179 -0.201 0.391 0.018 0.828 0.174 -0.733 0.023 0.78 
Probit estimation  
-0.006 -0.014 0.423 0.048 0.019 0.467 -0.225 0.06 0.49 
 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. c is the constant of the equation, Relroe 
is the ratio of the ROE of the acquirers to the ROE of the targets, Relsize is the ratio of the natural logarithms of assets of the acquirers to the 
natural logarithm of assets of the targets, Relliq is the loans to deposits ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Relprov 
is the provisions to total loans ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Releff is the cost to income ratio of the acquirers 
divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Rel_Nii_Ti is the proportion of the interest-related income of the acquirers divided by the respective 
proportion of the targets. For the probit estimation, all variables take the value of 1 when their values are above the cross-section median and the 
value of zero otherwise. R2 are adjusted R2 for OLS estimations and McFadden R2 for the probit estimations, F and LR are the F and the 
likelihood ratio statistics for the OLS and the probit estimations respectively. 
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5.2. Extended sample (1990-2015) 
In the next step, the key objective is to extend the study to the longer period up 
to 2015 to include the whole period between first European initiatives to harmonise 
the financial sector and the 5th merger wave up to the most recent times (the year 
2015). The rationale behind this sample selection can be found in more detail at the 
beginning of chapter 4.2. The same filtering criteria as for the replication procedure 
are applied to the merger deals between European banks in 1990-2015. According to 
the latest researchers that aim to investigate the phenomenon of the banking M&A‘s 
in Europe, it is important to treat the European Union as the integral entity of 
increasingly homogenous financial systems (Fiordelisi et al., 2008; Koehler, 2009). 
Thus, the logic of recent papers suggests that the European financial environment 
should be considered in the broadest sense, including the countries that joined the EU 
after 1990 (ibid). The compromise decision considering the final sample is to include 
only those merger deals, which occurred in the particular country after it has become 
a member of the EU. Thus, the scope comprises the entire European financial sector, 
and simultaneously only the deals in the developed financial systems are analysed.  
5.2.1. Sample and data characteristics 
The results of the cross-country tabulation in Table 25 have shown that the 
Italian banking sector is the most active (resulting in 139 merger deals), while the 
second and the third largest markets for banking M&A‘s were Spain (50 
acquisitions) and Germany (40 takeovers). As was previously outlined, the three 
above-mentioned countries of bidders‘ origin (Italy, Spain and Germany) contribute 
for almost more than a half of the total banking M&A‘s in the investigated period. 
These preliminary findings can indicate that the new EU members have influenced 
the processes of the banking consolidation very weakly, primarily due to a low 
number and volume of the merger deals. However, the total number of the deals 
between 1990 and 2015 is much higher than in 1990-2005, suggesting that the 
processes of banking sector consolidation were intensifying after 2005, but the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 terminated them or at least slowed down considerably. 
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Table 25. Distribution of sample deals by bidders’ and targets’ countries of origin (sample of 1990-2015). 
The table shows the geographical distribution of sample bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) and the new European Union members during 1990–2015. New EU members include the ten countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004, 1 January 
2007 and 1 January 2013: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. A bidder is included in the sample if it is categorised as a 
bank in the Thomson SDC database, is listed on a stock exchange in one of the above-mentioned 28 European member countries, and has participated in the M&A activities between 01.01.1990 and 31.12.2015. 
 
 Target Nation   
 
                      
Acquirer Nation AT BE BG CRO CYP CZ DN EST FIN FR GER GR HUN IRL IT LV LT LUX NED POL PT RO SK SP SW UK Total 
AT 9 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 18 
BE 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 19 
BG 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CZ 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
DN 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 29 
FIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 
GER 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 23 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 2 0 0 40 
GR 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 28 
HUN 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
IRL 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 
IT 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 125 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 0 1 139 
LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 
NED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 
POL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 0 2 0 0 10 
RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
SP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 35 0 4 50 
SW 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 7 0 24 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 10 18 
Total 11 8 8 1 1 4 33 3 4 31 32 19 4 4 140 1 1 3 4 41 15 13 6 47 9 16 459 
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Further, Table 26 demonstrates that almost all bidders are listed financial 
entities, with only 3 private bidders involved into M&A processes throughout the 
investigated period. The preliminary data analysis shows that average deal size is 
almost $805 million, which is significantly lower than average deal size in a 
narrower sample of 1990-2005 ($940.8 million). These findings suggest that the 
financial consolidation in the banking sector continued at the expense of smaller 
banks after 2005. Furthermore, as was expected, the average value of the domestic 
deals is slightly higher than the average value of the cross-border deals ($819.4 
million and $779.2 million respectively). It is worth admitting, that the difference 
between domestic and cross-border deals is much lower than for the sample of 1990-
2005 (when the average domestic deal was around $1.09 billion and cross-border 
around $0.59 billion), possibly because of the following reason. As the financial 
systems of the European Union members became more and more homogenised, the 
risks that accompany cross-border mergers decreased, resulting in high-value 
international bank takeovers. Thus, it is obvious that larger cross-border mergers 
occurred during the last decade of 2005-2015, signalling about further phases of 
consolidation between larger European banks, encouraging international mega-
mergers. Also, as was expected, the average size of the international acquirer is 
higher comparing to the domestic bidders ($16.3 billion and approximately $9.2 
billion respectively). Simultaneously, the extended sample demonstrates that the 
average size of bidders has also increased slightly if compared to the sample of 1990-
2015 (approximately by 12% for domestic bidders and 26% for cross-border 
acquirers, 18.3% for the total sample). 
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Table 26. Sample characteristics (sample of 1990-2015). 
Bids announced by banks based within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) during 1990–2015 are included 
in the sample. The sample ensures that the bidder is categorised as a bank in the Thomson SDC database, listed on a stock 
exchange in one of the 28 European member countries, bidders‘ share price is available from Datastream. For a given deal, the 
deal value is reported in US dollars. 
 
Panel A. Sample distribution of the European banking M&A announcements. 
 
  Replication sample 
Bidders Total Listed targets Unlisted targets 
  Domestic Cross-border Domestic Cross-border 
Listed 456 224 142 64 26 
Not listed 3 3 - - - 
Total 459 227 142 64 26 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics. 
 Domestic bidders Foreign bidders All bidders 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. 
Shares acquired 
(%) 
58.80 56.30 39.12 51.29 50 40.24 55.95 51.15 39.67 
Deal Value (in $ 
million) 
819.40 154.27 2490.81 779.22 134.36 2462.34 804.99 145.66 2476.65 
MV of bidders 
(in million $) 
9207.37 3123.75 17006.95 16304.36 8108.68 20079.81 11804.97 4682.05 18489.78 
5.2.2. Empirical results 
5.2.2.1. M&A announcement and market reaction  
In line with the paper by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) and the 
previous replication attempt for 1990-2005, the patterns of the abnormal returns for 
bidders and targets are studied. Firstly, the important aspect of the day-to-day 
behaviour of the abnormal returns is analysed and reported in Figure 4 for the sample 
of 1990-2015. Similar to the findings in the previous chapter, the general pattern of 
the CARs for both bidders and targets is almost identical to the expected 
configuration. The abnormal returns for acquirers show almost zero reaction on the 
announcement date, gradually moving into the negative zone around the 8
th
 day after 
the event date. On the other hand, the behaviour of the targets‘ CARs reflects the 
positive attitude of the market investors towards the opportunity to arbitrage on the 
merger-related stock premiums. The dramatic positive increase in CARs on the -1
st
 
and zero day is observable; abnormal returns grow up to maximum values of almost 
+6% on the 1
st
 day after the announcement. Further, the positive effect persists for 
almost 15 days with brief falls around the 6
th
 and 10
th
 day after the announcement 
day. This trend is generally following the trend that was found for the 1990-2005 
sample, differing only in above-mentioned negative daily reactions on the 6
th
 and the 
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10
th
 days. The run-up period, which is currently quite widely mentioned in the 
literature (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Beltratti and Paladino, 2013) is also present in 
the results for the subsample of targets: the positive market reaction builds up 
beginning from the 13
th
 day prior to the announcement, which is very similar to the 
run-up reaction since the 12
th
 day prior to the announcement for the 1990-2005 
sample. This effect can probably be caused by the market imperfections (information 
leakage, insider information, etc.), which can be more the case for the new EU-
members comparing to the EU-15. 
 
Figure 4. Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers and targets (sample 
of 1990-2015) 
 
 
Generally, the analysis of CARs for banking mergers in 1990-2015 has 
demonstrated that findings are in line with the initial paper by Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou (2013) and are very close to the results for the sample of 1990-2005. 
As was expected, OLS estimations are downward biased if compared with the 
GARCH estimations. On average, bidders‘ abnormal returns are insignificant and 
negative (or close to zero) in all analysed event windows. The number of bidders 
with positive CARs is almost equal to the number of acquirers with negative CARs. 
On the other hand, the market reaction to the targets‘ involvement into M&A‘s is 
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positively reflected on the stock returns: targets‘ shareholders gain almost +1.06% on 
the announcement date and approximately +3.95% in (-20;+20) event window. It is 
worth admitting, that targets‘ abnormal returns are positive in all analysed event 
windows. Again, the obtained results are completely in line with the existing 
literature that utilises event study approach as a key methodology. The hypothesis of 
value creation for the bidders is rejected, while targets‘ shareholders can expect the 
growth of the company‘s value, implying positive market expectations of the future 
synergy gains exist. Beitel et al., (2004), Cybo-Ottone & Murgia (2000) and Ismail & 
Davidson (2005) have drawn similar conclusions in their studies.  
 
Table 27. Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers and targets at 
various intervals (total sample, a sample of 1990-2015). 
 
Event 
window 
Acquirers (N=459) Targets (N=187) 
CAR (%) No. of deals CAR (%) No. of deals 
OLS GARCH 
With 
positive 
CAR 
(OLS) 
With negative 
CAR (OLS) 
OLS GARCH 
With positive 
CAR (OLS) 
With negative 
CAR (OLS) 
(-20;0) -0.12 -0.02 232 233 2.581,2 2.781,2 100 87 
(-10;0) -0.10 -0.02 227 237 2.13 2.22 104 83 
(-1;1) -0.35 -0.23 211 254 2.971,2 2.991 114 73 
(0) -0.07 0.02 222 241 1.06 1.02 100 87 
(-10;10) -0.12 -0.37 229 235 3.601,2 3.801,2 100 87 
(-20;20) -0.67 -0.77 221 245 3.951,2 4.351,2 88 99 
 
Table 28. Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers for different 
classifications of targets (GARCH estimation, a sample of 1990-2015). 
 
Event 
window 
Target listed (N=366) Target not-listed (N=90) 
CAR (%) 
CAR 
difference 
CAR (%) 
CAR 
difference 
Domestic 
deals 
(N=224) 
Cross-border 
deals (N=142) 
Domestic 
deals (N=64) 
Cross-border 
deals (N=26) 
(-20;0) 0.70 -0.21 0.92 -1.591,2 -1.441,2 -0.16 
(-10;0) 0.83 -0.41 1.24* -1.771,2 -0.96 -0.82 
(-1;1) -0.10 -0.37 0.28 -0.49 0.07 -0.55 
(0) 0.19 -0.18 0.36 -0.22 0.18 -0.40 
(-10;10) 0.79 -1.03 1.81** -2.471,2 -1.79 -0.68 
(-20;20) 0.50 -1.361,2 1.86** -2.851,2 -3.421,2 0.57 
 
Notes: 1, 2 denote significance at the 5% level of significance for the BMP and the Corrado tests respectively. * (**) 
denote significance at the 5% (10%) level of significance for the CAR difference (t-test). 
 
Further, the difference in the abnormal returns for bidders regarding the listed 
status of the target bank was studied. The results for domestic and cross-border 
M&A‘s are presented in Table 28. CARs were estimated by asymmetric GARCH 
technique. As is obvious from Table 28, it can be concluded that domestic M&A‘s 
outperform cross-border deals with listed targets. For instance, average CARs for the 
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domestic bidders are +0.19%, whereas international takeovers result in -0.18% losses 
for the acquirers on the announcement date. These observations are similar for all 
event windows: for longer event windows the difference between CARs is larger 
(compare +0.50% for domestic M&A‘s and -1.36% for international M&A‘s in (-
20;+20) event window). Such difference can be attributed to the number of additional 
risks related to the cross-border expansion and international M&A‘s, which makes 
the market estimation of future gains more pessimistic. Similar to the previous 
findings, results for the bidders acquiring private targets testify, that abnormal returns 
in almost all event windows are negative. Both domestic and cross-border M&A‘s 
result in value destruction for the acquirers in the longer event windows (-2.47% and 
-1.79% respectively for the (-10;+10) event window and -2.85% and -3.42% for (-
20;+20) event window). It is obvious that negative abnormal returns for the bidders 
involved in acquisitions with private targets can be explained by the lack of 
information considering target companies. In other words, the market investors are 
unable to estimate the quality and the composition of the acquired assets, thus 
reacting negatively to the perspective of future post-merger synergy gains. In 
general, above-mentioned results are in line with the initial findings by Cybo-Ottone 
and Murgia (2000) and Lepetit et al. (2004).  
5.2.2.2. The determinants of value creation. 
a) Estimations based on OLS 
After analysing the abnormal returns with respect to the bank-related factors 
(public status, country of origin), it is necessary to apply regression analysis to 
estimate the key deal-related factors and accounting variables that are considered to 
be important in the existing literature (particularly, in Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou, 2013). CARs for the (-1;+1) event window were selected as a 
dependent variable, as the abnormal returns from the shortest event window are less 
vulnerable to statistical problems and information leakages, but three days around 
announcement are considered to be able to incorporate the market reaction fully. The 
approach taken by Beitel et al. (2004), Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Ismail and 
Davidson (2005) is followed. The set of explanatory variables is identical to 
Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) and was described in detail at the 
beginning of the previous chapter, where the paper by Asimakopoulos and 
Athanasoglou (2013) was replicated.  
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Similarly to the analysis of the replication sample, univariate models are first 
applied in order to establish the separate role of each explanatory variable and to 
determine significant variables for the multivariate regression. The obtained results 
have shown following. Firstly, the findings presented in Table 29a suggest that 
several variables are significant. The target dummy is significant at 1% level, 
implying that targets tend to receive higher abnormal returns after the merger 
announcement, which is in line with the initial hypothesis. Further, provisions-to-
loans seem to have a positive impact on CARs, implying that higher volume of loan-
guaranteeing funds provides positive signal to the market investors. Interestingly, 
deal value and company size were found to be significant at 1% level and in reverse 
relationship with abnormal returns. These results provide an indication that larger 
banks involved into larger deals are expected to obtain lower CARs and to 
experience problems during the period of the post-merger integration, following the 
market‘s point of view (possibly because of high costs and transactional expenses 
due to complicated and layered structured of the financial companies). The obtained 
results are somehow different from the findings considering the period of 1990-2005, 
primarily because of significance for the factors of the deal value and company size. 
Simultaneously, the findings for the broader sample period testify that the accounting 
variables (namely, ROE) and the year of the acquisition do not play any role in the 
value creation or destruction in the short run. Further, several multivariate regression 
specifications were analysed, including all significant variables from the previous 
univariate analysis. The findings demonstrate that target status dummy, provisions-
to-loans ratio and high market dummy are significant (at 1%, 10% and 5% 
respectively) and positively correlated with the abnormal returns, whereas deal value 
is significant and negatively correlated with short-run CARs. These findings 
primarily support the previous conclusions on the higher merger gains by targets, that 
manage to achieve higher gains in the (-1;+1) horizon (by approximately 3.1%). The 
attempt to exclude the effect of target status resulted in significance for the bank size, 
which implies that mergers among larger banks generate lower short-term value 
gains. It is noteworthy that larger assets cause a negative effect on the post-merger 
abnormal returns. 
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Table 29a. Factors explaining the abnormal returns for the (−1, +1) window (OLS estimation, a sample of 1990-2015). 
 
c Target Dom Listed Cult ROE Size Liq Prov Eff Nii-Ti Value Year R^2 F 
-0.351 3.32***            0.050 34.90* 
0.749**  -0.369           0.001 0.29 
0.135   -0.489          0.001 0.67 
2.20    -0.0264         0.002 1.35 
0.612**     0.0244        0.001 0.04 
9.79***      -0.520***       0.020 10.55* 
0.586**       0.0110      0.001 0.07 
0.147        0.497**     0.009 5.96** 
0.623**         -0.0329    0.001 0.37 
-0.0568          1.76   0.002 1.53 
1.17***           -0.345***  0.017 6.83* 
0.417            1.42* 0.005 2.48 
2.40 3.99***     -0.178  0.505*   -0.374*** 2.02** 0.102 9.35* 
1.10***      -0.609***  0.546*   -0.250* 2.10** 0.057 3.52** 
 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
c is the constant of the equation, Target is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is a target and the value of 0 otherwise, Dom is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the M&A deal is a domestic one and 
the value of 0 otherwise, Listed is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the bank lists its shares in an organised stock exchange and the value of 0 otherwise, Cult measures the cultural distance between the countries 
involved in the deal, ROE is the return of equity, Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Liq is the loans to deposits ratio, Prov is the provisions for loans losses to total loans ratio, Eff is the cost to 
income ratio, Nii_Ti is the contribution of interest related income to total income, Value is the value of the deal and YEAR is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the performance of the stock market was 
positive and the value of zero otherwise  
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Table 29b. Factors explaining the abnormal returns for the (−1, +1) window (Probit estimation, a sample of 1990-2015). 
c Target Dom Listed Cult ROE Size Liq Prov Eff Nii-Ti Value Year 
Pseudo 
R^2 
LR 
-0.101* 0.380***            0.0142 12.82* 
0.012  -0.012           0.0001 0.02 
0.105   -0.105          0.0005 0.46 
0.073    -0.139         0.0019 1.68 
0.027     -0.039        0.0004 0.34 
0.128*      -0.241**       0.0051 4.64 
0.097       -0.179*      0.0028 2.58 
-0.001        0.016     0.0001 0.01 
-0.015         0.048    0.0006 0.55 
0.058          -0.101   0.0009 0.81 
0.008           -  - - 
-0.014            0.156 0.0012 1.09 
0.097 0.325***     -0.151 -0.140 -0.014 0.0585 -0.116   0.0973 17.81*** 
0.247**      -0.242** -0.131 -0.014 0.0506 -0.140   0.0112 10.03* 
0.036 0.335***     -0.117 -0.131      0.0177 15.86*** 
0.172**      -0.207** -0.121      0.0082 7.34** 
 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
c is the constant of the equation, Target is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is a target and the value of 0 otherwise, Dom is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the M&A deal is a domestic 
one and the value of 0 otherwise, Listed is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the bank lists its shares in an organised stock exchange and the value of 0 otherwise, Cult measures the cultural distance between the 
countries involved in the deal, ROE is the return of equity, Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Liq is the loans to deposits ratio, Prov is the provisions for loans losses to total loans ratio, Eff is the 
cost to income ratio, Nii_Ti is the contribution of interest related income to total income, Value is the value of the deal and YEAR is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the performance of the stock market 
was positive and the value of zero otherwise  
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b) Estimation based on Probit method 
Further, Probit estimation was applied to assess the influence of the deal-
related factors and accounting data on the post-merger abnormal returns. As in the 
previous part of replication procedure, the median of variables was utilised as a 
dividing point to transform firm-related variables into dummy variables, taking only 
values of 0 or 1. The results are reported in Table 29b. Similarly to the OLS 
estimation, univariate analysis has demonstrated the significance of several variables, 
namely target dummy (at 1% level), liquidity ratio (loans-to-deposits)(at 10% level) 
and the size of the company (measured as the natural logarithm of total assets)(at 5% 
level). Identically to the OLS estimation, target dummy has a positive influence on 
the CARs, whereas size- and liquidity-related variables are negatively related to the 
post-merger abnormal returns. After estimating the several regression specifications, 
which included accounting variables and significant variables from the univariate 
regressions, it was revealed that the best model with R-squared of approximately 
9.7% denotes target company dummy as the only significant variable. It is in line 
with our previous findings that targets are massively outperforming bidders in the 
European banking M&A‘s, and the status of acquired bank increases the probability 
to achieve value growth after the merger announcement.  
 
c) Determinants of the share price reaction of acquirers and targets 
Further, the necessity to distinguish between bidders and targets was actualised 
by the construction of the combined dataset, which included matched deals with full 
stock prices information and accounting data for both acquirers and bidders. The 
descriptive statistics of the implemented variables is presented in Table 30, 
indicating that acquirers compared to targets are in general more profitable, larger, 
have more liquid assets, have higher credit risk, are less efficient, and their income 
sources are less diversified.  
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Table 30. Basic descriptive statistics for a matching sample of acquirers 
and targets (sample of 1990-2015). 
 
Sample of 1990-2015 Sample by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) 
Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff 
Rel-
Nii-
Ti 
Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff 
Rel-
Nii-
Ti 
Mean 2.4 1.10 1.19 0.84 1.11 3.36 2.41 1.28 1.16 0.82 0.88 0.85 
Median 1.04 1.08 1.08 0.79 0.64 0.89 1.42 1.19 1.05 0.69 0.89 0.83 
St. Dev 12.7 0.11 0.68 3.67 3.06 20.6 2.82 0.26 0.50 0.76 0.17 0.25 
Obs 65 65 65 63 65 65 48 48 48 48 48 48 
 
Notes: Relroe is the ratio of the ROE of the acquirers to the ROE of the targets, Relsize is the ratio of the natural 
logarithms of assets of the acquirers to the natural logarithm of assets of the targets, Relliq is the loans to deposits ratio of the 
acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Relprov is the provisions to total loans ratio of the acquirers divided by 
the respective ratio of the targets, Releff is the cost to income ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, 
Rel_Nii_Ti is the proportion of the interest-related income of the acquirers divided by the respective proportion of the targets. 
 
Table 31 presents the results of the OLS regression analysis of accounting data 
variables. As was done before, firstly univariate regressions are applied, followed by 
wider inclusion of significant variables. Finally, probit estimation is deployed.  
Surprisingly, the findings for bidders suggest that, in contrast to the results in a 
paper by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), there is no significant connection 
between independent variables and abnormal returns. Furthermore, the regression 
analysis for targets did not find any significant variables as well, except relative size, 
which seems to have significant positive effect on the post-merger CARs (at 1% 
significance level). This result leads to the conclusion that the larger is the difference 
between sizes of targets and bidders, the lower are value gains for the acquirers‘ 
shareholders. This is contradicting to the theory that assumes higher value creation in 
the merger deals between large bidders and small targets, as integration is simple and 
cost-effective (Pasiouras et al., 2007). Possibly, market investors do not expect 
valuable synergy gains from the merger of size-differing banks. Furthermore, 
although no other variables were found to be significant, the estimations for the 
subsample of matched bidders has shown, that shareholders of the involved banks 
obtain higher abnormal returns when the bidder is more profitable, more liquid and 
more efficient than the target. By contrast, the findings indicate that bidders‘ 
shareholders experience lower CARs when the target is less exposed to the credit risk 
(have higher provisions-to-loans ratio). Considering the targets, the results reinforce 
the previous findings, that the status of a target is itself a positive factor for the 
growth of shareholders‘ wealth. The lower size of a target is significant (at 1%) and 
positively correlated with abnormal returns, implying that the most profitable type of 
mergers for the target banks is to be taken over by a giant banking institution. In 
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general, looking at the signs of the estimated coefficients, the findings testify that 
targets‘ shareholders receive larger gains when the merger deal involves a more 
profitable, more liquid, less diversified and less effective bank. 
The deployed probit regressions did not clarify the CARs behaviour any 
further, as none of the variables was found to be significant. In contrast to the 
previous findings, no evidence of importance for the factors of profitability, 
efficiency and liquidity was found. The previous studies also failed to establish a 
significant connection by applying probit technique (Beitel et al., 2004; Lepetit et al., 
2004). 
 
Table 31. Factors explaining the abnormal returns of acquirers and 
targets for the (−1, +1) window (sample of 1990-2015). 
Panel A: Acquirers (OLS estimation) 
c Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff 
Rel-
Nii-Ti 
R^2-
adjusted 
F (LR for 
probit) 
-1.18*** 0.027      0.004 0.26 
5.27  -5.810     0.015 0.93 
-1.91   0.668    0.007 0.44 
-0.877    -0.071   0.002 0.14 
-1.36***     0.222  0.016 1.00 
-1.14      0.066 0.001 0.04 
5.03 0.022 -6.220 0.530 -0.083 0.203 0.051 0.039 0.38 
Probit estimation  
0.011 0.246 -0.166 -0.065 -0.511 0.437 0.863 0.038 3.40 
 
Panel B: Targets (OLS estimation) 
c Relroe Relsize Relliq Relprov Releff 
Rel-
Nii-Ti 
R^2-
adjusted 
F (LR for 
probit) 
04.38* 0.146      0.029 1.85 
-7.60  20.3***     0.044 2.89 
4.84***   -0.091    0.000 0.00 
4.65*    0.164   0.003 0.18 
5.33*     -0.542  0.023 1.47 
4.52*      0.064 0.014 0.92 
5.03 0.022 -6.22 0.53 -0.083 0.203 0.051 0.039 0.38 
Probit estimation  
-1.631 0.468 0.996 1.081 -0.296 0.016 0.998 0.157 14.14** 
 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. c is the constant of the 
equation, Relroe is the ratio of the ROE of the acquirers to the ROE of the targets, Relsize is the ratio of the natural logarithms 
of assets of the acquirers to the natural logarithm of assets of the targets, Relliq is the loans to deposits ratio of the acquirers 
divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Relprov is the provisions to total loans ratio of the acquirers divided by the 
respective ratio of the targets, Releff is the cost to income ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, 
Rel_Nii_Ti is the proportion of the interest-related income of the acquirers divided by the respective proportion of the targets. 
For the probit estimation, all variables take the value of 1 when their values are above the cross-section median and the value of 
zero otherwise. R2 are adjusted R2 for OLS estimations and McFadden R2 for the probit estimations, F and LR are the F and 
the likelihood ratio statistics for the OLS and the probit estimations respectively. 
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5.3. Conclusion  
 
The study of Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) on the European 
banking mergers was replicated and extended the initial period of 1990-2004 up to 
2015. The short-run post-merger outcomes for the European banking mergers were 
investigated, and it was revealed that the obtained results were in line with the initial 
findings by authors. Primarily, the almost identical behaviour of the stock returns for 
bidders and targets around the announcement date was observed: persistent positive 
abnormal returns for targets and negative or zero abnormal returns for bidders. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of the ―price run-up‖ prior to the announcement date 
was also confirmed (since the 10
th
 day before the deal). Generally, no decisive 
evidence was found to support the hypothesis that bidders‘ shareholders create value. 
The targets, however, are able to increase the wealth of shareholders by 
approximately +2.5% in the (-1;+1) event window. Domestic M&A‘s were found to 
be outperforming cross-border acquisitions, supporting the hypothesis that the 
market investors are discouraged with risks connected with international expansion. 
Thus, even despite the efforts of the European authorities to harmonise the financial 
markets, cross-border mergers are still not creating value for the bidders. The results 
for the extended sample that incorporates all the merger deals beginning from the 
1990s to 2015 in the EU-28 have shown similar behaviour for the CARs: strong 
positive reaction for the bidders and insignificant, zero-close abnormal returns for the 
bidders. It was also found that domestic M&A‘s outperform cross-border 
acquisitions.  
The regression analysis has shown that accounting data has little influence on 
the short-term merger outcomes. Among the accounting-related variables, only 
profitability and provisions-to-loans ratio profitability were reported to be 
significant. The most important deal-related factors were bank size and target status. 
On average, the results provide slightly less explanatory power for the variables than 
the findings by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013), although there is evidence 
that smaller and less profitable banks generate higher CARs for both bidders and 
targets. After analysing the sample of 1990-2015, it was found that the most value-
generating mergers are deals between smaller banks with higher profitability and 
lower credit risks.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The European banking industry has undergone a series of changes and 
transformations since the early 1990s when the EU authorities initiated the processes 
to form the common financial market. Since then, the European Union has increased 
the number of member countries to 28 states, adopted crucial changes in the 
legislation, and introduced the new common currency – euro. The banking sector 
became more internationalised, and the financial institutions consolidated more 
actively, mainly by involving themselves into M&A‘s. The objective of the thesis 
was to re-assess the short-run results of takeovers, utilising the combination of 
market-based and accounting data approaches. The key focus of the research was 
concentrated on the replication of the existing papers by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) 
and Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) and extending the scope of the studies 
to assess the effect of the global financial crisis on the banking M&A‘s outcomes..  
First, the study by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) was replicated, and the analysis 
was extended to the broader sample comprising the period between 1990 and 2015. 
Several sub-periods were outlined: the pre-euro (1990-1995), ―run-up‖ to the euro 
(1996-1998) and post-euro period (2000-2004)(to reflect the role of the adoption of 
the euro). In the same manner, the effects of the financial crisis were captured by 
distinguishing four periods: the initial period of growth (1990-2000), pre-crisis 
period (2001-October 2007), the period of the financial crisis (November 2007-
December 2009), post-crisis period (2010-2015). The findings testify that CARs for 
the banking mergers decreased after the adoption of the euro, reflecting the tighter 
competition among banking institutions. This negative effect definitely outweighed 
the positive effect of eliminated currency-related barriers between EU member states. 
Similar to the results by Ekkayokkaya et al., (2009) the largest value gains were 
observed during ―run-up‖ period (1996-1998), whereas the post-euro period resulted 
in the poorest short-run abnormal returns for acquirer banks. These findings testify 
that some European banks were able to anticipate the introduction of the euro and 
benefit from positive market conditions.  
The role of the Eurozone membership was also analysed. The mergers 
involving targets outside the Eurozone show much better results, resulting in the 
significant value creation in the post-euro period. Remarkably, the same trend is 
observable for the post-crisis period (2010-2015), when acquirers obtained 
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significant average gains of +1.69%. These findings indicate that the competition for 
the banking assets in the Eurozone after the elimination of barriers and introduction 
of the euro has increased, motivating European banks to look elsewhere for takeover 
targets. Furthermore, our results also imply, as was previously indicated, that the 
market investors are highly appreciating the efforts to diversify geographically, 
rewarding acquirers with higher returns.  
Even more clear results were obtained for the role of the financial crisis. The 
period between 2007 and 2009 was devastating for the bidder banks that engaged 
into M&A‘s. On average, acquirers‘ shareholders were losing almost -1.15% of their 
wealth in the short run horizon (up to 10 days around the announcement date). 
Interestingly, focused domestic acquisitions suffered the worst losses, which can be 
interpreted as market‘s good attitude towards the operational and geographic types of 
diversification, which are demanded from banks in terms of the crisis. Nevertheless, 
only mergers between banks and investment firms resulted in positive CARs for the 
acquirers in the analysed period. Overall, the financial crisis was a major negative 
factor responsible for extremely poor merger outcomes and the decrease of the 
number and the volume of the acquisitions in the EU. The banking institutions 
appeared to be unable to benefit from low premiums, as the sceptical market attitude 
towards possible future synergy gains made the wealth gains impossible for the 
bidders. 
Overall, the results of the analysis indicate that both external shocks 
(introduction of the euro and global financial crisis) had significant negative impact 
on the abnormal returns of the bidder banks and rejected the possibility to increase 
shareholders‘ wealth for acquirers.  
Further, the combined approach by Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) 
was applied, and the analysis in Chapter 5 implemented both market-based and 
accounting data approaches to estimate the role of deal-specific and bank-specific 
factors in the process of the post-merger value creation. By applying event study 
approach and further regression analysis (OLS, GARCH and Probit estimation 
techniques), extended sample of banking merger deals in 1990-2015 was examined. 
Unlikely to the existing literature, the European Union was considered in its modern 
configuration of EU-28, reflecting the converging financial markets and banking 
sectors of the member states. 
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Overall, the findings of Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) were 
confirmed. In line with the existing literature on banking mergers, it was found that 
bidders do not create value for their shareholders in the short run. On the other hand, 
targets‘ shareholders experience substantial and significant growth in value 
(approximately +3.6% in the horizon of 10 days after the announcement). Other 
interesting evidence is that cross-border M&A‘s do not create gains for bidders, and 
can be even value-destroying in some cases. This finding primarily demonstrates the 
concerns of investors for the information transparency in the international scope, 
legislative and regulatory barriers between EU member countries, cultural 
differences, etc. As a result, it is highly probable that the financial homogenization 
processes that started in the EU in the early 1990s are still far from completion. The 
market beliefs are still cautious towards the potential perspectives of international 
synergy-creating banking mergers.  
The regression analysis demonstrated that accounting variables are weak in 
explaining short-run merger outcomes. It was observed that the large size of the 
involved companies and the deal value are negatively correlated with the post-deal 
value creation. This finding can be explained by high costs of the post-merger 
integration and problems with setting up the harmonised structure of the combined 
entity, implying that larger mergers are less likely to result in positive synergies after 
the acquisition. The proxy to estimate credit risk, provisions-to-loans-ratio, is the 
only accounting variable that was found to be significant and positively correlated 
with the wealth gains for both targets and bidders, confirming the initial hypothesis 
that financial stability remains an important part of the strategy allowing to involve 
into M&A‘s effectively and successfully.  
Overall, it was confirmed that the European banking mergers are not value-
creating. Furthermore, the market inefficiencies still hinder the cross-border 
expansion, as banks prefer to be active more in the domestic markets (although the 
majority of such mergers are value destroying as well). These findings lead to the 
conclusion that synergy motive is not valid in the European banking mergers, 
whereas hubris and agency theories seem to explain the M&A activities better. 
Among the obvious implications of the thesis the following can be mentioned. First, 
the managers and other decision-makers of the banking institutions would be able to 
define the optimal targets according to the deal configuration and accounting 
variables. Second, the general advise for the banking institutions is to refrain from 
174 
 
being involved into M&A‘ during the periods of external shocks (financial crisis) or 
regulatory transformations (introduction of common currency etc.). Thirdly, the 
market is much more actively reacting to the deal parameters (cash payment, listed 
status) comparing to the accounting data variables. Thus, it is highly probable that 
choosing appropriate payment type can be more value-generating strategy in the 
short-term. 
Finally, the limitations of the thesis should also be outlined. First, the analysis 
focuses on publicly available data only (due to data availability and access to the 
databases with relevant financial data). Thus, the substantial number of private 
banking institutions is excluded from the investigation. Secondly, the thesis omits the 
aspect of government-related acquisitions, nationalisations, bail-outs or forced 
mergers. As the problem of liquidity crisis intensified since 2010, more banks were 
struggling to cope with regulations and stable performance. However, the number of 
such government-related takeovers is relatively few in the scope of the banking 
sector in general. Additionally, data availability and information transparency are 
also problem issues if this category of banking mergers is studied. Finally, 
combining event study approach with more sophisticated accounting-based methods 
(DEA, SFA) can be the more effective approach, as short-term market assessment 
and long-term consequences for the banks‘ efficiency can be analysed jointly. 
To sum up, the thesis provides a comprehensive examination of short-term 
outcomes of the European banking M&A‘s from different perspectives. The results 
are in line with the existing literature, confirming zero wealth gains for the bidders at 
best, and high exposure of M&A outcomes to the external shocks. These findings 
may help potential investors to find optimal value-enhancing strategies and obtain 
maximum benefits from potential M&A activities. 
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